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The Antioch Review

New Fighting Orders For Liberals

—James MacGregor Burns

— *CONTROVERSY* —

"The German Mind"

KURT GLASER *and* ALEX INKELES

Communists in Colleges

RALPH F. FUCHS *and* ROBERT M. HUNTER

Does the World Move Toward Empire?

—William G. Carleton

The White Problem in the South

—Peter A. Carmichael

Stories by RAYA KEEN *and* J. L. TELLER

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A National Quarterly — Published in Yellow Springs, Ohio

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Contents

New Fighting Orders for Liberals 131
JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS

The So-Called German Mind 146
KURT GLASER

National Character and Social Structure 155
(Comments on Glaser) ALEX INKELES

Goethe Slept Here 163
ALFRED WERNER

Sign of the Times ..... *A Poem* ... 171
SAMUEL YELLEN

Does the World Move Toward Empire? 172
WILLIAM G. CARLETON

Epitaph for an Empty Grave ..... *A Poem* ... 192
WILLARD N. MARSH

Nothing Trivial ..... *A Story* ... 193
RAYA KEEN

Communists in the Colleges: Two Views 199
R. F. FUCHS and R. M. HUNTER

The White Problem in the South 210
PETER A. CARMICHAEL

A Ring On Every Finger ..... *A Poem* ... 218
LEE RICHARD HAYMAN

Education As Experiment 219
HAROLD TAYLOR

"Goyim" ..... *An Autobiographical Sketch* ... 236
J. L. TELLER

Books 243

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Editors' Shop Talk

Better than fifty per cent of our readers responded to our survey-queries as to what they thought of the *Review*. Those who keep score on such things tell us that this is a phenomenally high return. We are gratified and appreciative that so many readers took the time to help us. It also makes a considerable heap of data to tabulate and analyze. The full report has had to be postponed to the next issue.

It doesn't require punch cards and correlation tables, however, to see that our readers are informed and articulate. They are intensely interested in the world of ideas and events and they write very well indeed. A magazine like the *Review* should be a two-way communication hookup. We would like to establish a large, lively LETTERS department of the magazine beginning with the next issue. A consistently favorite criticism of the magazine on the questionnaire was "needs more opposing points of view." We are experimenting with the pro and con approach in this issue (pages 146-162 and 199-209). Let's have some further "points of view" from our readers.

* * *

Our Fall Issue will have one (possibly two) articles on the Nationalization Program in Britain and a survey of creative writing in England today. Ben Lewis contributes an article on the marriage-for-keeps which has occurred between economics and government. He calls it, "It's Political (Repeat Political) Economy." We wish to note in passing that Mr. Lewis is one writer on economic problems whose articles can be read for their sparkle and entertainment-value even by those who are eager to leave the "dismal science" strictly in the hands of the experts.

Other items in our next issue: a sociologist examines the extraordinary blend of reality and fantasy that is Texas; Jim Cork analyzes the relation between philosophers John Dewey and Karl Marx; and an anthropologist discusses the loneliness, the social atomization, of our cities.

* * *

Like new housing and automobiles, printing costs have moved up onto what looks like a long-time plateau of about twice the altitude of the pre-war "normal." At the same time, the percentage returns from standard methods of recruiting new subscribers have dropped to about half of what they were (and the costs of these campaigns have gone up along with printing-postage rises). A magazine like the *Review*—which pays its printer, its contributors, its Uncle Sam's mailmen, but not its editors—has practically nothing in its budget which it can live without.

All this is not leading up to an "appeal"—merely noting some of the facts of postwar life in a-commercial publishing. We are going to have to explore new methods for attracting and holding circulation. Perhaps we will call on our subscribers and readers later for (non-financial) help on some of these explorations.

New Fighting Orders For Liberals

By JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS

LIBERALISM IS A SOLDIER who has won many battles in the continuing war of the human spirit, but who must now shift to a new front," wrote Max Lerner in his notable volume, *It Is Later Than You Think*. "He has been travelling along dusty roads and through difficult terrain to reach it. Now that he is there he needs a new uniform, new ammunition, new fighting orders."

It is over a decade since Mr. Lerner wrote this. Where are the new fighting orders? The answer, I think, is that they are being held up by a basic dispute over strategy within the liberal camp. This dispute concerns the very issue on which Mr. Lerner wrote so eloquently—the premises and the consequences of economic planning and majority rule.

The cleavage is sharp. On the one hand there are the liberals who want reform but not at the risk of magnifying governmental power; on the other, the liberals who would have the people use their massed power freely in achieving "democratic collectivism" through government. Name-calling is the order of the day. The first variety is called the swivel-chair liberal, facing in all directions but essentially stationary. The second is dismissed as "totalitarian." For liberals the situation is serious. The conflict within their ranks is paralyzing liberalism as an intellectual force and may cripple it as a program of action.

It is high time that we define the central issue and try to come to grips with it. To talk about the need for new fighting orders may seem strange when the old ones have not been carried out, when the Fair Deal is being mangled in Congress. In view of the continued liberal temper of the American people as revealed in the 1948 election, however, one can be rather optimistic about the enactment of the

---

One of JAMES M. BURNS's first published articles, "Hitler, Roosevelt, and the Battle of Symbols," appeared in the *Antioch Review* for Fall, 1942. Since then he has taught at Williams College, been in government service and worked with the Hoover Commission. His book, *Congress on Trial*, has just been published by Harper.

remaining program of the New Deal-Fair Deal. Much of the basic program has been undertaken—social security, minimum wages, business regulation, better housing, stabilizing income, and the like. Even with sabotage in Congress, the chances are good that within a few years we will have achieved many of the goals that William G. Carleton described forcefully (yet almost wistfully, for he wrote before the election) in last fall's issue of this journal. It will take hard work and some luck, but it can be done.

What then? Assuming we realize our hopes, where do we go from there? Surely writing the Democratic platform into law will not exhaust the agenda of liberalism. New times, new problems. The strategists of liberal thought and action must look beyond the immediate battlefield to the looming contests that will shape the campaigns of the future.

II

The central issue in the next battle for liberalism will be this: Can the chief end of liberalism—securing the liberties of the individual and enlarging his opportunities for self-realization—be best achieved under a system where government intervenes with a series of piecemeal measures to subsidize, regulate, or administer various areas of the economy, leaving the main burden of economic activity in the hands of largely autonomous groups of business enterprises? Or will this supreme liberal objective be reached more readily in a system where both public and private economic enterprise is subject to central planning and control by government officials responsible to the voters? These alternatives are not all-inclusive; but I believe that they will overshadow all other issues in the political and economic realm.

To pose the problem in this way is, of course, simply to raise anew the ancient question that has always challenged liberal thinkers: Where should limits be set to the power of the government (or the State)? Yet it is to focus the question sharply in terms of the very special conditions of the mid-Twentieth Century. The question facing liberals is no longer: "Should the government intervene in the economy?" That question has long since been answered in the affirmative. The issues now are: "How far?" and "In what manner?" and "On what terms?"

There are two reasons for formulating the dominant liberal issue in terms of an economy centrally planned and controlled by responsible

public officials.[1] In the first place, liberals themselves seem to recognize it as the main issue. Men like John Jewkes and Walter Lippmann, for example, do not question the need for government intervention in the economy. They accept regulation and intervention in various areas, if only to protect the weaker groups in the community or to enforce the conditions of a free market. This acceptance is squarely in the liberal tradition. It was Ramsay Muir, the great British liberal, who said that liberalism involved "a readiness to use the power of the State for the purposes of creating the conditions in which individual energy can thrive, of preventing all abuses of power, of affording to every citizen the means of acquiring mastery of his own capacities, and of establishing a real equality of opportunity for all." And Muir was writing in the tradition of John Stuart Mill.

What Jewkes & Co. hate is the idea of centralizing major economic decisions in the hands of the government. They believe that such centralization, if possible at all, would be oppressive and incompetent. This thesis has been ably argued by other writers such as John Chamberlain, William Aylott Orton, E. Devons, Michael Polyani. Whatever the merits of their argument, they deserve credit for putting their fingers on the crucial issue.

The second reason for regarding central planning and control as the leading issue for liberals today is even more important. That reason involves the trend here and abroad toward increased governmental intervention. In an unplanned and almost haphazard fashion government has come to influence critically many sectors of the economy. The American government, for example, has considerable leverage power—which it often uses in a rather hit-or-miss fashion—over taxes, investment, spending, prices, savings, income. To mention only a few of their activities, public authorities subsidize farmers and veterans, regulate railroads and stock exchanges, operate dams and post offices, own lending corporations and river barges, protect labor unions and investors, finance investment at home and abroad.

Is it possible that our "super-government" can enter more and more deeply into these closely knit areas of our economy without

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[1] I use the term "directed economy" as one connoting both central planning and central control, after the French *économie dirigée*.

causing its policies to collide with one another? It seems unlikely. If only for reasons of efficiency and economy there will be demands for central integration, for co-ordination, for unified control, such as we have seen in the unification of the military establishment. Actually the drive for central direction in the long run will stem from something far deeper—namely the desire of the people as a whole to wield some control over the far-flung operations of government—a control they can keep in their hands only with central planning, management, and responsibility.

This is not to say that central planning and control on democratic terms is inevitable. Our economy probably enjoys enough slack and resiliency to accommodate a large amount of fragmentary and untidy government intervention for some time. In a period of stress we might move directly from such a condition to economic (and perhaps political) totalitarianism, without democratic leavening. What seems to be inevitable is bigger and bigger government. If President Truman can ask for comprehensive public action in a time of high employment and income, such as the present, we can hardly expect the demand for government action to be any less in time of deflation, unemployment, and industrial paralysis, or, of course, in the event of war.

The liberal has come to recognize the inevitability of big government; unlike the conservative, he will not try to turn the clock back to *laissez faire*. What he considers *not* inevitable, but on the contrary as the open and decisive choice ahead of him, is the way in which government will set about accomplishing its constantly enlarged duties.

So much for the statement of the issue. Let us now try to face it. I propose to argue:

1. That a directed economy (i.e., central planning and control by public authorities responsible to the voters) in practice *may or may not* conflict with the liberal objective of enlarged individual freedom;

2. That whether or not it does will not turn simply on abstract formulations of individual rights and duties *but on whether in fact the required administrative mechanisms will give rise to more individual liberty and self-realization than they destroy;*

3. That the problem is one of administrative possibility only initially; it becomes in turn a problem of the *governmental system* as a whole, and ultimately a problem of *political organization and strategy.*

III

"Central planning," says Mr. Jewkes in his recent *Ordeal by Planning,* "ultimately turns every individual into a cipher and every economic decision into blind fumbling, destroys the incentives through which economic progress arises, renders the economic system as unstable as the whims of the few who ultimately control it and creates a system of wire-pulling and privilege in which economic justice ceases to have any meaning." No planned economy, he goes on to say, has yet operated without suppressing free speech, destroying representative government, robbing the consumer of free choice, and virtually abolishing private property. These are strong words. The fact that Mr. Jewkes has lived amid Britain's own experiment with central planning and control gives them special importance.

Mr. Jewkes' fears about free speech and representative government hardly need detain us at a time when the Tories are noisily wheeling up their big guns for next year's election. His example of the trend against free speech—the rushing of the Transport bill through Commons—is not wholly convincing. Far more important is his worry over the implications of central economic and administrative direction for individual freedom. Are consumers free, he asks, to distribute their incomes among different goods as they wish? Are producers at liberty to seek out and satisfy the freely expressed preferences of consumers? Are workers free to choose and change their occupations? Such freedoms, he says, are impossible under central planning and control.

Still, there is much that the "free collectivists," as Walter Lippmann called them, will accept. Government may tax, and it may tax for purposes of social reform. Government may use its influence over investment and spending as means of economic control. Government may take strong action against monopoly. Government may make laws in behalf of the underdog. Government may intervene broadly in the economic system provided it does so to insure the conditions of a free market.

But other things the government must *not* do, according to the Jewkes school of thought. It must not try to control prices on any extensive scale. It must not use priorities and allocations as methods of economic control. It must not try to force labor into new channels. It must not try to direct the production and distribution of goods. It must not

try to nationalize or socialize private enterprise. Thus the "free collectivists" accept a large measure of governmental control—even some central direction, as in the case of taxing and spending—but beyond that they draw the line. To venture beyond that line, they warn, will mean economic breakdown, or despotism, or both.

These warnings are given urgently—yet it is hard to discover concretely from them just where the danger lies in central planning and control that goes beyond the magic line drawn by the "free collectivists." It is hard, that is, unless one rejects government intervention to begin with. But Mr. Jewkes and his fellows do not take that position. They occupy a half-way house. They know that sometimes the only way to protect the individual is to extend the sphere of social control, that liberty is not necessarily inconsistent with discipline and organization. For the problem, as Hobhouse pointed out long ago, is not simply of "increasing or diminishing, but of reorganizing restraints." Certainly the measures that the "free collectivists" hate would reorganize restraints. But would those measures necessarily increase the net total of restraints?

Take price control and rationing. The administration of prices on a large scale involves an elaborate bureaucratic structure, an army of officials, countless forms, and a vast number of rules and regulations. Price control impinges on the consumer at every turn; it affects his freedom of choice with respect to his most elementary needs and wants. At the same time, however, price control—if properly operated—*enlarges* his freedom in other respects. It frees him from some of the unpredictable and capricious consequences of scarcity; it guarantees him certain minima; and it gives him the assurance of a fairly just distribution of what there is. Price control "reorganizes" the restraints on him, to use Hobhouse's term; it does not necessarily increase them. Everything depends on the doing. If prices are equitably and efficiently controlled, any actual decrease in individual freedom would not lie in the control *per se,* but in the objective circumstances (such as war or inflation) that made price control necessary.

The prize exhibit in the "free collectivists' " chamber of horrors, however, is not price control but compulsory direction of labor. The picture of free men and women being torn out of their happy surroundings, bundled across the country, and forced into a deep coal mine is usually enough to make the sternest socialist blanch. But is this picture a true

one? For one thing, "redeployment of labor" in Britain has actually involved moving, none too forcibly, a few "spivs" and "drones" into useful jobs under authority granted to the government for a limited period. But more important, again, is the reorganization of restraints involved. In a crisis period a few persons lose a portion of their occupational freedom (not, be it noted, their freedom to speak and vote against the government) so that the economic underpinnings of the freedom of all Englishmen may be more secure for years to come.

Is there any basic difference between this situation and, say, the restraints put on me as a motorist? I have to exchange my freedom to drive as fast and freely as I wish for the freedom—in common with that of millions of others—to go out on the highways with a measure of security. Everything depends on the fairness and effectiveness of the traffic signs and traffic officers that put restraints upon me.

Another fighting phrase (within the liberal camp) is central planning and control of production. Here again the relativity of freedom must be the ground principle. As many economists have shown and as the war experience proved, intelligent planning for maximum use of resources holds great promise for raising the living standards of the mass of people, and thus for enlarging their freedom of choice and self-realization. Much of the controversy here arises from the belief on the one hand that government controls would have to extend to the manufacture of every nut and bolt in every nook and cranny of the industrial world, as against the belief that government could do the job through control of the "commanding heights." Once again the matter of means becomes decisive.

Finally, there is the issue of socialization, nationalization, governmental ownership. While this is a whole field of inquiry in itself, it should not be allowed to obscure the real issue. As Joseph Rosenfarb and Albert Lauterback have pointed out in their recent treatments of the subject, the issue is not *ownership* but *control*. Government does not need necessarily to "take over" anything; nationalization is but one of many possible controls under a system of central direction. By no means must it constitute the whole pattern; it may, indeed, be one of the less effective devices.

Viewed in these terms, the arguments of the "free collectivists" seem to be more useful as showing the difficulties facing a directed economy, rather than as proof that such an economy cannot be achieved in a dem-

ocratic framework. The whole controversy comes to hinge not on grand principles (since both the ultimate goal of individual freedom and the practical method of government action are championed by liberals on both sides of the fence), but on the actual ways and means of government intervention. The question becomes: Do the methods of planning and control in a directed economy seem likely to maximize the liberties and opportunities of the individual (who remains the starting-point and ending-point of the whole inquiry)?

Thus the question is one of the capacity of democratic government. Initially the problem is one of the capabilities of administrative agencies, which hold the skirmish line in the battle to tame an unplanned and uncontrolled economy.

IV

"It has been on administrative difficulties," Brooks Adams once said, "that revolutions have for the most part supervened." The "free collectivists" have turned this insight on its head; they hold that any effort to bring about a revolution in economic planning and control must sooner or later collapse in administrative chaos. They stress the simple limitations of the human mind. Government officials cannot direct the social process, the argument goes, they can only step in here and there to redress the balance of private actions through compensating public actions.

Are our resources of administrative talent and technique really as slender as this argument implies? Perhaps they are. Yet the student of administration cannot fail to be impressed with the capacity that government administrators have shown here and abroad in planning and organizing effectively on a gigantic scale. Often borrowing from the experience of large business organizations, they have used scores of techniques for managing bigness—techniques in the fields of staffing, recruiting, training, communication, recording, planning, control, delegation, supervision, and so on. They have shown, too, a capacity for experiment, for improvisation, for growth. They have amassed a store of information on the complex ways of the economic system. They have learned how to deal with politicians and pressure groups, how to respond to the needs of the people as a whole.

In America the New Deal was a university for the learning of administrative method. The Tennessee Valley Authority symbolized what the

scorned bureaucrats could do—how, working with the people in six states, they could shape the social and physical contours of a whole valley. World War II proved that administrative methods of planning, organization and control could be extended—via WPB, OPA, WMC, and the like—to the whole economy.

The capacity of the military to conduct intricate operations on a vast scale was equally impressive. Months before the battle of Okinawa, for example, American commanders planned to load over 150,000 troops of all types and over half a million tons of supplies into about 400 ships at eleven different ports, stretching 6000 miles from Seattle to Leyte; to deliver this army at a point off Okinawa early in the morning of Easter Sunday 1945; and to send men and materiel ashore in a precise sequence of action. Despite the weather, enemy opposition, and the limitations of the human mind, that is exactly what was done.

The anxieties of the "free collectivists" over central planning and control issue in part from a miscalculation as to the capabilities of modern administration. Thus Michael Polyani in an otherwise penetrating analysis in *The Manchester School* last September, presented a formula designed to show that the central governing group would have to control an impossible number of operations, yet he does not refer to modern principles of staffing that have greatly altered the old theory of the "span of control." Another miscalculation of this school of thought is even more significant. It is the argument that central planning and control must topple of its own weight because ultimately it would try to control every unit in our enormous productive and distributive system.

If this fear is justified—if indeed a directed economy must involve ubiquitous and all-embracing controls—then the whole enterprise should be discarded at once. But such is not the case. The problem, as Sir Oliver Franks pointed out in his recent *Central Planning and Control in War and Peace,* is "the inevitability of a minimum, not the desirability of a maximum." The aim of the government must be to restrict the number of its decisions as far as possible and to rely on the initiative and flexibility of individual undertakings to carry the momentum of the directed economy.

How can government restrict the number of necessary decisions? It can do so by making sure that it has a selected assortment of levers, switches, and gauges in the economic pilothouse. These are marked In-

vestment, Spending, Taxes, Production, Savings, Prices, Credit, Wages, Profits, and the like. The government establishes the framework of planning and control *within which private economic decisions can be made, and often made with far more fruitful results than in an uncontrolled system.* The precise mixture of governmental controls will vary immensely, and must be worked out on a trial-and-error basis. There will be many difficulties, many internal creakings and rumblings. But American and British experience with strategic economic controls in peace and war has been sufficient to prove that the government can direct the economy decisively without establishing controls down to the grass roots.

But let us not deceive ourselves. The very fact that the government will possess a variety of levers and will direct a mixed system of public and private enterprise will make the job of central planning and control all the more difficult. A directed economy that refrains from totalitarian economic controls is harder to administer, not easier, for it requires a consummate combination of flexibility and co-ordination at the top levels. A military analogy may be useful here. The infantry division over many decades has come to embrace many non-infantry types of units: artillery, tanks, anti-tank, chemical, engineers, and so on. These additions have enormously strengthened the division, yet they involve almost baffling problems of control for maximum effectiveness. The co-ordination of unlike units is far more difficult than that of like units. Inevitably the result has been the establishment of large staffs at every echelon to meet the needs of central planning and control.

In this sense, the real question is not whether our administrative apparatus as such could stand the heavy strain of a directed economy. We have reason to be hopeful on this score. The real problem becomes: Will the government system, within which the administrators must act, afford the proper environment for efficient and fair execution of public policies? It is all very well to say, as James Landis has said, that the "administrative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes." But Congress and the courts are still very much with us, and the capacity of democratic government in this country to direct its economic affairs will be, among other things, a test of our unique system of divided powers and checks and balances.

V

What kind of democratic government will make possible the best administrative performance? For one thing, there must be unity of purpose. "Central planning," says Sir Oliver Franks, "means that it is no longer possible for a Government to have a number of policies each of which can be pursued to some extent independently of the others." There must also be bold and resourceful leadership. There must be the chance for long-term thinking and decision. Finally, there must be a sense of responsibility to the voters as a whole, or at least to the majority, rather than simply to strategically placed minority groups.

If the current British experiment in central control and planning is successful, much of the credit must go to the governmental system itself. Thanks in part to a well integrated cabinet arrangement, the Government usually follows a relatively consistent set of domestic and foreign economic policies. The leadership has been (sometimes despite superficial appearances) courageous and often imaginative. Long-range planning and deliberate action have been possible because the Labor Government was virtually assured of staying in power for at least five years. And Britain's party system, which is stout enough to hold dissident groups in line, has enabled the Government to establish the needs of the great mass of the people as the touchstone of its policies.

Could our system of government show similar qualities under similar stress? Leadership, yes; in war and in peace, presidents have often moved ahead of the people and anticipated their needs in time of crisis. But our score on the other prerequisites of successful planning is not so high. Administrative agencies blithely pursue conflicting policies, and the Cabinet at times has served as a source of division rather than as a means of pulling the administrators together toward a common objective. Long-term thinking and decision are difficult to achieve under our system of national elections every two years; in this respect, the often-heard warnings of "transient majorities" take on some meaning. As for responsibility to the majority, our government often seems to be responsive to every sizeable group except the majority.

Americans, in short, face the urgent question of whether a governmental system that was deftly designed to be divided and hobbled can meet the imperatives of a directed economy. One of the tri-partite pillars —the Supreme Court—has helped to resolve its part of the problem, at

least for the time being, by the simple device of self-restraint (albeit as a result of an infusion of new blood). Doubtless a directed economy will be constitutional (unless there is another judicial revolution), and probably the courts will not unduly fetter the administrators through judicial review of day-to-day operations.

The real problem lies in the legislative branch. Congress has rarely exhibited the qualities of leadership; in times of crisis it has abdicated before the President, jealously withdrawing most of the delegated power once the crisis passed. Unity of purpose and long-range planning become will-o'-the-wisps amid the ever shifting coalitions of sectional, economic, and ideological blocs. Worst of all, the power of organized groups over Congressional procedure and policy distorts the reflection of the general interest of the mass of organized and unorganized voters. The Congressman is concerned primarily with protecting the interests of his district, for that is the price of political survival.

Bolstering minority power in House and Senate is an arsenal of organizational and procedural devices. The seniority rule steadily promotes the members of "safe" districts who faithfully serve—and are faithfully rewarded by—the dominant interests at home. Important committees such as Agriculture are packed with legislators chiefly responsive to the economic interest involved rather than to the overall national welfare. The Rules Committee, once the citadel of minority rule in the House, has lost power; it is notable, however, that much of that power has passed not to the party leadership but to the committee chairmen, who themselves are often the agents of minority groups. The filibuster in the Senate symbolizes minority rule to a degree so extreme as to be grotesque; today it is a stronger weapon than it has been for thirty years.

All this is a familiar story; its importance here lies in its relation to administrative achievement. Congress has tremendous powers over the Executive branch. It must formulate, or at least ratify, basic policies to be administered; it supplies the funds; it influences the appointment of personnel; it investigates remorselessly and publicizes what it finds. Inevitably its shadow bulks large on the administrative landscape.

If Congress is hostile to administrative planning and invention, if it is satisfied with routine and conformity rather than with boldness and experimentation, if it is niggardly with financial and moral support—then all these qualities will be reflected in the mission, achievements, and

morale of the administrative establishment. It is no accident that the deepest cleavages within the bureaucracy can be traced to warring blocs on Capitol Hill; that the worst threat to administrative reorganization (as former President Hoover clearly sees) lies in legislative hostility; that the administrative official is the most suspect form of animal life in the eyes of the average member of Congress; that the most promising agencies for economic planning and control, such as the National Resources Planning Board and various departmental research units, were ground to pieces in the legislative machinery.

If this argument is correct, the great obstacle to successful central planning and control in America will appear not in the bureaucracy, which has made vast strides when operating in a proper governmental environment, but in the Senate and House of Representatives. What is to be done? Many schemes have been proposed to reform Congress and to close the gap between the executive and legislative branches—for example, executive-legislative cabinets, policy councils, committee reorganization, better staffing, and the like. Most of these changes are desirable because they would increase legislative efficiency and improve communication between Congress and the Executive. Yet these changes alone cannot unify either Congress or the government as a whole. They cannot do so because they would not alter the basic pattern of political organization that makes Congress what it is. It is only in the framework of new power relationships that these devices could help solve the problem of divided authority and responsibility.

VI

This last point bears brief elaboration because it is crucial to the whole question of the prospects of central planning and control under the American system of government. Any directed economy worth its salt will have a vigorous impact on the matter of "who gets what, when, and how" in America. It will modify traditional relationships among farmers, businessmen, producers, consumers, labor, and others. Inevitably it will operate amid tremendous pressures from these groups.

This is as it should be in a democracy; but the important question is how these pressures are organized and channeled. Congress without doubt will be the medium of divisive and separatist pressures from organized groups that are out on their own. Only if democratic govern-

ment can master these pressures in order to respond to the will of the majority of the voters (a kind of pressure that is more conducive to stable, sustained, and co-ordinated administrative action) will a directed economy be able to function with the right combination of administrative expertise and political responsibility.

Congress cannot cope with these difficulties, because they lie largely outside its confines. The internal weaknesses in Congress are not the real source of the trouble, but responses to the mighty political forces that play on Senate and House from without. Recognizing this situation, students of government have for years been urging basic constitutional changes, such as adoption of the parliamentary form of government. It is hoped that such reform would bring the kind of unity and discipline that the British enjoy. Unfortunately, even such basic constitutional changes would not do the job, because they would not alter the pattern of political pressures within which the individual Congressman acts. It does no good, for example, for a President to dissolve a rebellious House of Representatives when virtually the same set of legislators is returned by groups dominant in the local constituencies. As N. A. Pelcovits pointed out in these pages in the fall of 1947, the basic cause of stalemate in Washington is not merely "governmental fission." The ultimate source of faulty direction and co-ordination in the governmental process lies back in our feeble and sluggish system of political organization.

Specifically, this means our party system. The major party *should* be the means of organizing a majority—or at least a large minority—of the voters behind a common cause, leading them to victory, and, if vested with power, uniting the branches of government for the fulfillment of the program. The party *should* be able to subdue minority opposition within its ranks or outside. Actually our parties accomplish only half this job. Undisciplined, decentralized, often spiritless, they achieve victory at the polls only to cave in before the thrusts of organized minorities when the time comes for forming and executing public policies. The arena where the party's high hopes are dashed is, of course, Congress, which virtually never achieves party solidarity on important issues.

It is the centralized, unified party system that has enabled the British government to plan years in advance, to provide steady leadership, to integrate the branches of the government, to handle particularist groups. It is this system that lies behind the successful workings of the parlia-

mentary system during times of acute economic crisis. Reporting on the central planning system in Britain, Herman Finer states that "British planning begins with British political parties. . . . The political party carries the men who are going to administer the plan right along with it from its stage of conception, through contact with the ordinary man and woman in the street and the factory, to the stages of legislative and executive authority." Surely the comparatively slow progress that the French have made toward economic stability is related to their multi-party system and its precarious alliances. All indications are that strong party government is indispensable to an effective and democratic system of central planning and control.

To formulate the ultimate problem in this fashion is not, of course, to solve it, but to restate it. It is to restate it, however, in terms that may have some relevance for liberal action as well as for liberal thought. Certainly the condition of our political parties is not hopeless. Much depends on the infusion into their ranks and leadership of men and women who are more concerned with important national policies than with patronage, who want to stiffen the parties and force them to deliver on promises made.

It is altogether appropriate that a leading liberal organization, Americans for Democratic Action, should adopt the strategy of working within the two-party system rather than striking out on its own. It is a hopeful sign that Democratic leaders have been willing to press for civil rights legislation at the risk of losing Southern votes, that the Republicans have been engaged in some noisy soul-searching. All this may be the prelude to the organization of a more disciplined and coherent party system during the years ahead.

Seen in this light, the cleavage within liberal ranks takes on different proportions. The issue is not an insuperable moral or philosophical one; it is essentially a problem of administration, government, and politics, and consequently is wholly manageable. New fighting orders for liberals, in short, will involve both the capacity of liberals to see clearly the link between individual freedom and economic organization, and their readiness to act in behalf of that freedom by using the political and administrative tools that lie at hand.

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The So-Called German Mind

By KURT GLASER

EDITOR'S NOTE: *As all but our newest readers know, we conducted a survey this past winter to find out what our subscribers think of the* ANTIOCH REVIEW. *Probably the most frequent criticism-suggestion was that we needed more "opposing points of view." The treatment of the "German question" which follows is an attempt to give such a rounded discussion to an important issue. First we present Kurt Glaser's article; then a series of "loaded" questions to point up those of Glaser's contentions which seem most debatable; finally, a commentary by a distinguished sociologist to give the whole argument scientific perspective.*

Controversy for its own sake doesn't interest us. Controversy which clarifies issues, however, can be a valuable thing. We shall be glad to hear from our readers as to what they think of this type of treatment as well as what they think of the issue discussed. Space permitting, we shall be glad to publish such letters.

SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING in Germany in the Spring of 1946, I was taken in hand by an American who had lived in Germany, physically at least, for a number of years, and was lectured at length on "The German Mind." The substance of this lecture was that the German does not think the way other people do; somewhere deep down inside him there is a fundamental distortion of moral values, which makes him, on the one hand, a philosophical dreamer, fond of concocting impossible *Weltanschauungen* and on the other hand an incorrigible brute, when he really gets down to brass tacks. His particular vice is intellectual dishonesty—if at the moment he appears to be a democrat, this is a matter of pure convenience, and he is only waiting for the right moment to turn the tables on his conquerors and resume his amoral practices. There was nothing new about the idea expressed in this lecture: it was a restatement of one of the standard myths current in British, American and particularly

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French intellectual circles—a myth which was one of the most potent factors in mobilizing intellectual support for the Allies in both world wars.

After two and one half years in Germany and many evenings of argument with all kinds of Germans, including ex-*Parteigenossen* as well as concentration camp inmates, I am convinced that this myth about the special nature of the German mind is complete rubbish. It is not only useless but also dangerous rubbish, since it prevents us from developing the kind of political philosophy which will accomplish what we are here to accomplish in Germany, namely the moral and political rehabilitation of that country through the efforts of its own leaders. The worst about this myth is that not only foreigners but also many *Germans* believe it and are thereby prevented from thinking or acting in a reasonable manner.

There is no racial basis for presupposing special German character traits. The Germans are not the pure Nordic folk which Rosenberg imagined them to be but a mixture resulting from successive migrations of Romans, Goths, Burgundians and Poles, not to mention a substantial assimilation of Jewish blood which the Nazis conveniently ignored. As a matter of fact the notion of special and pernicious characteristics in the German mind first gained currency after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and is one of the ideological backwashes of history.

During the past fifty years the western nations at least have developed an entirely new standard of political ethics. Looking at Bismarck's politics in terms of today's standard (which itself has not yet gained the full acceptance of all nations) we would say it consisted of unprincipled grabbing for power and territory. In terms of the *then existing* political standard, however, it was perfectly normal behavior. Bismarck was simply doing what Pitt, Talleyrand and Metternich had done, and what Napoleon III was doing—only he did it better, and succeeded, temporarily at least, in establishing German predominance on the continent of Europe.

The systematic study of sociology brings to light an important fact, namely that nations and societies change their moral standards only when they are thoroughly convinced that the old ones are no longer useful, that is, that they no longer conduce to the well-being of the nation or society in question. It is not a question of intellectual progress

or conversion to a higher standard of morals; it is a question of brute survival. When a nation reaches a saturation point in its policy of competitive power politics it undergoes what seems to be an intellectual mutation. It adopts some other policy, such as collective security or establishing a world-state and proceeds forthwith to denounce its own former policy in the most furious of terms and to proclaim the mental and spiritual depravity of those who continue to practice it.

A further fact which is important in a sociological comparison between nations is that changes in political ideas and governmental forms which in their end result are moderate and evolutionary often involve a radical intermediate stage accompanied by the most brutal blood-letting. Excessive rigidity of an *ancien regime* results in its violent overthrow and a period of unreasoned persecution of all those associated with it—then the pendulum swings back, not to its original position but to a new one representing an evolutionary combination of old and new ideas. This happened in England during the Puritan period of 1649-1660 and in France during the revolution and Napoleonic periods from 1789 to 1815. In both cases there were wholesale executions without trial, tortures, and slaughtering of infants directly comparable with the worst excesses committed in the Nazi concentration camps; thousands of "innocent" people perished along with the guilty. It is impossible to "excuse" these British and French atrocities by pointing out that they took place a long time ago and pretending that the British and French have morally "changed" in the meantime. Quite to the contrary, it is a firm fact that the groundwork of British and French philosophy and the essential elements of British and French character as we know them today were already firmly established *before* these bloody revolutions. It is also impossible to excuse the Nazi blood-letting—among the Germans only a handful of fanatical Hitlerites have tried to—but it is necessary to avoid having our view distorted by the fact that the particular point of time on which we stand is closer to the Nazis than to the Jacobins or the Roundheads.

To return to our story of changes in political ideas, France reached her point of saturation with power politics after the war of 1870. This change did not reflect any substantial improvement in the character of the French people, but was produced by the fact that the country had become politically and militarily too weak to carry its former policy

any further. This did not prevent continuance of a wish for *"revanche"* (that is, a *successful* return to power politics) and it is probable that the failure of the Boulangist movement of the eighties was due not so much to its distastefulness to the French public as to the fear that Boulanger would involve France in a *losing* war. After World War I, the French rejected Wilson's fourteen points, which might have resulted in genuine reforms in European relations, and returned to a revised system of power politics, based this time on the "Little Entente" in eastern Europe and dedicated to the task of keeping Germany and her former allies firmly suppressed.

England reached her saturation point in power politics after the Boer War, and for a rather different reason: she had accumulated about all the possessions which could be had through imperialist expansion, and the best chance of keeping what she had lay in changing the moral system—the rules of the game—so as to prevent a repeat performance by other powers. Since Germany, from 1900 onwards, gave every evidence of continuing with her own imperialism, there arose in England a pseudo-philosophical school which announced the discovery of monstrous deformities in the German character and which warned that German autocracy was about to attack and destroy British democracy. The fact that German and British political interests *did* clash in 1914 led to the logical acceptance of the German-mind bogey as the number-one plank in British war propaganda; it was an essential device in securing the participation of the United States.

As of about 1930 it was fairly well accepted among American and probably also British historians and politicians that "autocracy versus democracy" was not a real issue in World War I, that the Treaty of Versailles was a cynical betrayal of justice and the reparations program an economic impossibility. Sidney Fay's *The Origins of the World War* had exploded definitely the notion of exclusive German war guilt. I am not mentioning these facts with the intent of excusing any of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, but merely to lead up to the curious fact that the official Allied propaganda of World War II not only held the Germans to be the aggressors in that war but also reversed the considered judgment on World War I. At the heat of battle we were saying that we should not have stopped on November 11, 1918 but should have driven ahead to Berlin and that the trouble with the Treaty of Versailles

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was that it was "too soft." The consequences of our efforts to rectify these errors are too apparent to require any elaboration.

On the German side, the damage was done not by the rejection but by the *acceptance* of Anglo-American and French allegations about the innate barbarism of the German character. From an economic point of view the population, density and degree of industrialization of Germany entitled her, as of 1914, to as much of a world empire as the British. If this be a weak entitlement, the British themselves had no other save the right of prior possession. The German politicians and philosophers could have, and probably should have, said that the new-found British morality was a sham and that they, the Germans, were quite as moral as the British. Instead, the politicians talked about outworn concepts such as glory and fatherland and the philosophers swallowed the British appraisal of the German mind. It was the widespread conviction among German intellectuals during World War I that the new western morality was the excrescence of a decadent civilization and that the only worthwhile ideas lay in the positive strivings of the German *Geist*. Among others, Thomas Mann, in his earlier writings, accepted this point of view. His "Reflections of a Non-Politician," which held up the virile German *"Kultur"* in contrast to the sterile *"Zivilisations-literatur,"* combined with the writings of Spengler laid the intellectual foundation for National Socialism and opened the way for the Strassers, Moeller van den Broek and ultimately Rosenberg. The intellectual foundation was very simple, and apart from the trimmings, consisted of one plank—morality is nuts, and the duty of the *Volk* is to grow, to make itself strong, and to fight for the very practical things which morality won't get you.

It is interesting that when Mann later changed his personal stand, he did not change his fundamental evaluation of Germany. His writings after 1933, which combined justifiable protest against Nazi terror with a fundamental hate—actually a pathological self-hate—for everything German, had the practical result of driving many Germans toward emotional acceptance of National Socialism. They provided materials which the Propaganda Ministry could rework so as to identify National Socialism with the natural and normal instinct of self-survival.

Now that the Germans have had a very practical demonstration that National Socialism is also nuts, or as they put it *"nichts,"* let's take

a look at them as they are today. For one thing, there is no such thing as a typical German, any more than there is a typical American. There are certain German "types" such as the Prussian civil servant (who is actually more prevalent *outside* of Prussia) and the impoverished nobleman, but these are as much exceptions as are the Kentucky Colonel and the New England schoolmarm in America. The common characteristics you see in Germans are characteristics you can find in any people. The main topic of conversation during the past three years has been not politics but food, and next to food, housing. Certainly it is not a particularly German attribute to get hungry, to object to being cold and to prefer roofs which do not leak.

Aside from a few Germans who have obsessions about war guilt, there are few who concede that Germans as such are any less moral than other people, or that they have particular traits of bestiality. They do not maintain that Germans are better than other Europeans, but they are inclined to ask you, before throwing the first stone, to consider the following facts:

(1) German resistance to Hitler was much greater than was commonly supposed. Evidence coming to light in the war crimes trials and in autobiographies such as that of Von Hassell show that there were many scattered groups working against the Nazis in one way or another. Information given from time to time by escaped Russians suggests that the same is probably true in the Soviet Union, but that under conditions of modern technique it is practically impossible for a democratic opposition to make headway against a centralized and ruthless secret police. In other words, the modern dictatorship, so far as our experience goes, can only be overthrown from *outside*.

(2) The political chaos resulting in the triumph of National Socialism was precipitated by the economic liquidation of the middle class in the inflation of 1923. In France, where the middle class has similarly been liquidated, exactly the same kind of political chaos exists today and the future of French democracy hangs in the balance as did German democracy before 1933.

(3) The Czechs have always been considered a "freedom-loving" nation having all the good qualities the Germans are supposed to lack. Under the right combination of circumstances it was, however, possible for a dictatorially-minded prime minister, by means of a bloodless *coup*

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d'état, to abolish the democratic constitution and bill of rights and set up a one-party state under the control of an all-powerful secret police.

(4) The Nazi concentration camps of Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Torgau and many others have been reactivated by the Soviets and contain some hundred thousands of political prisoners, either imprisoned with no trial of any kind, or on the strength of confessions extracted by the most medieval tortures. Even Auschwitz has been reopened as a way-station to the forced labor camps in Russia and Siberia. Statistics are not complete on the number of deaths through mistreatment, starvation and deliberate neglect in these camps, but it is estimated that these figures will run into the tens of thousands.

Most Germans of military age fought in the war, on the principle "my country right or wrong," which was also accepted by the U.S. Government whose Selective Service Regulations provided that objection to *this particular war* could not be used as a ground for claiming exemption as a conscientious objector. They also felt that things would go worse for Germany if she lost the war, which turned out to be right. If the treatment meted out to Germany at the close of World War II has served any useful purpose, it has been to restore the German's faith in his own morality, through the process of dramatically debunking the moralistic pretentions of the Allies.

The cost of the Allied war effort in money, materials and human lives can only be justified if we are intelligent enough to take advantage of two things which our victory over Germany accomplished. First, our victory got rid of Hitler and his political thugs—the majority of Germans with whom I have spoken say this never could have been done alone by anti-Nazi forces within Germany. Secondly, the experience of war and total defeat has brought Germany to the saturation stage—the point where the German public is genuinely ready to abandon international power politics. To make these results stick, the Allies have got to demonstrate practically that Germany can obtain just and fair political treatment by playing the game according to the new rules.

It is a fact that Germany has gone through certain stages of the growing-up process of a nation later than England, France and the United States. She was the last to achieve national unification and the last great nation—except Soviet Russia—to abandon power politics as an avowed instrument of national policy. This backwardness shows in other fields

too—for instance German education is still much too cut-and-dried and much too disciplinarian. But when one considers the modern American public school and then reads Edward Eggleston's *The Hoosier Schoolmaster* one realizes that our own educational revolution is quite new and that there is nothing to prevent Germany from following suit. There is nothing in German social life which has not been present, in one form or another, in American, British or French society over the past century. Although German youth of today is by no means as free as American youth, it is a long way ahead of the last generation. Fathers such as Clarence Day's have passed from the scene in Germany as well as in America.

The thinking Germans of today—and most of my German friends think and talk incessantly about social probelms when they are not thinking of where their next meal is coming from—want desperately that the new society in which they are going to live be a moral society, both within Germany and in international relations. But they insist vehemently that the moral system be universal. They will not accept moral standards for themselves which do not apply with equal strictness to their neighbors. Since the German territory after Versailles was recognized as the absolute minimum which could rightfully be considered German, they cannot and will not accpet the territorial cessions forced upon Germany as moral or just. If they did so, they would be prejudicing from the start any possibility of a sincere conversion of Germany to the new international morality. If they are, at the present time, forced by the brute strength of their conquerors to recognize the *de facto* cession of undoubtedly German territory and to absorb the millions of refugees from this irridenta and from German-speaking areas in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, they will nevertheless plan for the day when these wrongs can be righted.

No, the fact that the Germans are not satisfied with the conditions of armistice does not mean that the insidious "German mind" is at work planning new deviltries. The Germans are reacting exactly the way Americans would react if they had to cede all the states west of the Rockies to Russia and to absorb the population of these states plus the entire English-speaking population of Canada into the remaining area.

I have met hardly any Germans who really want a new war. They've "had it" as the saying goes. Insofar as some of them may be nursing new nationalistic ideas, this seems to result from a feeling that mere compliance with the occupying powers isn't getting them anywhere. In the

present situation, Germany is still plastic—we can, by our deeds and omissions influence Germany, or at any rate western Germany, for better or worse. Scratch a person who tells you it is too late, that Germany is already renazified, and you will find under the skin a Germanophobe—a person who believes in that fiction of fictions—the "German mind."

The Germans are not perfect. They are human beings. They are patriotic, in the same way Americans are patriotic, and like Americans they want the good things in life for themselves and their country. Like Americans they are ready to criticize themselves and to listen to constructive criticism from others, but they can no more accept an expatriate like Thomas Mann who tells them they are fundamentally no good than Americans can accept intellectuals who deliberately and purposefully try to shed their "American-ness." Right now, the Germans are recovering from a bad shock, and they are perfectly aware of the damage they have caused other nations. Perhaps the wish which I have heard more often expressed than any other is the wish that Germany be received back into the family of nations—that the German, as a German, be accepted by others as a moral equal.

Protagonists of the "German mind" theory tell you that the German is either at your heels or at your throat. If we, as Allies, want to make our victory in World War II really stick, then we've got to see to it that the German has a third alternative.

* * *

Leading Questions on Mr. Glaser's Argument

If it is true that Germans are now ready to criticize themselves "like Americans," was it also true between 1933 and 1942?

Is the Nazi movement comparable to the French Revolution? Is there no basic difference in purpose, temper, scope, accomplishment?

Is it so odd that allied "propaganda" held the Germans to be the aggressors of World War II? Is it really odd that the perpetrators of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk should have—in part—accepted the basic premise of the Treaty of Versailles?

What would the world be like today if appeasement of Nazi Germany had continued? Was there anything in Nazism to suggest that

events comparable to the independence of India and the Philippines would have taken place in the Nazi empire in any foreseeable future?

Supposing Thomas Mann's testimony to be suspect, how would Mr. Glaser account for that of William L. Shirer, Howard K. Smith, Eric Sevareid, and the other American correspondents—that something basic in the German culture pattern found Nazism congenial and that having one morality for Germans and another for lesser races was as natural and unquestioned as breathing?

And finally, what is one to make of that "systematic study of sociology" which boils down to the "important fact" that nations achieve morality only after they have tried plunder and massacre and found that they didn't pay? If the fear of retaliation is all that prevents the Germans from starting all over again, are they really "aware of the damage they have caused other nations" and should they "be accepted by others as a moral equal" at the present time?

THE EDITORS

* * *

National Character and Social Structure—Comments on Glaser

By ALEX INKELES

THERE HAVE BEEN relatively few periods in recorded history in which the process of social change characteristic of the current century has been equalled or surpassed in intensity, speed, and scope. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a high degree of interest in the study and control of this process which accounts, in part, for the striking growth and elaboration of the social sciences during the twentieth century. Traditionally, the study of social change has been the concern of people in the fields of political science, sociology, and economics. In recent years, and particularly in the last decade, however, there has been a developing interest in the psychological aspects of social change.

Indeed, it may be said that there have arisen two major and opposed "schools" of thought on this question: a political school, which maintains

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that social change can be understood, and meaningful social change effected, only on the basis of political and socio-economic analysis and action; and a psychological school, which maintains that the roots of social movements are essentially psychological, and which declares that social change must begin with alterations in man himself. Adherents of the "German mind" theory must be placed in this psychological school. Thus, although Mr. Glaser has directed his fire solely against this theory of the German mind, he has actually raised the whole question of the conflict between these two schools. Stated in its broadest terms, the controversy involves the relations between national character and social structure. This comment will seek to place Mr. Glaser's argument in that broader context, and to point up some aspects of the relationship between national character and social structure which he neglects.

The driving force behind the study of national character has been largely provided by anthropologists and psychiatrists, although the problem has also been given serious attention by psychologists and sociologists. The bulk of the academic studies in this field have been primarily concerned with primitive, that is, non-literate, societies, and consequently have not received much attention from those who criticize the characterological approach on political grounds. There have, however, been related studies, or, better, essays (for they are little more), on contemporary, large scale, industrial societies. Among the better known works in this area by anthropologists are Ruth Benedict's book on Japan, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* and Geoffrey Gorer's *The American People.* Perhaps the best known of the psychiatric studies is Richard Brickner's *Is Germany Incurable?,* whose extreme thesis of a paranoid Germany aroused a storm of controversy.

The authors who have attempted a characterological analysis of societies differ widely in background, interests, and method. But they have in common a psychological approach to the roots of social phenomena like war, revolution, and crime, and share the assumption that societies can be most meaningfully understood in terms of national character. Although these authors cannot be directly charged with responsibility for the political uses to which their theories are put, their basic approach has been used to justify the assumption that social change must begin not with institutional change but with changes in national character. Some have gone so far as to utilize these theories to support the assertion

that national character, for which the term human nature is conveniently substituted, is essentially immutable, and social change, by implication, not subject to control and planning.

Against these theories there has been mounted a progressively more vigorous attack, emanating from the group here termed the political school. This group finds the psychological explanations of social phenomena, and especially the treatment of large scale, industrial societies, impressionistic and even mystical. It finds the psychological argument vague and shifting, and asserts that the analysis is not borne out by concrete case studies. The claim has been made that the methodology of students of national character, insofar as an explicit methodology can be discerned, is unscientific, and that it depends on inadequate samples and is saturated with analogical reasoning. The proponents of the characterological approach have also been held to be either woefully ignorant, or willfully neglectful, of the influence of such factors as the power structure, the system of economic organization, class and caste differences, and similar political and socio-economic elements of the societies they have dealt with. Finally, it has been asserted that the psychological approach is a-political, politically defeatist, or a justification of the *status quo*.

In contrast, the political school maintains that societies and social movements can be most meaningfully understood in terms of political and socio-economic analysis. It holds that social change is primarily a product of institutional change rather than changes in national character. It assumes, on the whole, a highly rational orientation in people, and tends to minimize the non-logical components in human behavior. Its political orientation is therefore essentially optimistic and activist, based on the belief that by providing socially "correct" conditions one can insure socially correct behavior, the national mind or character notwithstanding.

Mr. Glaser places himself firmly in the political school. In analyzing the German problem his underlying assumption is that "nations and societies change their moral standards only when they are thoroughly convinced that the old ones are no longer useful . . . no longer conducive to the well being of the nation or society in question."

At least two fundamental objections may be raised to Mr. Glaser's statement. First, it assumes the existence of a set of "objective" circumstances which have the same reality for all participants in the total situation. Yet all of our experiences, both in the laboratory of social relations

and in the world of everyday life, indicates that the same situation may have profoundly different meaning for different participants. And this, of course, has a tremendous impact on the resulting behavior of individuals and groups who are interacting. Furthermore, Mr. Glaser assumes that men are able to make an adequate assessment of the relations of means to ends so as to act in the most rational way to secure their own interests. Actually, our histories are crowded with the tales of groups and nations which were unable to make a rational assessment of their situation and who acted contrary to their "real" interests. What other characterization can we make of the recent history of Germany itself, which, even granting full recognition to the many other forces acting in the field, twice in less than thirty years launched itself on disastrous aggressive wars which ranged most of the continent of Europe and the rest of the world against it?

The second basic weakness in Mr. Glaser's argument lies in his virtually complete neglect of the role played by psychological factors such as the symbols and stereotypes a people orients towards, the role of their sentiments and values, their experience of frustrations, or their tendencies towards aggression. *These elements have no necessary connection with any group mind, and however much they may be the direct outcome of any given political and socio-economic system, they must still be accounted for.* Thus, Mr. Glaser errs as seriously on the other side as do those he so effectively criticizes. One has only to recall here the tremendous impetus, of which Mr. Glaser is undoubtedly aware, which was given to the Hitler movement by the support which it obtained from the German lower middle class, women, and the youth. To affirm this is not in any sense to deny or depreciate the fundamental significance for Hitler's rise of such "objective" socio-political facts as the weakness of the Weimar Republic, the fascist tendencies of the military hierarchy and the government bureaucracy, and the support which Hitler secured from powerful leaders of finance and industry. But it was the combination of these forces, not any one set acting alone, which must be considered for a total picture of Hitler's rise to power.

I share with Mr. Glaser his doubt about the existence of a peculiar German mind, his concern about the political uses to which the concept can be put, and his alarm at the apparent tendency to abandon political action as the main instrument of social change. But I can hardly share

his implied assumption that the study of national character has no relevance for understanding the internal political movements and the international relations of any national state. However valid the criticism of the work done to date, and however much it may lend itself to unacceptable political uses, it would be a serious mistake to dismiss the concept of national character as a "myth," and the students of it as mere political dupes or people subject to a special form of "phobia." The validity of the concept of national character cannot be judged adequately on the basis of such "vulgarized" forms of it as the "German mind" theory.

The burden of the available work in the scholarly disciplines concerned with social relations indicates that there are distinctive patterns of reaction to given situations which may be used to distinguish the populations of particular national states. These patterned responses, along with the symbols and value systems already mentioned, are not independent of political and economic institutions; indeed they are intimately interwoven with them. But they may exercise an independent influence in the selective apprehension of experience, and have a profound effect on the opportunities for success of *new* institutional forms in the political and economic realm.

To what extent these patterns may be embedded in a distinct entity to be called national character remains to be determined by further research, but the basic phenomenon cannot be denied. Insofar as Mr. Glaser rejects this general proposition—and he does so by setting up a straw man in the form of a "German mind" theory—his position is untenable.

Clearly the only acceptable resolution of this difficulty lies in the adoption of an integrated approach to social problems which recognizes and takes advantage of the contribution which both psychological and political analysis can make. I agree with Mr. Glaser that the German problem is essentially a political and socio-economic one. But this does not mean that the insights provided by research on national character, when derived from scientifically adequate investigation, cannot serve as a valuable adjunct to political planning. On the contrary, verified psychological facts can be utilized as a significant aid in enriching our understanding of past political events and for evaluating the probable consequences of setting in motion given institutional changes. This does not mean that psychological considerations will *determine* the course of

political action, but it does mean that such considerations may be utilized in adapting essentially political programs to existing conditions.

Fortunately, there have already been some efforts made in this direction. Attention is here called to the Report of the "Conference on Germany After the War," which appeared in the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* (1945), and the supplemental report by Talcott Parsons, a sociologist, "On the Problems of Controlled Institutional Change," which appeared in *Psychiatry* (1945).

At this Conference a group of psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists, and representatives of related social science disciplines met to discuss the sources of German aggression and to propose a series of measures for dealing with the German problem. The Conference did not adduce any theory of a German mind, and on the whole showed commendable restraint, with the exception of a few minor lapses, in avoiding extreme indictments of the variety Mr. Glaser finds so objectionable. Neither did the participants conclude that the same range of human emotions found in other nationalities is not also present in Germany.

The Conference did, however, stress the distinctive *combination* of some of these human qualities which is particularly characteristic of Germany, although giving full recognition to the fact that this combination was a product of the special *social* conditions existing in Germany. Among the qualities to which the Conference turned its attention were: strong preoccupation with status and hierarchy, and heavy emphasis on the principle of subordination and superordination in inter-personal relations, features of German life which have been widely reported.

It gave particular attention to what it regarded as the two major components in German national character: the first an "emotional, idealistic, active, romantic" element, the second an "orderly, hard-working, hierarchy-pre-occupied, methodical, submissive, gregarious, materialistic" component. Neither of these was held to be constructive or destructive in itself. Rather, it was emphasized, particularly by Parsons, that the meaning of these components would depend on the social institutions with which they were combined. This being the case, the problem became one of utilizing these hypotheses about German national character as an aid in making political plans for Germany. Specifically, the problem was defined as one of encouraging those institutional forms which would give

a positive orientation to German qualities and discouraging those institutional forms which fostered destructive manifestations. The specific policy proposals adopted recommend themselves to the serious examination of political scientists and policy makers.

The work of the "Conference on Germany After the War" represented the hope and the promise rather than the actual fulfillment of the potentialities of the approach suggested in this comment. The Conference was far from having shaken off a strong tendency toward psychologism, and it seriously neglected economics and the political structure. But on the whole its work did demonstrate that the concept of national character can be meaningfullly integrated with other approaches to political and social planning.

In summary, therefore, the following points seem germane:

1. Although there is as yet no satisfactory formulation which precisely defines the existence of a national mind, there can be no serious question but that there are important characteristic value systems, symbols, and patterns of reaction which may be meaningfully used to distinguish the populations of particular national states.

2. These distinctive patterns must be recognized, however, as products and reflections of the unique social, economic, and political conditions existing in any country, rather than as products of race or as innate national traits.

3. As such they are mutable, subject to change and in some respects to control and planned development. Furthermore, since any national group may manifest more than one distinct pattern, there is frequently a range of alternatives as to which pattern will be predominant in future social developments.

4. Changes in these distinctive patterns cannot ordinarily be effected by a direct assault on the patterns themselves, but must come from changes in the political and socio-economic situation which gave rise to them. To proceed by direct assault on the values of an entire nation is to ensure only unstable, fleeting, surface results, and may, because of the induced conflict between new values and old social system, introduce strains and tensions which can have serious unintended consequences in the form of new outbreaks of social unrest and communal upheaval.

5. Therefore, a program of social change, including changes in national character, must begin with and be primarily based on a program

of *social* action, that is, a program for changes in the nation's institutional structure, in its political, social, and economic systems.

6. But these changes cannot be made on the basis of political considerations alone. Each alternative course of political action must be considered in terms of its possible effect when juxtaposed with the facts of the distinctive reactive patterns and symbolic systems of any given society.

In a period of crisis assuming world wide proportions men must recognize and accept the need for controlled and planned institutional change, a program which requires the utilization of the best efforts of social science no less than the mastery of the material world requires the utilization of physical and natural science. A serious study of national character should be one element of that utilization of social science. Such a study does not necessarily lead either to the imposition on any nation of social forms alien to its population, or to the assumption that nations like Germany should be left completely "free" to work out their own social problems. It simply makes available an additional tool which men may utilize in their efforts to build a better society.

Goethe Slept Here

By ALFRED WERNER

> *". . . Here stood their citadel, but now grown over with weeds; there their senate house, but now the haunt of every noxious reptile; temples and theatres stood here, now only an undistinguished heap of ruins."*
>
> OLIVER GOLDSMITH

PRECISELY ON THE DAY of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's death, one hundred and twelve years later, British planes raided his native city, Frankfort-on-Main. Thereupon Goebbels' broadcasters hysterically celebrated the annihilation of fifty-five bombers, but slyly withheld from the *Vaterland* the shocking fact that the *Goethe-Haus* had been razed to the ground, together with the entire *Altstadt,* or Old City. After all, by March 22, 1944 the morale within the Reich had sunk so low, with the Red Army before its gates and the Allies deep in Italy, that this blow might have increased considerably the growing number of malcontents. For to some Germans, especially to the older generations, the house where their poet Goethe was born had more significance than the Austrian cottage where the Fuehrer first saw the light of day; to some it was the symbol of Germany's intrinsic greatness, as distinguished from the Nazis' bombastic speeches and mass slaughters. There were others who would forgive Hitler a dozen military defeats, but not his failure to safeguard this national shrine. Yet the rumor of this catastrophe spread, and the British bomb that hit the proud edifice on the Grosse Hirschgraben was bound to shatter the ego of the German nation!

Last summer I went out to seek whatever pitiful ruins might be left of this shrine. I walked with mixed feelings through the debris of Frankfort. I remembered seeing the house in its full splendor as a young stu-

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DR. ALFRED WERNER's article appears appropriately just before the Goethe Bicentennial, which opens June 27th at Aspen, Colorado. Dr. Werner is a native of Austria and lived there until 1939. After a stay in Dachau and a brief internment in England, he came to this country in 1940. His articles and book reviews have appeared in *The American Scholar, Saturday Review of Literature, Commentary, Free World, The New Republic,* the *New York Times* and others.

dent when the whole Reich went mad celebrating the centenary of Goethe's death. This was in 1932, before Hitler, yet there was hardly a trace of Goethe's humanism to be found in public life. Apart from a few individuals desperately clinging to the poet's cosmopolitan spirit, the nation turned its back on all that Goethe advocated, albeit they wildly hailed him as "unser Goethe." Marching past the rubble of many an ancient burgher's house, I recalled the words of the poet who, as an old man, sadly acknowledged his people's moral defeat: "How the Germans have carried on to ward off what I may have done and accomplished—and are they not still doing the same? Had they let things go and proceeded, had they exploited my gains, they would have got farther than they have."

I shivered, despite the torpid midsummer heat, approaching what was left of a once busy thoroughfare: a little street sign reading "Grosse Hirschgraben," and, on a broken wall, a rain-washed notice saying "Entrance to the Goethe-Haus." There it had stood, with its broad façade, its four stately floors and twenty-odd large windows, earthy and solid, as if no human power could challenge it—and now my hands touched air, grasped at a dream. For a second I felt like a cripple who, awaking after an operation, reaches for his leg, only to find it has been amputated. . . .

But look! Something has remained, though it is only the door-arch and, above it, the beautifully carved lintel on which the coat of arms of Goethe *père,* the Imperial Councillor, is visible: on the upper part, a man ready for combat, brandishing a drawn sword, and below, three lyres. Once there was a guide to relate the involved history of this strange ornament. I can't recall it, but I am glad to have found, in this desert of rubble, a tiny remnant that would link me with the glorious past, a branch of a once-gorgeous tree not atrophied, a twig still green with life. Or maybe it wasn't a tree, maybe it was a mason's scaffold, and I was holding a stone in one hand, and a mallet in the other, building a dream house on half-forgotten memories. . . .

It is a still, summer afternoon, like this one, and Herr and Frau Kaiserlicher Rath Goethe have left their stately house on the Grosse Hirschgraben to visit. Behold, a window on the third floor swings open, and a black-eyed little boy appears. Suddenly a plate crashes to the street.

Other plates follow, then cups, then saucers, too, until the whole of mama's crockery comes smashing down, while little Goethe cheers. . . .

More than a half century later the poet related this peculiar incident. But whether he got a spanking from the rigid and severe Imperial Councillor, or whether jolly Frau Rath was able to shield her first-born, Goethe failed to record. Freud, incidentally, believed that the boy's strange outburst was caused by a resentment of his newly-born sister with whom, from now on, he would have to share his parents' love. And, speaking of Freud, one may mention that once in this very house the Goethe Prize was bestowed upon the Viennese doctor by the city of Frankfort.

But back to Goethe—we are indebted to the poet for having described his birthplace with such exactness that, if all plans, descriptions, and pictures were destroyed, one might rebuild it from his detailed autobiography. He even told us how the street came to be called "Hirschgraben": this space had once been a moat in which stags were kept and fed at the burghers' expense, for every year the Senate of the Free City would feast publicly on one of those royal animals. As a matter of fact the house we used to stare at on the Grosse Hirschgraben looked different from the one in which the poet was born—for the original old edifice was given the New Look by Johann Kaspar Goethe. You see, the building (in which the weak little baby that was to be christened Johann Wolfgang gave his first yelp on August 28, 1749), was an awfully somber place, with many corners and gloomy recesses, bound to awaken dread and terror in the children's minds. When the little ones, finding it impossible to sleep in those frightening rooms, tried softly to slip from their beds and seek the comfort of servants, their father, a stern pedagogue, would appear: in awesome disguise he frightened the kids back to their beds.

Wolfgang was six when the Imperial Councillor had the 17th century place renovated into a light and cheerful domicile, with broad staircases and pleasant vestibules. In this still-medieval city of 1755 it was as revolutionary as was a Frank Lloyd Wright house in 1900. Papa Goethe let sonny, clad as a bricklayer, officiate at the ceremony of laying the foundation stone: "I wish that this house should stand unchanged until the end of the world," the boy recited, in the presence of the invited

guests, while the stone, with the Latin inscription, "Lapis fundamentalis 1755," found its place.

The house did stand for almost two centuries, and tens of thousands have visited it. The noblest, such as Klopstock, of *Der Messias* fame, and Wieland, the "German Voltaire," came to Frankfort when Mother Goethe ran the house. Through the little paved court yard where the children so often played, the esteemed poets would enter the parlor, sitting at the large round table, while in the nearby kitchen Frau Rath chopped meat for the delicate pastries for which she was famous. And one of the servants would climb down into the spacious cellar and tap wine from large barrels—even when Goethe *fils,* the Privy Councillor, lived in Weimar, he had these wines sent to him.

You can still see the cellar, overflowing with queer-looking debris. But that is all there is. Gone is the music room where the boy took his first spinet lessons and where the mother, accompanied by her Italian language teacher, Giovinazzi, sang the arias from her favorite operas. Gone is the room where the children played with the puppet show, a present from grandmother, and dramatic plots blossomed in the soul of the boy Wolfgang. Also, you will look in vain for the staircases decorated by the elder Goethe with costly prints of the Eternal City he had visited as a young man.

Gone, gone, gone, the crippled stones sing. Disaster, man-made, that gutted the once proud city of Frankfort was, perhaps, more terrible than the earthquake which once destroyed the magnificent city of Lisbon. When news of the Portuguese tragedy reached the six-year-old boy Wolfgang he was greatly shocked at God for not having manifested himself in a more fatherly manner. Another, though less tragic awakening occurred four years later when, during the Seven Years' War, the French occupied Frankfort and *le lieutenant du roy,* Count Thoranc, bagged the best rooms in the house. The older Goethe was furious, but Frau Rath, still young and attractive, rather appreciated the lighthearted, vivacious aristocrat, comparing him to her querulous and pedantic spouse. If he introduced the boy Wolfgang to French literature, he took good care of mother, too, giving her a course in life and love *à la Française.* As for Wolfgang, he needed no such instruction: as a lad of fourteen he lost his heart to a young waitress who, however, treated him as a mere child. This first "love affair" ended tragically for the girl (most of Goethe's

later liaisons also hurt the woman involved): through the combination of unfortunate circumstances, she had to be banished from the city. Goethe would not banish her from his heart: her name, Gretchen, was given to the charming heroine of his greatest work.

Love and poetry go together. It was in the house on the Grosse Hirschgraben that the boy's poetic talent developed. Looking from the windows of the upper floors he saw the green nature, so conducive to the development of his genius:

> Beyond these gardens, across the walls and ramparts of the city, might be seen a beautiful and fertile plain. . . . In the summer I commonly learned my lessons there, and watched the thunderstorms, but could never look at the setting sun, which went down directly opposite my windows. But, at the same time, when I saw the neighbors wandering about in their gardens and tending their flowers, the children playing, parties of friends enjoying themselves, and could hear the skittle-balls rolling and the nine-pins drop—there would awaken within me a feeling of solitude, and thence a vague sense of longing, which accorded within a certain seriousness and undefined foreboding implanted in me by nature, and so exerted its influence at an early age, and showed itself more distinctly in after years.

But don't feel sorry for this melancholy boy—Nature gave him a sufficient dose of cynicism to cope with the world's sorrows. On his sixteenth birthday he wrote this ironical poem:

> Thus it is the world appears,
> That is called the best of spheres:
> Like a haunt of highwaymen,
> Like a merry student's den,
> Like a gaudy opera house,
> Like a master's gay carouse,
> Like a host of poet-freaks,
> Like a store of fine antiques,
> Much, indeed, this best of spheres
> Like a worn-out coin appears.

By the age of sixteen he had learned a great deal, at the instance of his severe father, and written an equal amount against the Imperial Councillor's wishes (most of these youthful scribblings were later destroyed by their critical author). But father's will triumphed: Wolfgang was sent to study the law at the University of Leipzig. The better part of the decade—1765 to 1775—he spent outside Frankfort, though for a short time Goethe did practice the law there. It was a decade in which love flourished—there were Kaetchen Schoenkopf, Friederike Brion, Lotte

Buff, and a host of other lovely victims—love as well as passionate love songs, and during this time also some of his most revolutionary works were written, such as *Goetz of Berlichingen, The Sorrows of Young Werther, Egmont,* and the first version of *Faust.*

Why did Goethe leave Frankfort for Weimar, at the age of twenty-six, never to return except for a few brief visits? It seems that Goethe dearly loved his native city. Frankfort, whose spring and fall fairs attracted traders from every part of Europe; where ships from all over the globe brought their cargoes to the banks of the Main River; and where German emperors were crowned and the most elaborate coronation ceremonies were held: could there be a city more fitted to stir a poet's imagination? As an old man Goethe confessed to Bettina Brentano: "If anyone were to ask me if I could conceive of a place more suitable for my cradle; more congenial to my convictions, or more in keeping with my poetic views—I could not mention a dearer city than Frankfort."

Before he, together with Schiller, made Weimar the Athens of Germany, it was a dull, insipid little town. As a companion to the jolly Duke Karl August, the young Frankforter soon felt socially at home. Yet he never fully adjusted to its blustering northern winds: he had been banished to a place where the sky was grayer, the sun paler, the air colder. What a difference between the sombre hills of the North, and the sunlit Rhineland, between village-like Weimar and the bustling traffic center of Frankfort!

Still, his native city meant: the rigid father, the hated law practice, the choking of every ideal Goethe cherished. Living like an English squire in Weimar, he could breathe freely. He acquired an elegant new house on the Frauenplan, where he would reside for a half century, eventually to become a demigod, nay, an Olympian, a mystical sage. Incidentally, the Goethe House in Weimar was hardly touched by World War II. Like the Frankfort Haus, it was the goal of countless "pilgrimages." Yet it was less popular, just as most people prefer the youthful, passionate Goethe of Frankfort who wrote *The Sorrows of Young Werther* to the wise, unlovable old gentleman. The burgher's house on the Grosse Hirschgraben, with its quaint old chambers recalling the magic of bygone years, was always dearer to our hearts than the palatial mansion at Weimar.

At any rate, like a famous surrealist painter of today who, though living in Paris, spiritually and emotionally never left his Russian town which is featured on almost all of his canvasses, Frankfort, with its fortified walls, crooked streets and medieval pageantries, appeared in many of Goethe's works, notably in the *Faust* upon which he worked throughout his life. Significantly, too, his autobiography, *Fiction and Truth,* ends on the day he answers Duke Karl August's summons to Weimar. It was this book which guided German patriots who, in the middle of the nineteenth century, decided to refurnish the house on the Grosse Hirschgraben which had been empty since the death of the poet's mother. They were further aided by Goethe *père:* that domestic tyrant's orderliness which truly drove his family crazy, now bore fruit: the account books in which the Imperial Councillor had listed the purchases of all household goods, including the minutest ones, was a boon to the Goethe fans wanting to restore the house to its former condition.

Today it would be well-nigh impossible to obtain the baroque furniture of 1750 in the bombed-out Reich. First of all, the "Santa Casa" as Wieland fondly called it, would have to be rebuilt from scratch. On April 19, 1947 the Frankfort city council did decide to rebuild the house and work was started soon after. But there were technical difficulties in addition to the financial ones. To cite just two examples: in all of Germany only one artisan was found who could fashion the roof's curved roccoco type slates, and only one mason to cut the red sandstone slabs in the required style. A short time after preliminary work had begun, the bugaboo of finances reared its ugly head. On hearing this, five hundred German-language teachers in the USA organized a campaign to collect the necessary funds, so the outlook is not bleak. Nevertheless, the original plan to have the house ready for the Goethe bicentennial of August 1949 has been scrapped.

I talked to the man who, for a quarter of a century, guarded the Goethe Haus and contributed to the rise of the Goethe Library as well as to the establishment of the more recent Goethe Museum. A genuine liberal, Professor Ernst Beutler managed to keep Hitlerism out of these three institutions as much as was humanly possible. But Dr. Beutler, who physically somewhat resembles the Weimar Olympian, is not the typical German of today. He was an exception even in 1932 when he begged Thomas Mann to open the Goethe Museum with an address. . . .

Though there is now little left of the old house, and just enough of the library building to keep its treasures protected from the wind and the rain, there will be much ado about Goethe in Frankfort this year. For while to the majority of the young Germans born after World War I Goethe is just an old fogy, there are still the German professors of literature who have vested interests in that figure; there are the German nationalists who parade his name, though he was definitely a foe of any sort of chauvinism. Finally, there are the businessmen who wish to lure strangers to their city. There are true Goethe lovers, but they do not count in the Frankfort of today, which, I was told, has become a real boom town in the last few months, thanks to currency reform and the Marshall Plan. When I visited this capital of Trizonia, last summer, it was a city of pimps and prostitutes—now, I hear, it has become one of buccaneers and profiteers.

It seems that the bomb of 1944 which razed the Goethe Haus did, in a sense, merely destroy a hollow shell: the Germany of Goethe and Thomas Mann was dead—it has not come to life again. To put it bluntly: there is no need for a new Goethe-Haus where there is money for new restaurants, shops, and night clubs, but not for cultural institutions. Let's be realistic: the center of Frankfort is now the huge I. G. Farben building, left intact, whether because of I. G.'s connections with American business, or out of pure chance, I can't tell. Today it still flies the Stars and Stripes. Tomorrow it will be German again, and the whole sad story that, bypassing whatever Goethe, Schiller or Beethoven houses there were, led to Auschwitz and Maidanek, may repeat itself. . . .

Signs Of The Times

By SAMUEL YELLEN

Would you see a sign?—*Yes, we would, we would see a sign.*—
Then look not for famine and plague spot to break forth;
Look not for deluge, earthquake, hail of fire and brimstone,
Nor descent of brute barbarians out of the dark North.
Turn not your eyes upon the heavens for trail of shooting stars;
Seek not the bloody moon that stains the night dew,
Nor marvels like comets, eclipses, zodiacal wars.
Such omens are for the savage, they are not for you.

Here is a sign. A man stacks papers with finical care.
His last look keeps objects in their customary places
(Until he turns his head). He tries the windows, the door.
He averts his startled eyes from oncoming faces.
He sets down figures in a ledger, the columns are neat.
He crosses each *t*. He does whatever he does in a stipulated way.
He moves a vase one inch to the right and fingers an ornamental plate.
That lingering touch holds the writhing shadows at bay.

Here is a sign. Not a book is out of place on his shelf.
Somewhere beyond, on the other side, the enemy is loose;
But on this side he has fettered and confined himself—
Constraints marking the conditions of an uneasy truce.
By what subtle stratagems he has achieved this delicate equipoise!
Yet it will not last. No, the thing will not die when he is dead.
Already, even now, by unwitting gesture and tone of voice,
The sac has been broken, the hidden infection has spread.

SAMUEL YELLEN studied at Western Reserve and Oberlin and now teaches at Indiana University. His poems have been widely published in the "quality" magazines.

Does the World Move Toward Empire?

By WILLIAM G. CARLETON

EVEN THE MOST TIMID of political analysts have now got around to admitting that in international politics only two genuinely first-class powers exist—the Soviet Union and the United States—and that this polarization of power is unique in the modern history of international relations. Bolder analysts suggest that for all practical purposes the world is divided into two spheres of influence—the Russian and the American. However, there are few who penetrate through appearances and words to admit that from the broad historical point of view what may be happening in this decade is the building of two great world empires—a Russian empire and an American empire.

To be sure, the Earle-Bullitt-Burnham school of thought leaves us in no doubt that the Russians are building an empire, but analysts of this school are likely to see Russian empire only in terms of sheer diabolism, and they play down American impulses to empire. They insist that America must be aggressively defensive, but they do not admit that in taking aggressive defensive measures America may be building a kind of empire. On the other hand, the Henry A. Wallace school sees only American imperialism in the offing, visualizes that imperialism merely in terms of predatory capitalism, and glosses over the imperialist sins of Soviet Russia. The truth is that both points of view are extreme and one-sided, and both are using the methods of the propagandist rather than those of the historian.

If indeed both Russia and America are moving toward empire the causes are many, complex, and devious. They spring from motives both defensive and offensive, probably more defensive than offensive. The processes of institutionalization are more non-voluntary and unconscious than they are voluntary and conscious. (Certainly in the case of the

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United States the motives are more defensive and the processes largely non-voluntary.) Both Russia and the United States are piling improvisation upon improvisation in an attempt to protect themselves from the other, and out of these improvisations two great world empires may be emerging.

Since the end of World War I, international relations have been in an extreme state of flux. Since World War II, this flux has degenerated into near-anarchy. Those who peer into the future in an attempt to discover the "system" of international relations which eventually may come out of today's uncertainties see a number of possibilities. What are these possibilities?

There is a possibility of a third world war. Out of such a war could come Russian victory, and the building of some kind of universal Russian empire, which might or might not evolve into genuine international communism. Also, out of such a war could come American victory (this is more probable than Russian victory), and the building of some kind of universal American empire, which might or might not evolve into genuine United Nations internationalism. Again, out of such a war might come a terrible stalemate, another Thirty Years' ordeal, a long drawn-out purgatory for mankind. And should the dire prophets of the Atomic Age prove correct in their predictions, out of such a war might come the destruction of civilization and of organized life, even the upsetting of the whole balance of nature.

There is the possibility, even the probability, that we shall escape a third world war. Conceivably a counter-revolution might succeed in Russia, establishing there a regime more friendly to the United States and the West, giving the West a complete victory without war. This is extremely unlikely. Conceivably Soviet communism might sweep over the western world, giving Russia a complete victory without war. This, too, is extremely unlikely. Communism seems to have been checked on the continent of Europe, and, in any event, even in the event of a serious economic depression, Britain and the United States are not going communist.

The United Nations might develop into an effective world organization and ultimately into something like a world government. However, this awaits resolving the current ideological and power conflict. It also awaits a widening of the powers of the United Nations and upon the increased practice of functional groups inside countries crossing national

boundaries and co-operating with like functional groups inside other countries, in opposition to dissimilar groups in their own countries. The representatives to the organs of the United Nations must come to represent people, groups, classes, and interests inside their countries and not merely their sovereign states, not merely their official governments. (Just as the Congressional delegation of New York represents not a territorial entity known as the State of New York, not the official government in power at Albany, but the peoples, the groups, the classes, and the interests living inside the State of New York, and is free to divide into factions and parties and to make alliances with like factions and parties in other states.) In short, before a world organization can become an effective instrument in curbing nationalism, in keeping peace, and in building world government, the same process of group conflict and compromise which takes place inside countries must also take place inside the world organization.

Merely to state these obvious truths of practical politics is to reveal how far we are from the goal of effective international organization. Indeed, we are still so far that as yet we have no assurance that the trend toward international government, based upon contract and actually operating through across-the-border functional alliances, is to prevail. Knowledge of our shortcomings should not make us try any less to make such international organization prevail, but the honest historian must report what he sees and not what he would like to see. The honest historian at this stage must report that effective international organization is no way near achievement; indeed, there is still great doubt that during the twentieth century it will become even one of several primary trends in international relations. At the present time there are several trends in international relations to which the genuine international approach is yielding.

Far more likely to develop is a revival of the multiple-power system, a revival of the normal system of international relations as they have existed since about 1500. A strong federal state may gradually develop in Western Europe—its beginnings are already discernible. India may grow to be a great power. Most important, countries that go communist may decline to link their interests with those of Russia, and they may fail to constitute an international communist front. Communist countries may go national; they may find that their national traditions and their national

interests require national policies separate from those of the Soviet Union and from other communist states. In Yugoslavia, we have seen a communist revolution proceed along lines different from those of the Soviet Union. What has happened in Yugoslavia is even more likely to happen in large and non-Slavic countries like Germany (should Germany go communist) or China. Indeed, any group that wins in China and becomes responsible for the welfare of the Chinese people will need American economic aid. A communist China, then, may in time be weaned away from the Soviet and become a powerful independent factor in a revived multiple-power system. Should the communist world thus divide, fears in the West would diminish. Instead of being faced with an ever-enlarging Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a developing international communist state, a united communist world, the West would be faced with a new, a dividing, a multiple, an infinitely less dangerous balance-of-power system. However, it is still too early to know for sure whether communism will turn out independent of Russia or dependent on Russia —national or international. Nevertheless, if the present trend toward a two-power system is halted at all, it is more likely to be halted by a revival of a multiple-power system than by the early development of an effective United Nations.

However, in spite of these various possibilities that may develop in the future, the inescapable fact of international relations today is the development of a two-power, balance-of-power system. The planet is being divided into two spheres of influence—two worlds—and the immediately burning question is whether these two worlds can establish a *modus vivendi,* can live side by side in an uneasy peace. In one world the Soviet Union has developed a hegemony. In the non-Soviet world the United States is developing a less clearly-defined hegemony. Indeed, hegemony may be too mild a word, for in the larger historical sense perhaps two great world empires are emerging—the Russian and the American—although the great variety of political arrangements existing inside both hegemonies, particularly the American, may make us reluctant to use so strong a term as empire.

II

As late as 1914 there were eight first-class powers. These were Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, the United States, and

Japan. Today only two remain—the United States and the Soviet Union. The balance of power was dangerous business when there were eight powers to engage in it, but it is vastly more dangerous business when only two powers are left. As practiced by a number of powers, there was a degree of flexibility; as practiced by only two, there is scarcely any.

The two great powers that remain face each other in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility. Each fears the collective power of the other. Each has an economic and a political system repulsive to the other, and each is sure that the other is engaged in a universal crusade to crush the opposing system and to make its own system worldwide. Each is a comparative newcomer to the ways of international politics. Each contains a population, youthful, strong, practical, ardent, impulsive, unspeculative, naïve. Both are considered "barbarians" by the more cultivated peoples of Western Europe, China, India.

Out of mutual fear and hostility may be developing two world empires—the American and the Russian. Both the United States and Russia are reaching out for bases, strategic areas, "defensive" frontiers. Both are putting pressures on the states and peoples within their respective orbits for economic and military preferences. Both are giving needed and enormous aid to the peoples of their respective orbits, and they are demanding and getting concessions in return. Both are busy reducing the peoples of their orbits to a high degree of economic, military, and even political dependence. Moreover, among "dependent" peoples and "secondary" states some are so afraid of American imperialism or of Soviet communism that they are voluntarily hastening the process of empire-building by inviting and eagerly welcoming the protection either of Russia or the United States. Within these secondary states are now either powerful pro-Russian parties or pro-American parties ready to extend within their respective states the influence and power of their protector, Russia, or of their protector, America. Separating the two developing empires is a twilight zone, that zone in which it is not yet certain which influence, Russian or American, is to prevail. In the countries of this zone, two parties, the pro-Russian and the pro-American, are spreading the influence of their respective champions.

The United States is busy integrating its orbit. This orbit is coming to be almost the entire non-Soviet world. Some areas of this American orbit are conquered provinces or satrapies; some are protectorates (actual

or veiled); some are associates; some are allies; and all are in varying degrees dependent upon the economic productivity and the military might of the United States.

Japan is under direct American military government and promises to be so indefinitely. Even after the withdrawal of American occupation, Japan will be a dependent state for a long time to come. American forces occupy Southern Korea, and the newly proclaimed government there is an American creation. Somewhere in South China a defensive line against communist China probably will be set up, and everything south of that line to greater or lesser degree will be within the orbit of American responsibility.

In the Western Hemisphere, nations are linked to the United States by an elaborate system of regional solidarity. Increasingly, American credits determine economic conditions and military efficiency in most of those nations.

Large portions of Western Germany and parts of Austria are under direct American military government. Even the new government of Western Germany now in process of being born will be largely an American creation. German politicians gathered at Bonn to write a constitution for the new state admit publicly that even after the withdrawal of allied troops the new state will be a dependent one.

A federation of Western European nations is in the making. The nucleus, already established, consists of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. Doubtless other countries will join in time. This federation has American blessing and is an adjunct of American policy. This embryonic federation, other nations of the North Atlantic, and Italy will be linked to the United States by a series of enveloping political and economic ties and by definite military commitments. The United States, at tremendous cost and by elaborate lend-lease arrangements, will undertake to furnish participating nations in the North Atlantic Pact with the modern equipment of war.

The Marshall Plan is tying Western Europe closer and closer to the United States economically. This necessarily requires the United States to supervise internal budgets to some extent, to make suggestions as to domestic taxation, and to demand that measures be taken against undue inflation. An implied threat to withhold release of aid-funds is usually

sufficient to bring participating governments into line with American suggestions.

To Greece and Turkey, the United States is supplying arms and military advisers. Both countries are virtually under friendly occupation by the United States, and Americans are leading the Greek war against the guerrillas.

In the Middle East, particularly in the Arabic world, there is increasing American penetration into the oil areas, and American oil subsidies are tying Middle-Eastern governments closer to the United States.

A veritable web of economic interdependence—and of economic dependence on America—is being spread. There are gifts-in-aid, loans, communications arrangements, currency stabilizations, trade agreements, tariff concessions. There are intergovernmental banks for reconstruction and development and settlement, and intergovernmental monetary funds. There is the International Trade Organization. There is the International Petroleum Council. All of this and more are in addition to the Marshall Plan, to extensive credits to Latin-American countries, to numerous private loans from American sources. And everywhere there is the continuing need for American dollars and American goods.

In all parts of the non-Soviet orbit, the attitude of the American government more and more influences the domestic policies of nations, their internal politics, the rise and fall of their governments. Even in Argentina, most intransigent of the Latin-American states, the powerful Péron seems to be weakening because of the Argentine need for American dollars and American goods.

What we Americans are doing in our orbit, the Russians are doing in theirs. The Russians, too, are uniting the coutries surrounding them with economic, military, and political links. They have made vast annexations—in Sakhalin, in the Kuriles, in the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, in Poland, in Bessarabia, in Bukowina, in Carpatho-Ukraine. They control Northern Korea. They have special concessions in Manchuria. They have links with the new communist China. They are building an international controlled-economy of Eastern European states. They are integrating military methods and strategy. They are binding their satellites to them with even stronger political ties than we have used, for in nearly every land in the Soviet sphere a communist party is in power or on the way to power. Within the Russian sphere there will

be far less national and personal freedom than in the American sphere. It is not necessary to give a more extended treatment of Russian expansion because Americans are well aware of the Russian brand of imperialism, clearly perceive that a kind of Russian empire is being built, and have no hesitancy in calling that empire by its real name.

Perhaps we should drop the pretense involved in employing such words as "orbit" and "sphere." The word "empire," used in its large historical sense, better describes what is happening, for it appears that two great empires are being built. It is a mistake to speak of these in terms of the future, as though we still possessed the free will to build or not to build them. Indeed, they largely seem to have been built already; what apparently we are now witnessing is the process of internal organization, integration, stabilization, and delimitation of boundaries. (This, of course, does not mean that the empires will be frozen permanently, that there will be no shifts in boundaries and in spheres of influence. There will be shifts, particularly in the marginal areas. For instance, the Soviet Union may lose strength in some Balkan countries and gain strength in China.)

Just how enduring these empires will prove to be is another matter —perhaps a decade, perhaps a quarter of a century, perhaps a half century, perhaps even a longer period. Other forces, now secondary, may move to the front, become primary forces, and give international trends a push in another direction. For instance, the social-democratic movement typified by Nehru may gain ground in India and the Far East, checking communism and in consequence our compulsion toward American imperialism. Far more likely, communism may spread in Asia. Communism seems to be a more spontaneous force in Asia than in Europe. Should China continue to go communist, the impact of that immense land's coming inside the Soviet hegemony would be tremendous. It might change the nature of Soviet policy, make it less centralized in Moscow, render it more responsive to wider opinion. Or communism in China might turn out to be quite independent of Moscow, as communism in Yugoslavia has. It might become nationalist, resisting Soviet imperialism and communist internationalism. In that case a new balance of power would arise, and fears in the West—fears behind the compulsion to empire—would relax. However, before any of this can happen, not only must communism win in China but China must develop enough modern

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technology to make itself felt as an important power factor. This, it seems, would require at least a quarter of a century. In the meantime the Soviet and American empires probably will have become crystallized, and the American empire, through sheer power or a counter-program of mass attraction or a combination of both, may have checked communism in Asia. As a result, a line demarking the American and Soviet hegemonies probably will cut clear across that continent.

In short, we must avoid a too-categorical interpretation. The dominant trend of today is the enormous expansion of Soviet and American responsibilities and power. This is resulting in the building of what looks very much like two empires. But how far this process goes and how long these empires endure may depend upon other forces. These other forces are now secondary, but they may become primary and produce a new balance of power, a new balance of power which in turn may be affected somewhat by the functional internationalism of communism and the contractual internationalism of the United Nations. However, the supremely important fact of international politics *today* is the emergence of what appear to be Soviet and American empires.

III

Even though they are now ruling over more peoples without consent than with consent and the decisions of their government affect countless other millions in numerous ways, Americans hesitate to call what they are doing in foreign affairs "imperialism." Americans look upon current trends as "temporary." They do not consider that a large part of what is being done (outside the United Nations) may be in process of being institutionalized. They realize that they do not mean to be imperialist, that ideologically they are not imperialist, that indeed their historical ideals are non-imperialist, anti-imperialist. Their political heritage is largely eighteenth century rationalism; they are likely to think of historical events as the products of their conscious free will; they scarcely comprehend that conditions, circumstances, and impersonal historical forces may play a large part in forcing a people into paths they do not want to take.

Moreover, American statesmen, in the periods following the "founding fathers," accustomed as they were to world conditions which made possible a policy of American Continentalism or "isolation," never came

to understand the world balance of power and America's place in it. We have inherited much of this inexperience and many of the naïve notions that accompanied it. Now if we Americans never came fully to comprehend the principles and practices of the normal balance of power, how can we be expected easily to understand the unusual and unique balance of power that exists in the world today?

Then too, American leaders of this generation have been led to expect that the next stage in international relations would be an international organization based upon contractual consent. This fitted with their political concepts inherited from the eighteenth century Enlightenment (among others, the compact-theory of government) and with their habit of thinking of public affairs in terms of written charters, written constitutions, legalism. This expectancy was further strengthened by Anglo-American liberal thinkers and jurists of the nineteenth century, who, in turn, were influenced by the century of international peace from Waterloo to Sarajevo and by the prevailing notions of the inevitability of human progress. American leaders still cling to these ideas in spite of nearly a half century of world wars, revolutions, civil wars, and fierce class conflicts, in spite of mounting evidence demonstrating the importance of class, group, and functional approaches to politics. In this connection it is relevant to recall the disparaging remarks made by H. G. Wells with respect to the futility of Woodrow Wilson's "schoolboy essays" to alter the deeper currents of history.

When Americans think of imperialism at all they think of the mercantile imperialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or of the colonial imperialism of the late nineteenth century. They think of colonies in the tropics, of coaling stations, of naval bases, of "most favored nation" agreements, of localized spheres of influence. But what appears to be emerging in this mid-twentieth century is something more than the limited imperialism of Colbert, Clive, Pitt, Disraeli, Ferry, Rhodes, and Kipling; something even more than the commanding and stabilizing position of Britain in the nineteenth century. What appears to be emerging is something at once more subtle and more grandiose; something akin to the complicated imperialisms of antiquity; something analagous to the empires of Darius, Alexander, Alcibiades, Scipio, and Caesar. Is it any wonder that Americans, hardly at home in the world history of the last century, let alone of antiquity, should be mentally unprepared for

the surprising turn mid-twentieth century history seems to have taken?

Now one does not have to be a Toynbeeite to discern today's analogies to the ancient world, nor does he have to attach the great significance attached to them by the Toynbeeites. Still, such analogies have some value. And what are those analogies?

The great empires of antiquity spread out over vast territories of diverse and highly developed cultures. Often the state building the empire represented a newer and more raw culture than those of the peoples made dependent. Within some of these empires existed a wide variety of political arrangements: some dependent states were associates, some allies, some nominally free, some semi-free, some enslaved. Almost always the dependent peoples continued their cultural self-development. In many ancient empires, the Athenian and the Seleucid for example, dependent city-states exercised a large measure of political freedom. Oftentimes the ties that bound the dependent states to the imperial state represented ideological penetration, the boring from within by fifth columns sponsored by the imperial power. There was a time in the Hellenic world when the triumph of the "aristocratic" party within a city-state meant control of that city-state by Sparta or Persia, the triumph of the "democratic" party within a city-state meant control of that city-state by Athens.

So today, many dependent states within our developing American and Russian empires will appear free; some of them will have a greater degree of freedom than others; all of them will have a rather wide opportunity for continued cultural self-development; a large number of them will be linked to the imperial state by ideological ties (or so it will seem if they are on our side) or by ideological fifth columns (or so it will seem if they are on the other side). Sometimes ancient empires made use of leagues, for instance the Athenian empire was built out of the Delian League. Today, the United States is using the United Nations as one of its devices for integrating the western world, and the Russians are using the old Comintern and the new Cominform for integrating their growing empire. Nor will our body of international law which has been taking shape since the days of Grotius be wasted; what the *ius gentium* was to the Roman empire, the developing body of international law will be to the growing western empire of America.

By the close of the first century B.C., the ancient world had become fairly well stabilized. In the West ruled the Roman empire. In the East

ruled the empire variously known as the Persian, the Seleucid, the Parthian, the Sassanid. Within these empires there was comparative peace: each represented the triumph of a larger political order over the parochialism of the earlier, warring city-states. Between these two empires was established an uneasy *modus vivendi* which lasted for centuries. It was impossible for the one empire to conquer the other. A total war waged for unlimited objectives and full destruction could have been won by neither, and if won, would have been followed by an unenforceable and a chaotic peace. So today, the two great empires in process of development, after their respective boundaries have been fairly well delimited, may settle down to a long period of peace, another uneasy *modus vivendi* dictated by seeming necessities. What necessities? Mutual fear of the cataclysmic weapons of our day. Fear that "victory" of either side would be followed by a chaotic and an unenforceable "peace."

The probability, then, is that an uneasy *modus vivendi* will be arrived at between the Americans and the Russians. Emphasis, however, must be put on the word "uneasy." The fear existing on both sides is likely to continue. Indeed, it is precisely this fear that will lead to the continued building and further integrating of the empires. Mutual fears will continue to beget mutual compulsions toward empire. The imperial powers will not dare to let go and the dependent peoples will not dare let them go.

And—for what they are worth—there are other analogies to be drawn from the ancient world. It will be said that we, like the Romans, are immature; that it is somewhat grotesque to see Americans take the lead over the more experienced, the more sensitive, the more intellectually creative peoples of Western Europe, the peoples who still produce a major portion of the ideas of the western world. But while we are still relatively weak in pure science, in speculative thinking, and in artistic creation, we have no equals in our ability to apply science in a practical way, to make modern technology work, to produce goods and services. Comparably, in the ancient world it was Hellas that produced the ideas but it was Rome that built the roads and aqueducts—and it was Rome, not Hellas, that built the enduring empire of antiquity. And, like Rome, our increasing contacts with the older and mellower world will hasten our own ripening from adolescence to maturity. Cyril Connolly has pointed out how as Europe grows more helpless Americans are compelled to become

more far-seeing and responsible—as Romans were so forced by the long decline of Greece—and he detects a burgeoning of the American spirit, "as if the wonderful *jeunesse* of America were suddenly to retain their idealism and vitality and courage and imagination into adult life."

Again, it is said that the Americans are in no position to take the lead in empire-building at a time the world is experiencing the maturity of the industrial revolution, for America, it is contended, has done least among the great industrial nations to adjust its social and political institutions to the advanced stages of the industrial revolution, to resolve the internal contradictions of industrialism. What can America teach a world frantically seeking a workable adjustment to the Machine Age—America, with its backward social and economic thinking, its anachronistic free-enterprise psychology, its inadequate social security system, its refusal to accept adequate government controls over economic booms and busts, its unorganized salaried classes, its relatively immature labor organizations, its racial prejudices and castes? Now there is some truth in this, but it is also true that no real and lasting adjustment can be made to the Machine Age until nationalistic economic barriers and nationalistic wars are eliminated. The United States may represent a time-lag in its social adaptations to the industrial revolution, but the advocates of a strong American foreign policy point out that the United States has the power and the energy and the practical equipment needed to overcome the parochialism of nationalism and to organize the West internationally, and that apparently no other nation, force, or movement has.

Here again, historical analogies from the ancient world may be suggestive. Of all the great states of antiquity, Athens, in a series of constitutional developments from Solon to Pericles, made the most satisfactory domestic adjustments to the commercial and industrial revolutions of her day. Her transition from a feudal agrarian society to a democratic commercial society was most orderly, most peaceful, and least marred by tyrannies and dictatorships. From the point of view of domestic adjustments, Athens should have led the Hellenic world in external affairs, yet Athens failed in all her attempts at large, cosmopolitan leadership. Her empire was abortive and she was never able to overcome city-state parochialism. On the other hand, Rome never made really successful internal adjustments. Her group and class struggle was never resolved in any sensible way, and down to the end of the Republic the plebeians formed

a kind of state within a state, a state complete with its own institutions, assemblies, and officers. In Italy at large, a classical feudalism, with its great estates, its growing coffles of slaves, its conversion of free farmers into dependents and into an idle city proletariat, grew apace and wormed into all phases of Roman life, leading finally to a century of bloody revolution, then to permanent dictatorship, then to collapse. Rome, in short, never did solve its internal contradictions. Nevertheless, in one phase of its history Rome possessed not only the practical sense but also the force and the energy to put together the Mediterranean world, to surmount city-state parochialism, to end the bloody wars of the Hellenistic states, to create an international order and a long era of international peace.

In this example from antiquity there is both encouragement and discouragement. It is reassuring to know that a rather crude but practical people could do for the ancient world what its more cultivated peoples could not do; but it is disquieting to know that the power which accomplished this merely postponed the grappling with its own internal problems—merely won a domestic reprieve—and that in the end imperial expansion exacerbated internal conflicts to the point where those conflicts could not be resolved peacefully and some could not be resolved at all.

However, such "lessons" from ancient history, while suggestive, must be taken with caution. Our high technological development; our scientific methods; our great capacity to produce goods and services and to cope with human want; our increasing tendency to carry over scientific methods into the social studies; the growth of a scientific humanism; our expanding capacity for self-analysis and self-criticism; our enlarging social consciousness (in spite of the barbarities of our time; indeed, these barbarities have come in part from the irrational impulse to reject ruthlessly the unfamiliar implications of the new social sciences for a better adjusted world); the awakening social awareness and growing sense of belonging of our "internal" proletariat and the absence of an "external" proletariat; the gradual but sure breaking down of the distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" and the barely visible emergence of a genuine international society (which is groping toward institutionalization and which may be coming by way of the imperial detours analyzed in this article)—all of these factors and many others, most of which differentiate us from the ancients, should make us wary of laying too much store by analogies from ancient history.

IV

Let us examine the forces which seem to be operating to produce in this mid-twentieth century two great empires.

What are the forces operating to produce a Russian empire? Some of them go far back into Russian history—the desire of a largely land-locked country to expand to warm-water ports on the Baltic, in the Black Sea area, in Southern Manchuria. Some are the results of bitter experience following the Revolution—the desire to prevent another *cordon sanitaire* and to assure friendly neighboring states for protection against hostile anti-communist powers. Some come out of what amounts to a fear psychosis born of a fixed belief that capitalist countries back the enemies of the Soviet Union everywhere in the world, and that if the Soviet does not convert peoples to communism or secure friendly communist governments in countries even remotely removed from its borders, the only alternative is governments passionately antagonistic to the Soviet Union. Some spring from the dynamic revolutionary nature and the missionary zeal of the Soviet state and its urge positively to expand communism and bring world revolution. These motives for Russian empire building are widely advertised in this country and in a sense are probably better understood than the motives behind the counter-measures taken by the United States.

And what is the historian of the twenty-first century likely to say of the forces that played upon us twentieth-century Americans, causing us to erect—at least for a time—one of the great empires of history? As is the habit with historians, he probably will emphasize the flow of one policy out of another; he likely will say that the drive that led to empire was substantially the same as the practical drive that led us to expand across North America and to develop American Continentalism. He will speak not so much of the break in American policy in 1900 as of its continuity, and American imperialism will be seen as evolving inexorably out of American Continentalism. (Indeed, Frederick J. Turner, writing in 1896, already anticipated this interpretation and incidentally pointed out that our Middle West was nationalist and imperialist, not isolationist. Turner wrote: "That the energies of expansion will no longer operate would be a rash prediction; and the demands for a vigorous foreign policy, for an interoceanic canal, for a revival of our power upon the seas, and for the extension of American influence to outlying islands and

adjoining countries are indications that the movement will continue. The stronghold of these demands lies west of the Alleghanies.")

Our historian will raise certain fundamental questions with respect to power. When have a people, no matter what their form of government or their sentiments, ever long resisted power? When have a people with power failed to occupy a neighboring vacuum? Under such circumstances, have they not always responded affirmatively and then rationalized this response as not only good for themselves but as also good for the dependent peoples? At this point he may find a remark of George Santayana pertinent. Santayana, commenting on the indignation of William James over America's Philippine imperialism of 1900, observed that any realistic appraisal of a given power situation must recognize that domination is likely to become a necessary aim whatever may be the language and even the thoughts of individuals.

The historian will give weight to the economic—the apparent necessity of saving the western economy from complete collapse. He also will give weight to the dictum of the economic determinists who insist that American imperialism is the result of the capitalistic urge to discover again an expanding economy. (These motives for imperialism were anticipated several decades ago by J. A. Hobson in his brilliant analysis of the more restricted imperialism of the turn of the century.)

Our historian also will track down the technological causes: the relation of modern technology's great capacity to produce to the capitalist urge to expand; the propulsion given to communism by the drive of backward peoples to get modern technology in a hurry, a propulsion which produced in America the counteracting compulsion to empire; the devastating nature of wars fought by modern technological weapons and the contemplated terrors of atomic warfare. He will see in modern technology both the *causes* of a larger cosmopolitan society and the *means* of putting such a society together. He will draw analogies between the part played by technology in building the Roman empire and the part played by technology in building the American and Soviet empires.

Finally, the historian of the future will appraise the psychological and the political motives: fear that America would be isolated in a communist world; the urge to save the deeper values of western civilization; the drive to build upon the ruins of the old provincial nationalisms, bled white by wars and paralyzed by revolutionary schisms, a larger society

which would make possible a continuation of life itself in the Machine Age and give western man a reprieve in which to solve peacefully the internal contradictions of industrialism; the patent fact that America alone in the western world had the power of effective action.

In appraising the success or failure of American empire, our historian again will have to return to the nature of power. He will point out that as a people we Americans, at the beginning of our hegemony, had to learn that military, technological, and economic power were not enough, even when supplemented by charitable handouts and faith in the universal efficacy of free enterprise; that power also consists of social adaptability, of an intellectual understanding of foreign attitudes and trends, of an appreciation of historical and cultural relativity, of a sense of the vicarious; that social power must be used to implement physical power. He will also point out that by the mid-twentieth century social politics had become an indispensable element of power politics. How well twentieth-century Americans learned this peculiarly significant truth and how well they applied it in supporting the social-democratic aspirations of the peoples of Western Europe and in developing a people's program in Asia that could compete with Soviet communism, only the historian of the future can say. But whatever he says on this point is likely to contain the essential elements of American success or failure.

V

If this analysis of contemporary imperialism is a correct one, then its implications and ramifications are supremely significant for every problem and movement of our time. It involves some important reconsiderations and some decisive actions. It means even more armaments. It means some kind of compulsory military service in peacetime. Ultimately, it may mean giving military guarantees to countries as remote and as far removed as Iran, Sweden, India. It means vast expansion in State Department personnel and the training of thousands of Americans for responsible posts abroad, not for a temporary "emergency" but for a long time to come. Ultimately, it may mean revision of America's historic protective tariff policy. It means, if we are wise, a creative program of social politics in Europe and Asia. (This is the area in which we are likely to fumble and falter.) It means re-evaluation in our estimates of the future upswings and dips in the American business cycle. It means

that for some time to come we may escape a really serious depression. It means that reform movements and the forces making for long-range political party realignments may be slowed, in spite of the liberal temper of the country in domestic politics. (Social services may continue to expand, but not as rapidly as they would if so much of our wealth and resources were not going into vast armament programs. Moreover, as pointed out by Mark Etheridge in the *New York Times Magazine,* the motives for the expansion of social services will shift from individual welfare to the necessity to be strong collectively as a nation and to propagandize abroad for our "way of life.") And it means the party now in power, assuming that party does a tolerable job of integrating our expanding hegemony, probably will remain in power for a long time to come.

VI

Now, plain statement of the fundamental proposition laid down here may be disturbing reading to many people. It is so much pleasanter to think in terms of surface events and to continue to pretend that the nations of Western Europe are still as free and sovereign as they once were and that the members of the United Nations act as free agents in a free association of nations. (Although, of course, it is quite all right to think of the countries in the Russian hegemony as dependent and even enslaved and as having no freedom in the United Nations.)

Communists will not like facing the fact that the communist revolution has become more an adjunct of Russian power than of spontaneous mass revolution, particularly in Europe. Socialists will not like hearing that the future of democratic socialism resides in capitalist America. Liberals and social democrats will not like to confront squarely the failure of the United Nations, the hard facts of American imperialism, the apparent necessity for conscription and large military commitments, and the use for armaments of public wealth which might otherwise go into even more rapidly expanding social services. And doctrinaire capitalists will not like being told that capitalism is to have a new lease on life, not because of its inherent merits and superiorities, but because it has through imperialism recovered its old opportunities for expansion.

It must not be thought that communism, socialism, and the movement toward democratic international government are entirely spent forces. Communism as an ideological factor making for revolution, and

democratic socialism as a developing system within large areas of the American hegemony are still factors to be reckoned with. Even the United Nations may develop in time from an agency supplementing American power into a governing body for western society. The building of empire will not destroy the group and ideological struggle within that empire and it may actually encourage group co-operation and conflict to cross the old national barriers. Conservatives in the United States may more and more join hands with rightists in other countries, and leftists in the United States with socialists in other countries. Functional group politics on an international scale may be increasingly played not only within empire but also within that ancillary body known as the United Nations. And one day in the long future a general leftist trend within the American hegemony may convert the United Nations from an auxiliary agency into a primary one. However, this is speculative and for the future.

The important fact today is that communism, socialism, and the movement toward free international government based upon consent are not the driving forces they were expected to be; that they are operating in a different way from what was anticipated and have become distorted; that they have not developed the prime initiative to control history; that they have become subsidiary forces rather than paramount ones; that they are all *at this time* largely dependent upon the power of either Russia or the United States.

What makes doubly significant the miscarriage of these movements is the dangerous polarization of power existing today and the haunting fear produced by the cataclysmic weapons of our time. Out of the pressures produced by this terrifying impasse we seem to be developing imperialisms suggestive of the imperialisms of antiquity.

There are American liberals and leftists who will say that the central proposition laid down in this article is too pessimistic, that, fortunately, American capitalism is not wise enough to carry through such an ambitious undertaking. (For evidences of a developing universal ethic or rationale to justify American empire, it would be well for these people to read the speech of John Foster Dulles at the Amsterdam meeting of the World Council of Churches. Also, it would be well for them to read the recent Rome speech of James D. Zellerbach, head of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Italy, in which Mr. Zellerbach frankly told the Italians to gear their economy to American free enterprise.) Now

if American empire does not spring in part—and only in part—from the conscious planning of American "free enterprisers" it may spring from their short-sightedness! For should our failure to establish sufficient economic controls carry us into an economic depression, we would bring down with us the economic structure of all Western Europe. Out of the resulting economic misery would come a spread of communism, and out of a spread of communism would come even stronger impulses to American empire to check that spread—impulses that still could be implemented by tremendous economic power.

Now the author of this piece is attempting to separate what he *wants* to happen from what he thinks *is happening*. He had hoped that the world situation would take shape in such a way that an American empire would not develop (and he does not, to use Philip Rahv's phrase, embrace the politics of disillusionment, for he will continue to advocate the desirability of a social-democratic world, and he sees the historical process as eclectic and synthetic, blending in strange ways seemingly contradictory movements), but he perceives world forces moving to bring an American empire into being. Within himself the historical interpreter and the political reformer are somewhat in conflict, and there is always the possibility that the mere analysis of what seems to be happening will actually contribute to its happening beyond recall.

In the actual state of the world today, however, there are alternatives to empire much more undesirable. Far worse than empire would be a weak western world unable to cope with the aggressions of the Soviet Union. Surrender by appeasement or defeat in war is to be avoided at all costs—and one of the costs may be the building of an American hegemony strongly suggestive of empire. In this sense the developing American imperialism is distinctly to the good. Nor do the peoples dependent upon United States protection look upon growing American power as an unmixed evil. Far worse than strong American leadership, in their majority opinion, would be a United States upon which they could not depend for security against Soviet aggression.

Undeniably, for those of us who had hoped for a social-democratic world operating through an international government based upon genuine consent, there is much in the present trend that is bitterly disappointing. But whether we like it or not, if we are honest we shall have to acknowledge the emerging realities of the hard world of power.

Epitaph For An Empty Grave

By WILLARD N. MARSH

Beyond the monastery garden wall, the world
Surges like the sea; strange appeals occasionally wash ashore
In bottles, but they are in another tongue.
The oldest brother tells of primitive legends:
Hate, Waste, Want, Blood—of love that scrawls itself
In transient idioms upon a soiled slate.
And while the world strains at their dike, the brothers
Wander in the dutch-blue dusk, among non-Freudian tulips
That grow between the rows of functional potatoes.
They wander till the iron tongue annotates
The muezzin hour: bells blossom on the tides of evening
As they file back indoors. Wings spread,
God perches nearby in the steepled dusk.
Somewhere a distant ambulance shrills urgently,
A seagull keening past their barren beach.

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A STORY

Nothing Trivial

By RAYA KEEN

THE BUS was crowded. The conductor's voice, frayed with impatience, spat out each word like a "fie."

"Fares!" he snarled. "*Feh*-res, please. Have your fare ready. *Feh*-res, please."

Martha Jefferson put her briefcase under her arm and hugged it with her elbow while she opened her purse. She always put a dime in before she left the house because she disliked getting change. Usually something would happen. A coin would fall out of her hand and she'd have to stoop and search while the conductor growled over her. Or else the thin dime seemed to become thinner and adhesive and she was unable to dislodge it from her fingers and aim it at the slot. But even when nothing happened, she didn't like to hold out her palm for change. She didn't like to wait, palm up, like a supplicant.

The conductor reached Martha.

"Fares," he said directly at her. "Fares!"

He didn't say please. He had said it all along the line, but he didn't say it to her. Martha's mouth compressed into a hard line of resentment and her fingers floundered in her purse.

"*Feh*-re," snapped the conductor. "Fares, please. Have your fare ready. Feh-re, please."

Martha looked at him. His face was redly belligerent. But he was unaware of her. His spleen was impersonal and all-embracing.

Martha found her dime.

She moved to the back of the bus and holding her briefcase and purse handles in one hand she gripped the back of the seat with the other. The man over whom she was swaying got up. Martha stepped aside to let him pass and sank happily into the vacated seat. Suddenly she stiffened. Did

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the woman sitting beside her shrink away? Martha wasn't sure. And she couldn't look at the woman to make sure. She tried to slide to the very edge of her seat, to shrink from the shrinking. She couldn't move. She sat in angry humiliation, her lips pressed painfully against her teeth.

"I beg your pardon," said the woman, a fleshy, well-groomed white woman. "I'm getting off here."

Martha moved aside and then moved in to the window. She put the briefcase on the floor against her feet. And now she felt the grimace of her mouth, and she was frightened. She relaxed her jaw and passed the tip of her tongue over her lips. She was afraid to acquire the zippered mouth of the embittered. She was too young, too pretty.

And she was obsessed. After all she had been mistaken about the conductor. She had probably been mistaken about the woman who had just left. But then, today was one of her bad days.

It had started when she was dressing. She was brushing her hair in front of the mirror, and suddenly she had put down her brush and looked at herself. She had seen that her eyes were large and long and shining as though tear-washed, that her nose was short but not flat, that her lips were full but shapely. She had seen that she was pretty. "Real pretty for a nigger," she had hissed at herself. "Real pretty for a nigger."

No one had ever said that to Martha. But Martha heard it all the time. She heard it from appraising eyes and from patronizing, sometimes pitying, smiles. She heard it because she was so afraid to hear it, and because she was a Negro.

It wouldn't matter so much if she were ugly, she thought. It was a misery to be ugly no matter what your color. Ugliness was an impartial injury to your person. But when you were beautiful and young it was a misery to be colored. It was unfair, it was cruel to be born colored. And that was the first thing people saw. Color was like a sandwichman's signs that hid you while advertising someone else's prejudice. Color! Martha hated the word. She hated the white people who drooled about rich copper tones. She hated the Negroes who pretended pride in their skins—like slaves pretending that their chains were the train of a regal robe.

Martha sighed deeply.

Yes, today was one of her days; a day when color flashed through her thoughts like a red rag baiting a bull.

Yet she had wakened in a good humor. She had remembered that Lily Frazer would be back today. Martha worked for the Frazers and liked them. She liked Lily, the daughter, best. And Lily had been away for two weeks visiting an aunt in Detroit. Martha had decided to wear her good suit and her new brimmed felt hat in honor of Lily's return. Perhaps that was the trouble. Perhaps it was the desire to look well and the knowledge that she looked well that made the smells and the sights and sounds around her so hard to bear.

When she had locked the door to her room and had hurried down the dim hall and smelled the fetid air of the house she had sickened with shame. She knew it smelled of rotting boards and bad plumbing and over-crowded rooms and over-worked, unwashed bodies. She also knew that people sniffed and said it smelled of color. And so she was ashamed.

When she stepped into the corner drug store for juice and coffee and saw the hatless colored girls, with their hair stiffened and straightened and fatuous like waxed mustache ends, she had been ashamed. Why did they do it? It was such a defeated imitation. It was like mink-dyed rabbit fur.

When some young bucks sported in and gathered around the juke box and began to stomp and clap and swing each other to the music, Martha had glared at them in fury. "Uninhibited," she seemed to hear a slurring white voice proclaim. "Born entertainers. Absolute children." Yes, Martha had glared and she had hated. Because hatred and shame were the burden of her pride.

She wanted the Negro to be the best-behaved, the quietest, the most brilliant. She wanted the Negro to be perfect because he was persecuted. And so she hated; herself, for her shame; the Negro for his failures; the white man for his white security.

And again Martha sighed. And heard herself sigh. She sat up, uneasy and embarrassed. The briefcase knocked against her shifting leg and slumped flat on the floor. Martha made a grab for it, at the same time poking her head at the window in a distraught effort to see where she was.

"This is Fifty-sixth Street."

Martha turned her head in surprise. She hadn't seen or felt the white woman sit down beside her.

"Oh, thank you," said Martha. "I lost track of the streets."

The woman smiled. "It happens to me very often," she said pleasantly.

"I get off at Firty-fourth Street," Martha volunteered.

The woman inclined her head politely and got up to let Martha out.

"Thank you," said Martha.

Martha lingered on the curb and as the bus passed her she looked through the window at the woman. She felt quite happy. And that was unreasonable. As unreasonable as her recent depression. Nothing had really happened. A conductor said please. Or he didn't say please. A woman told her what street it was. It was trivial. It should be meaningless. But Martha walked west on Fifty-fourth Street with a brisk and buoyant stride. Nothing was trivial, no courtesy could be taken for granted, accepted casually if you were a Negro.

Martha swung her briefcase. It didn't seem heavy as usual, although it was Monday and she had two classes and the briefcase was packed with her schoolbooks and her working smock and shoes. This was one Monday she couldn't expect her Sunday comics though, reflected Martha. Lily would be too enthusiastically preoccupied with her homecoming to remember. Martha smiled. Ever since Lily had discovered that Martha liked the comics but bought only the *Times* on Sunday, Lily saved them for her. It was an attention too slight to be a gesture. It was an attention that was magnified by its slightness like emotion by understatement. It made Martha glow to think of it. Martha hurried.

Soon she reached the building in which the Frazers lived. It was an old graystone apartment house. The lobby was large and bare and clean. Spotless, Martha noted enviously. She crossed the tiled expanse quickly and stepped into the service elevator. She wondered as it rose whether the other elevator creaked so menacingly.

Martha got off on the eleventh floor and rang the bell of 11C.

Mrs. Frazer opened the door. Her blond hair was dishevelled and she looked happily busy.

"Good morning, Martha," she said.

"Good morning, Mrs. Frazer. Is Miss Lily back?"

"Yes. She came in last night. Go in and say hello to her before you change."

Martha followed Mrs. Frazer to Lily's bedroom.

Lily was standing in front of a full length mirror, preening in an unfinished white evening dress.

"Hello, Martha," she called. "How nice you look!"

"Hello, Miss Lily. It's good to have you back."

"It's good to be back. But Detroit was fun. I like your hat, Martha. New?"

Martha nodded.

"Very smart. Which reminds me—how were your exams? Did you pass?"

"Of course she passed," said Mrs. Frazer.

"What did you get?"

"Hold still, Lily," grumbled Mrs. Frazer, who was on her knees adjusting the hem of Lily's dress. "Stop wiggling."

"I'm sorry, mother. What did you get, Martha?"

"Ninety in Psychology, eighty-seven in French and —"

"My God, I don't see how you do it. Working during the day . . . and then such marks!"

"Martha works hard," said Mrs. Frazer approvingly.

"She's certainly giving me an inferiority complex," said Lily. "I just don't see how you do it, Martha."

Martha smiled self-consciously.

"There's something for you on the bed," announced Lily.

"For me?" And turning Martha saw the pile of funnies and beside it a small flat package.

"Open it."

Martha fumbled with the string.

"It's nothing you can't get in New York," said Lily disparagingly. "But the label proves it's a remembrance from Detroit."

Martha untied the package and took out the black suede gloves. And then, without realizing what she was saying, in breathless gasps that were like involuntary souvenirs of slavery, she said:

"Kiss her for me, Mrs. Frazer. Kiss Miss Lily for me."

Lily's face became scarlet. She veered back to the mirror and laughed nervously.

"It never fails," she giggled. "I always have to go to the bathroom just when I'm being fitted. Excuse me." She hurried out of the room.

Mrs. Frazer rose from her knees.

"Excuse me, Martha," she said and followed Lily out of the room.

Martha smoothed the soft suede mechanically. Her mouth was pursed, hard and hurting against her teeth. And the horror of her humiliation was that she knew it was self-seeking. It was as though the known prejudices of others perversely impelled her to seek the level that was expected of her. She had spoken like a slave, like a nigger. . . .

Yes, like a nigger, like a nigger, Martha branded herself viciously, feeling the word like a lasso tightening around her throat.

"Do you like the gloves, Martha?" Lily asked in a pinched voice as she sidled back into the room. "Do they fit?"

Martha turned, and somehow the gloves, like the bus fare that betrayed her, dropped out of her hands.

The two girls stooped simultaneously to pick them up. When they straightened they stood staring at each other in anguished embarrassment. Lily was the first to speak.

"I had to guess at your size," she said shyly, handing Martha the glove she had picked up.

"Thank you," said Martha. "It was lovely of you to think of me. Thank you very much." She folded the gloves carefully and placed them on the pile of funnies.

Communists in the Colleges: Two Views

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Recent actions by certain colleges, and the categorical positions taken by those defending or denouncing those actions, have underscored the need for a more fundamental understanding of the precise issues involved. The point of tension has been the practical point of tenure—a fact which has not always been kept in sight by partisans arguing the pros and cons. The following exchange, by Professor Ralph F. Fuchs of the Indiana University School of Law and Professor Robert M. Hunter of the Ohio State University College of Law, may help to clarify an issue all too difficult to isolate, involving as it does personalities, teacher-administration aims and responsibilities, and the meaning of academic freedom. The exchange of vews was presented before the conference of Indiana State Chapters of the American Association of University Professors, April 9, 1949, Professor Hunter's remarks being subsequently prepared for publication.*

Academic Freedom and Tenure in Relation to Communist Party Membership

By RALPH F. FUCHS

THE QUESTION BEFORE US is whether it is wise to recognize a right of colleges and universities to dismiss members of the Communist Party from their faculties because of that membership; or, put in a different way, whether dismissals for this cause are consistent with sound principles of academic freedom and tenure. That question has come to the surface prominently of late because of public discussion and several recent instances of dismissal. Committee A of the American Association of University Professors has strongly taken the position in its report for 1947 and has repeated it in its 1948 report, that party membership should not in itself be ground for dismissal. Ths view has been taken, not by a few men at headquarters, but unanimously by a representative professional

group which has given much thought to the matter; and it has been approved by the Council of the Association. It does not, however, prejudge any of the cases which are now before Committee A for determination in the light of all of their facts.

There seem to be two main reasons for contending that membership in the Communist Party warrants dismissal. The first is that the safety of the nation and of our way of life requires colleges and universities to eliminate disloyal individuals from their ranks. This, I submit, is an unsound reason. Withdrawal of economic opportunity and the infliction of criminal punishment in order to guard the safety of the State are properly in the hands of authorities established for this purpose. If, using legal and constitutional means, they order the dismissal of members of the Communist Party or make membership in that party illegal, the institutional duty to act accordingly may arise, and not before. Institutions of higher learning, although they serve the state in a very fundamental way, are not charged with an obligation to go beyond the law to protect the existing social structure or existing governments. Indeed, it would endanger their primary function for them to do so; for it is their task to examine searchingly and critically into the truth, including economic, social, and political truth. That cannot be done in subjection to the established order. As a matter of justice to the individual, moreover, Congress and the Supreme Court have wisely recognized upon occasion that a human being may have loyalties which for him are superior to his loyalty to the political state. If organized government can tolerate such persons, colleges and universities surely are under a duty to protect them in their opportunity as faculty members to apply their thought and effort freely. According to democratic ideology, the system that permits them to do so is thereby rendered sound and safe, rather than endangered.

The other chief reason for urging the dismissal of members of the Communist Party from academic positions is an asserted inconsistency of such membership with objective teaching and pursuit of truth. The party member is committed, it is said, to a dogma; to the advancement of doctrines formulated in Moscow; and to support of the cause of Soviet Russia. He is bound in all of his teaching, writing, and conduct to behave accordingly and even to use dishonest methods in pursuing the purposes of the party. This is the most serious reason advanced, and it has carried conviction to many thoughtful people.

I believe, however, that this argument overlooks several important considerations. In the first place, as Alexander Meiklejohn has just pointed out ably in the *New York Times,* the obligations of party membership, whatever they may be, are voluntarily assumed because of belief; and they may be discarded by resignation, as they have been in a number of well-known instances. The party possesses no power of compulsion. Therefore, those who say that a Communist Party member should be dismissed from a faculty because he has bound himself to a certain point of view and certain conduct are in effect arguing that the consequences of a particular intellectual position are forbidden to the teacher, despite the fact that others may freely take that position and act accordingly. An argument more inconsistent with intellectual freedom and the freedom of the teacher as a citizen would be difficult to imagine.

It may be said, however, that while all this may be true, the Communist Party member is nevertheless an intellectual slave to the party while he remains a member and that, at least until he shakes off his party obligations, he should be kept out of academic posts. This argument proves too much and fails to take account of important factors. Even the most rational individuals among us are not governed wholly by reason, and few there are whose various intellectual views are wholly consistent with each other. Scientific advance has taken place through the thought and work of men even while they adhered, for example, to religious dogmas inconsistent with scientific endeavor. Noble artistic creations have been brought forth by individuals whose political and social opinions are anathema to democratic minds. Even political and social truth have been apprehended and contributed to humanity by cold-blooded villains whose ideas and purposes our democratic ideology rejects as false and perverted. It is utterly unrealistic to demand that a teacher maintain a scale of values and a set of ideas completely consistent with democracy or with his work as a teacher and searcher after the truth. If such a demand were to be enforced, it would result in the dismissal of many who adhere to religious and other dogmas, either because of their content or because they sometimes are supported by organizational discipline and belief in supernatural sanctions that block off scholarly objectivity in certain areas of knowledge. Yet, on the whole, our teaching and research go forward relatively free of taint from the inconsistent positions we hold, largely because the pursuit of truth has its own disciplines. If we strike at the

communist because we say he has surrendered his freedom and that our institutions should be purged of all who cannot demonstrate completely open minds in the search for truth, we must eliminate many others also. That would be a high price to pay.

If demonstration be needed that objectivity in his chosen field is possible even for a Communist Party member, it is furnished by the case of Professor Phillips, recently dismissed from the University of Washington. Eight of the eleven members of the faculty committee which sat in the University of Washington cases state specifically in their reports that in his philosophy classes, when he had occasion to discuss Marxism, Professor Phillips did so in an objective manner and with warning to his students to evaluate his lectures in the light of his bias. If such is the fact in his case, it could be in others too. The incident illustrates the wisdom of Committee A's insistence in its report a year ago that ground for dismissal of a college or university teacher must be established by proof of violation of duty in his particular case and that guilt by association is inadmissible.

It is said, of course, and it may be true, that the Communist Party instructs its teacher members to take advantage of their positions to further the communist cause and to avoid exposure while doing so. I do not argue that one who has consciously undertaken to use his teaching position in such a manner should not be dismissed. Of course he should be. But I insist that actual personal guilt of such an offense should be required and that membership in the Communist Party should not in itself be taken as a basis for concluding that the offense has been committed.

Adherence to any other principle presents serious dangers of abuse. It is naïve to suppose that, with Communist Party membership as difficult to prove as it is, and with the motivation that causes many to advocate dismissal of party members, the purge of our institutions could stop with teachers whose membership was demonstrated. Inevitably, those who were shown to be "party liners" or "fellow travellers" would have to go too, on the ground that they either avoided membership for tactical reasons or managed effectively to prevent its formal proof, or because the "fellow traveller," even though not a party member and perhaps lacking in desire to become one, is as enslaved intellectually as one who has entered into formal affiliation. The case of Professor Spitzer, recently

denied reappointment at Oregon State College, illustrates this point. I do not undertake, of course, to pass judgment upon the merit of the College's action in the light of all the facts. President Strand's utterances in connection with the case, however, clearly take the position that since "exact proof of a person's loyalties and beliefs is difficult and often impossible to produce," public friendliness by a faculty member toward a scientific position advocated by communist authorities which is opposed by the great weight of scientific judgment, renders the individual unfit to be a teacher, at least when it is accompanied by other "pro-Soviet propaganda." In other words, advocacy of sufficiently unpopular ideas justifies dismissal.

President Allen of the University of Washington frames his utterances regarding the tenure rights of communists temperately. He casts doubt upon his fundamental philosophy, however, by a passage in his introduction to the pamphlet recently published, containing the report of the tenure cases at that institution. Again, I do not undertake to pass judgment upon these cases. President Allen says, however, "It is not surprising" that the question of tenure for Communist Party members should receive "first detailed attention" in the Northwest. "Throughout the history of this area," he points out, "liberal thought and freedom of action have been highly prized. But," he continues, "it is commonly accepted, I believe, except by those devoted to communism itself, that communism is parasitic on real liberalism, that communism thrives best where there is a background of honest liberalism, and that communism, generally speaking, has taken advantage of tolerance of liberal thought and action to further its ends." The partial truth at the close of this quotation does not obscure the major untruth that communism thrives best against a background of honest liberalism. The belief that it does and that communism must be eliminated seems clearly to threaten honest liberalism itself. One can hardly expect that, given such a belief, faculty purges will stop with those who are party members.

The action of the University of Washington in the case of the three accused faculty members who were not dismissed raises further serious questions. They were placed "on probation" because, forsooth, they had once lived up to their particular ideas by becoming members of the Communist Party and again by resigning from membership. Because of these indiscretions, they are humbled before their students and placed under

surveillance lest they wander from the path of rectitude again. The conditions of their probation are not stated, but it does not take an overactive imagination to conjure them up. Subservience to "safe" ideas, not honest living and honest teaching, seems to be what is expected of them.

Those believers in freedom whose hatred for the cruelty and duplicity of Russian communism and whose disgust for the tactics of communists in the United States tempt them to join hands with advocates of suppression to eliminate communists from the teaching profession had better consider carefully the contents of the Pandora's box they propose to open. The only sound and feasible position is, I submit, the view advocated by Committee A of our organization. This view is that any attempt to subject teachers to civic limitations not imposed upon other citizens is a threat against the academic profession and against the society which the profession serves. The safety of our democratic order rests upon the improvement of knowledge and the refinement of our purposes through free investigation and "free trade in ideas," including free action upon ideas within legal limits. If we sacrifice these freedoms by imposing conformity to prevailing opinion within our colleges and universities, we endanger the safety of the State itself.

* * *

Communists, Academic Freedom, and Tenure

By ROBERT M. HUNTER

SHOULD teachers' organizations fight for the reinstatement of faculty members discharged because of admitted or proven membership in the Communist Party?

The question is closely related to, but not the same as the question, "Should Communist Party members be allowed to teach?" The latter is a policy question and in the first instance is decided by the administrators and governing bodies of our colleges and universities. Some of the reasons which support a negative answer to the first question are also applicable to the second, but others are not, and the two questions should be kept separate and distinct. Neither of the above questions should be confused with a third: "Should teachers who are not communists, but who are so labeled by irresponsible persons, be protected in their tenure?"

The first question should be answered "No" for at least three reasons. (1) The loyalty implications of Communist Party membership have become such as to warrant policy decisions by educational institutions in connection with such membership; (2) Intellectual integrity and Communist Party membership are incompatible; (3) An effective fight for the protection of the rights of noncommunist liberals cannot be carried on by an organization committed to the defense of communists.

Sufficient evidence has been brought to light in recent months to place Communist Party members under a deserved suspicion of disloyalty to the National Government. To contend that conviction of treason in a criminal case should be a prerequisite to justification of discharge from a university faculty position is to ignore the true relation of the faculty member to his employer and the latter's relation to the public.

It is not unfair to liken the communist of today to the Bundist of 1939, 1940, and 1941. If the latter had been discharged from a university faculty because of his organization's placing loyalty to the German Nazi regime above that to his own government, teachers' organizations would have been ill advised to protest. The ruthlessness of totalitarian states makes a mockery of the well-intended gestures of liberals in behalf of their adherents. We were in a cold war with Germany long before the shooting war started after Pearl Harbor. The cold war of today places Communist Party members in a setting in which conflicting loyalties are of the utmost importance. Communist leaders in this country have followed the pattern of similar leaders in other countries of publicly announcing their intention, if war should come, to oppose war efforts of this country directed against Russia, because such a war would be unjust, aggressive, and imperialistic. Similar opposition to war with Hitler was voiced by both Bundists and communists in 1940 and 1941 prior to Hitler's invasion of Russia.

The confessions of such former communist leaders as Benjamin Gitlow and Louis Budenz, and the writings of present leaders, such as William Z. Foster's *Toward Soviet America* (Coward-McCann, Inc., 1932) leave little doubt as to the conspiratorial character of the Communist Party. A college or university which knowingly employed a Communist Party member would be warranted in discharging him in view of the presently known implications of such membership.

The person who secured employment as a teacher without disclosing Communist Party membership or, being a teacher, joined the party without disclosing that fact to the college or university, has not shown the good faith which is to be expected of any college faculty member.

Intellectual integrity and Communist Party membership are incompatible. Academic freedom means more than freedom from restraints imposed by the institution which employs the teacher. The preamble to the 1940 Statement of Principles of the American Association of University Professors contains the following statement:

> Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good, and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition. (34 *A.A.U.P. Bull.* 130)

Is it possible for one to adhere to the tenets and obligations of the Communist Party and also freely search for truth and freely expound it? The answer is "No." Professor Sidney Hook *(New York Times Magazine,* Feb. 27, 1949) has called public attention to the fact that "The concluding sentence of the pledge which the member inducted into the Communist Party takes since 1935 reads":

> I pledge myself to remain at all times a vigilant and firm defender of the Leninist line of the party, the only line that insures the triumph of Soviet power in the United States. *(Daily Worker,* April 2, 1936)

How repugnant to common conceptions of freedom and truth the Leninist line may be is indicated by certain "Leninist" maxims quoted by Max Eastman in his Foreword to Benjamin Gitlow's story of communism in America, *The Whole of Their Lives* (Scribners, p. ix, 1948):

> We do not believe in external principles of morality. . . . Communist morality is identical with the fight to strengthen the dictatorships of the proletariat. We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, lawbreaking, withholding and concealing truth. We can and must write . . . in a language which sows among the masses hate, revulsion, scorn and the like toward those of differing opinion.

The same Foreword contains an account of the expulsion of Gitlow from the Communist Party of the United States because of his attempted defiance of Stalin's edict that American communists submit to the decision of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. This account is taken from Gitlow's earlier book, *I Confess* (E. P. Dutton, 1939).

Professor Hook in the article previously cited indicates the changes in the party line issuing from Moscow and the slavish adherence to it of Communist Party members in this country. He writes:

> In the social sciences, Communist Party teachers taught in 1934 that Roosevelt was a Fascist; in 1936 during the Popular Front, a progressive; in 1940, during the Nazi-Stalin pact, a warmonger and imperialist; in 1941, after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, a leader of the oppressed peoples of the world.

In view of the absurdities which have characterized the party line pronouncements, and the uncritical acceptance of them by American communists, it would be a bold person who would defend the thesis that communist teachers are free to search for the truth and to expound it. The ridiculous situations in which American communists have found themselves, in vehemently proclaiming the party line as they have received it, are well known. In his book *The Red Decade* (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1941) Eugene Lyons describes the predicament in which party line followers found themselves in August 1939. He writes (p. 342):

> (1) August 14, 1939, some four hundred Americans, among them important figures in education, the arts, sciences and religion, issued a long Open Letter branding as 'Fascist' and 'reactionaries' all those who dared suggest 'the fantastic falsehood that the U.S.S.R. and the totalitarian states are basically alike.' The letter particularly castigated the Committee for Cultural Freedom formed some months earlier, for including Russia among the totalitarian nations that suppress cultural independence and deny civil freedom.
>
> (2) August 23, 1939. Both Berlin and Moscow made it known that their respective dictatorships had entered into a pact of friendship, nonaggression and mutual economic aid—the pact which was the signal for the second World War.

A dean interviewing an applicant for a position might well ask, "Is there anything which will prevent you from diligently seeking the truth and passing it along to your students?" A communist, if he answered truthfully, would have to reply, "I shall diligently seek the truth as it is expounded by the Praesidium of the Comintern,"—Benjamin Gitlow says that it still functions. (*The Whole of Their Lives*, p. 353). It is quite improbable that one frankly stating such a view would be hired. When, without such frankness, a communist has succeeded in obtaining a college teaching position, or has retained such a position after joining the party, his colleagues owe him no duty of defending his tenure. A college faculty is a body of free men, each entitled to regard his fellows as searchers after the truth. A communist, with his allegiance to Moscow, is not in a posi-

tion to make his contribution to the joint effort. By the same token he is in no position to demand or to expect that his colleagues shall rally to his support.

An organization which purports to defend the rights of non-communists who are under unwarranted attack as communists must make clear its position as recognizing a distinction between these persons and admitted or proven communists.

In what has been previously said an attempt has been made to show that real questions may be raised as to the wisdom or desirability of hiring or retaining communists as teachers. For every communist on a college faculty it is probable that there are from ten to a hundred persons who have been unjustly called communists by irresponsible persons who throw the term about with abandon. If one detests totalitarianism in Russia as well as in Spain and publicly attacks it as existing in both countries he is a "communist" to Francolovers and a "fascist" to the party liners. If he believes that Negroes and other persons of color are entitled to consideration and respect he is a "red" from the viewpoint of certain members of the "white" race. If he advocates the public generation and distribution of power he is a "communist" in the tirades which emanate from private power companies and their Charlie McCarthys. If he believes in the essential soundness of farmer and consumer co-operatives, he thereby becomes a communist in the diatribes of the so-called National Tax Equality Association.

On the faculties of any number of colleges will be found many genuine liberals who are maligned for holding some or all of these views. If they have arrived at their convictions in a quest for the truth which caused them to consider and to weigh all the available evidence, they are entitled to the unswerving support of their fellows whether their views are widely shared or not.

Between such persons and the communists shackled to a party line there is a spread as wide as that from pole to pole. When a really free member of a faculty is discharged, or threatened with discharge, because of attacks by powerful selfish interests, faculty organizations should mobilize their resources and fight for academic freedom and tenure. How futile will be their efforts if communists have succeeded in their strategy of blurring the distinctions between themselves and non-communist liberals. Public opinion is a vital factor in any such controversy.

No greater disservice can be done to non-communists than to blanket them with communists in the public thinking. That is exactly what the communists desire. It is also playing into the hands of the reactionaries who by their charges have indicated that no distinction should be made.

A non-communist teacher whose tenure is threatened because of any such views as those previously mentioned might well hesitate before accepting the support of an organization which is equally willing to support the cause of an admitted or proven communist. A faculty organization may say, "We don't care whether you're a communist or not. We'll fight for you regardless." Does any one believe that it will be as effective in its fight in behalf of a non-communist as it would be if it should say: "We too recognize the great difference which separates a communist teacher from one who is free to seek the truth. We know that this man, our brother, is not a communist and we shall fight to the end to see that he receives just treatment."

The White Problem in the South

By PETER A. CARMICHAEL

NOT SINCE pre-Civil War times has the South made a serious, thoughtful attempt to deal with its "Negro problem." The colonization movement of the decades just before the war, though it came to little result, was rationally conceived, not shirking the facts or scheming to justify them, but meeting them squarely and magnanimously. The slaves had been imported and had become a charge upon the conscience, to say the least, of a good many owners; now let them be sent back. That project, like slavery itself, was costly and complicated. Ever since its failure, and in spite of emancipation, defeat in war, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the South has tried to suppress the whole "problem."

This attempt has been vain and degrading to the South. In the place of intelligence and cool objectivity, not to speak of humanitarianism, which were leading motives to colonization, what have we now? Self-deception, inaction, nullification. These we have had so long that a tacit presumption of their legal and ethical justification has arisen and pervades the mind of the South. It is presumed that the Negro has a distinct place —*his* place—which is below the level of citizenship; that in spite of the Civil War and the Constitution there is an unwritten law guaranteeing this; that the South is an autarchy, immune to all attempts of the nation to stop lynching and to give equal protection of the law. There is a weapon, now very familiar, to give force to these presumptions; namely, that hoodlum device of the bad loser, that club of the bigoted over the enlightened, the filibuster.

There are quasi-slaves in the South today, both black and white, in large numbers. The average black is still a slave, extralegally, to the

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white, and the white is an unwitting slave to inertia. As the filibuster stifles reason, so the dead force of thoughtless presumption, of which the filibuster is an implement, shuts off the motivation of enlightened action. Self-righteousness, touchiness, pettiness have arisen as shields. An element called Southern liberals is aware of wrongness somewhere but is ever hesitant about causing justice to prevail or about ascertaining what the just course really is. Wait, they say; let us deal with this problem in our own way; look at the progress we have already made.

Let justice wait? I wonder whether this would be their plea if they themselves were the victims. Justice can never wait without implication of injustice.

There is no more a Negro problem in the South than in New York or Somaliland, but there is a confounded white problem. Before the country and the world it is not the Negro who is under indictment, but his defaulted master. Whether a rapist or murderer is lynched immediately or electrocuted after trials and delays, is a small matter so far as he himself concerns others. The former fate is perhaps the lighter, if he has any awareness, for it saves him the dreadful distraction of the condemned. But it is ominous to think that justice should be so flouted or be uperceived. There is an offense against the sovereignty of government, in fact a petty insurrection. If the state cannot or will not punish the offenders, it has abdicated if not connived, and when this happens the national government must act if it, too, is not to surrender to the outlaws.

Now citizens who are revolted by lynching and who see their local or state government unable to prevent it will, if their dismay is attended by just a little reflection, welcome the intervention of the federal government. They will not only welcome it but seek it. Did they not seek federal intervention to bring about Prohibition? Their representatives in Washington besiege the government for almost every form of assistance. How, if they want an end to lynching, can they resist the powerful assistance which the federal government can supply? I suppose they do not think of it, or think it only trifling, but their position is so manifestly illogical that the enlightened world cannot believe they mean what they say. The faint demurrer of the "liberals" that a federal law would not work is typical of the reasoning the South gives to its problem. A very little consideration, by a free mind, would show that whether such a law would work is all a matter of what the law is and what the authority behind it.

Do they presume that the government of the mightiest nation, a nation which guarantees citizens against discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, is incapable of apt and effective legislation to that end? Or do they presume that the patient shall prescribe his own medicine or the offender say whether he shall be punished? Or what do they presume?

But these are not free minds (as they must be before they can solve their problem or any problem). They are bound to an invisible and impossible empire. They must save their face, by covering it from the light of justice. A federal law against lynching would humiliate them. But how it would humiliate any who really condemned lynching and desired justice, whose habit was that of free and thoughtful men, is nowise apparent. I should think the acceptance of federal bonuses of all kinds in recent years would have been exceedingly painful to this strange pride, but it is my recollection that southern acceptance went on right gladly.

The invisible empire takes precedence of the ordinances of reason and fairness. It has enslaved southern life, not in everything by any means but in politics and all matters pertaining to the Negro. As free, enlightened minds we are evidently not so far advanced as Southerners a century ago. On the other hand, the Negro has advanced unmistakably. Justice, which we deny the Negro, has not denied us. Neither has irony. The two have wrought strange bonds on us. Emancipation is a need of today, as of a century ago, but this time it is the white who needs it. No fiat or legislative enactment can give it, since the bonds are in locked minds where the mandates of law cannot reach.

How to overcome prejudice, how to see clearly and understand well, how to achieve fairness, where to draw the motivation to these ends, are questions which require answering by the South.

Take the first. The Negro must stay in "his place" even today. Where did we discover what that place is? To such a question we can answer, at first, only with blank silence, not having directly considered it (unlike our forbears of a century ago, such as Dr. Nott of Mobile, who thought he had found strictly biological evidences of Negro inferiority). The Negro's place was established by force early in the seventeenth century, the place, namely, of a slave. The preconception of it which lingers today is inherited from that time. It is so strong that it overrides the United States Constitution and makes hypocrites of millions, including, I dare

say, the majority of Northerners who have migrated to the South (for the prejudice against Negroes is contagious). But in addition to the preconception, we think we can cite immediate and abundant evidence of Negro inferiority—sloth, crime, disease, promiscuity, ignorance, incapacity. It hardly occurs to us that this is beside the point. We have no jurisdiction to prescribe merit or status as conditions of legal rights, in contravention of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. We can only try to elevate the Negro, if he is so wretched, or try to induce him to leave. But so little have we seriously thought of our limitations and prerogatives—who would suppose that the Bilbos, Rankins, Talmadges, Dixiecrats ever *thought* of such?—and so powerfully are we gripped by our prejudices, that even the possibilities before us go unrecognized. So, too, the eventualities, those reckonings with law and justice which cannot always be forestalled in a world of change and of some progress toward universal liberation.

Were the bondage to prejudice broken we should be in a position where the possibility, at least, of seeing clearly and understanding well would have been achieved. Conversely, this possibility of science and understanding is the quietus of prejudice. But the prejudice of the South is so great that these have almost no chance. Amidst its inertia and autarchic security the South does not think of this. A greater reproach to a people, the reproach of subduing its very mind, is scarcely to be found in history (even though it is duplicated in many an instance).

It is a further reproach that we have yet to achieve fairness, regardless of what the reasons may be. Unfairness, like the stifling of reason, is an undoing of human integrity. It takes a heavier toll of him who is unfair than of his victim, since it corrupts his soul, while it is incapable of reaching the inner being of the victim. The South does not admit that it is unfair to the Negro. But prejudice has disqualified it to judge. Moreover, it can only cite the alleged inferiority of the Negro, and that, as just now noticed, is an irrelevancy.

As a plea in extenuation the South will perhaps call into account its generosity to the Negro in distress. Huey Long remarked that the North calls the Negro mister but lets him starve, whereas the South feeds him. In a very limited sense that is so. With the condescension of the master to the slave, and provided the Negro will come to the back door and demonstrate a satisfactory submissiveness, we give him the leftovers. But

the incidence among Negroes of pellagra and rickets, for example, does not indicate that our grudging, second-rate charity is equal to the rhetoric with which we have advertised it. Charity is a feeble substitute for opportunity. It may only perpetuate the impoverishment which it denotes, and stand as a confession of failure all around. Moreover, it is optional, hence free to withdraw at will, whereas fairness is neither optional nor dispensable, except to the unfair.

The blinding force of our prejudice is by no means confined to police officers, labor bosses, lynching parties, or riffraff. Certainly not; the southern party in Congress attests the contrary with eloquence—or with vociferation at any rate. A militant manifestation of this force has been witnessed lately, in the fiasco of the Dixiecrats. A glance at the tenets of this band, to see what manner of thought it was that led to their suicidal and even masochistic exploit against the Democratic Party, is worth a moment.

The Dixiecrats affirmed devotion to the Constitution, in letter and spirit; they stood for "preservation of individual liberty," for "preservation of human rights," and for "the basic rights of citizens"; and they stood for "social and economic justice," which, they said, requires "strict adherence to our Constitution." But while pledging themselves to all of this, they were opposing the prohibition of discrimination "in public and private instruction and administration and treatment of students; in the operation of public and private health facilities; in all transportation, and . . . all places of public accommodation."

Evidently logic was no part of the education of the official Dixiecrats. Here is a spectacle of men vehemently professing liberty, justice, the Constitution, and in the next breath repudiating them all. Not the least sign here of any awareness of the inconsistencies and impossibilities; nor the slightest intimation that minds so possessed and befuddled are thoroughly disqualified to judge of liberty or justice or the Constitution.

The man chosen by the Dixiecrate as a candidate for President expressed himself, in one of his addresses, as follows: "Lynching is murder. And murder is a violation of state laws, punishable by state laws. We do not intend to let the federal government come in and take over our state courts." This was the same individual who was Governor of South Carolina at the time of the notorious Greenville lynching trial in which a band of taxicab drivers were triumphantly acquitted, without

a word of defense, of lynching a Negro. He had taken pains to bring the lynchers to justice. As the ringleader cried defiance at the acquittal, so now the Governor cries it, and one would have to rely on sophistry if he hoped to show any significant difference between the positions of these two.

There is no reasoning with men of this stamp. What is called the Negro problem is not that, but a Negrophobia problem, and to deal with it the country must deal with irrationality, mania, malevolence, incapacity—a catalog of ills and deficiencies equal to or exceeding what the southern white alleges of the Negro. The perennial plea of the South for more time cannot be heeded. It is nearly a century since the Civil War, and there are limits, now exceeded, to the propriety of pleas for procrastination. Moreover, the Dixiecrats (who voiced the sentiments of more than voted for them) proposed to go back to 1840, not forward to freedom and justice.

Coercion of the Negro has been the practice in the South for so long that it may fairly be regarded as a domestic institution. If now a little coercion were applied to the coercers themselves, sufficient to awaken them to fact and reason, there could be no legitimate complaint. There is doubtless ample constitutional warrant, under the Fourteenth Amendment, for whatever police or juridical measures this would require.

The slightest move in that direction would start cries of outrage—Governor Thurmond, the Dixiecrat candidate for President, said that if even the segregation program of President Truman were to be enforced, there would be lawlessness and chaos, and "the greatest breakdown of law enforcement in the history of the nation." Still, these cries and threats are not so ominous as the nullification of law and justice which already goes on, nor do they confront the mind with a spectacle as depressing as that of generations of men in thrall to prejudice and the awful consequences of this to the integrity, security, and worth of life.

Shall we go forward or fall back? At least it is clear that the choice must be made. If it is to fall back the future will bring us new Beast Butlers and perhaps carpetbaggers. In that direction futile guerrilla action would be all that was left.

No doubt there are many who will choose that direction—the Dixiecrats' mad gamble is a sign. Since there is nothing that way but outlawry, it is not what can be called a problem; that is, it disturbs no premise of

law, justice, or reason; it simply calls for police action. The South's problem is in the other direction. The cowed, hesitant "liberal," the quixotic Dixiecrat, one can suppose all but the willfully benighted, approve the direction; only, they don't want to start now. Their program, so far as it can be called such, is to bargain our little progress of the past for long delays now, hoping to defer the day so far that we shall never see it. Not to solve the problem or even to meet it quite, rather to dissemble it, is a design apparent in all of this.

The tide of the times (a mode of inertia unreckoned by the inert) will no doubt one day resolve the obstructors of law, carrying the present obstructions before it. In the mean time the obstructors have a choice: whether they are to be moved like inanimate bodies or by their own motion. If the first, there is nothing to think about (save the willful degeneration of human beings); but if it is the other way nothing foregone can be assumed, beyond the necessity of recognizing and meeting our problems. Only the resources of reasonableness and the capacity of men to govern themselves by that rather than force, apply there. We have to ask: Are we to continue nullifying the constitutional guarantees to the Negro, and continue hoodwinking ourselves by believing the contrary, or by not giving it a thought?

This might be answered on grounds of expediency or resurgent sophistry, but there is a deeper question in it which cannot be met that way, simply this: Are we to be unjust, cruel, inhumane?

It is in the privacy of conscience that questions like this have to be answered. They are not questions of expediency, political, economic, or other, but of right and honor; that is, ethical questions. A century ago ethics had a high place. It was the motive of emancipation. Nowadays it is superseded in popular thought and education by social science, including "race relations." But this science is a far from adequate substitute. We have it in abundance—even the Dixiecrats advocated "social and economic justice"—yet we have all our troubles still. Science can only observe and scrutinize the facts, it cannot complain of the Negro's lot. It cannot venture reform without quitting its province and invoking ethics. And so poor are we in ethical education that the entire ethical resource of I dare say the majority is scarcely more than rude impulse and theocratic dogma.

The strongest sanction against the unethical element is exposure. Let them be exhibited in the unconscionable, sluggard character which they have given themselves. The stigma of injustice, the proof of degradation, are too galling to be endured today, thanks to the extent and intensity and revulsion with which they are beheld. Since the South will hardly be its own critic and judge, far enough to count, it would be idle to wait for southern initiative to make a start; hence the familiar but always suspicious argument that ours is a peculiar problem which we must be left to solve in our own way, is dispelled by its own terms. We have a peculiar problem, indeed, one so peculiar that even to have it is reproachful, this: How, or how soon, to free ourselves from bondage and stand before the world without need of apology or of questionable, sinister devices for maintaining the servitude not only of Negroes but of ourselves. Federal legislation is the most promising stimulus, or one should say the only prospective stimulus, for arousing the South to its opportunity and need.

A Ring On Every Finger

By LEE RICHARD HAYMAN

Only the night releases the city's hold.
The claw unopens with elevator's drop
from the fisted office-chair — see
how fingers slack when hat holds
to the head again and feet find the street.

Music in the packed hall sounds ersatz love
or colored movies flash what Sand, Sky,
Ocean, Mountain and Company are in the raw—
nature is wonderful is everywhere
and nowhere finds it now.

Crawl back into the hand that feeds you
the long finger of commerce beckons
to bare yourself to its cunning cloak
you will dine well and ride splendidly
and shine a ring on every finger.

LEE RICHARD HAYMAN writes advertising copy in Cleveland. His poems have appeared in the *Saturday Review of Literature, The American Mercury* and many of the "little magazines."

Education As Experiment

By HAROLD TAYLOR

AMERICAN EDUCATION has lost touch with many of the realities of contemporary life. The world has moved past it, leaving its theories dated, its philosophy discursive, and its energies dissipated in managing practical problems which have only incidental relations with education itself. The result is that American education is over-organized, while the American student continues to be under-educated.

Reality in contemporary life is not academic, abstract, or genteel. It consists of people, in and out of trouble, in varying degrees of social tension. What is real is that prices rise, civil wars are fought, politicians are jailed, governments are overthrown, workers riot, music and poetry are written, new lives are formed. It is true and real that the moral values by which Western civilization has lived its past are shattered in Europe, that the economic and political unity designed to support those values is broken, and new values, with new social systems to support them, are coming into existence. The reality in which we live is one of old societies breaking up and new societies developing, where India, China, Japan, and the whole of Europe show us man in social crisis and active revolution, with only America and Russia in comparative stability. Even that degree of stability and power is relative, and in a large degree illusory, since it is also true that man himself is in a critical stage in his own transition from an old world into a new, where each is vulnerable and each is tormented by contemporary necessities. This crisis, in which men are either brutally certain of their powers and convictions, or frighteningly uncertain of their feelings and beliefs, is at the center of contemporary life. It is this reality with which contemporary education must deal. The central issue is this: What are the values by which modern man can live most nobly, and what are the ways in which life must be organized in order to make this possible? The central task, therefore, for all of us who teach, is to plunge our students into the middle of their time, and to help

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them gain knowledge and make judgments about matters affecting the future of life on this planet.

If we look at American education with these things in mind, we are condemned to disappointment. Throughout the school system, we find that we have deliberately trained our teachers to care desperately about only the little bits of knowledge by which they make their meagre living. We make it almost a professional obligation on their part never to say anything about anybody else's bit of knowledge, nor to make any statement or take any action about life, politics, or pleasure, for fear they might be misconstrued by the community.

We find that in the practice of education, people have lost their desire to experiment, to try new things, and have found, instead, that it is wise to talk about the need for discipline, compulsion, the required curriculum, and the necessity of producing no controversy. We find that school superintendents who are socially conscious are likely to be replaced by men who are safe and who can be relied upon to keep the buildings and the public relations program in order. Throughout the working areas of the American school system there is little deep sense of urgency, of an important time passing, of the need for fresh social action, or of the enormous social possibilities which lie in American education.

Nor has there been very much radical thinking in our colleges and universities about the aims and practices of education. There has, instead, been a national obsession with the rearrangement of old courses in new clusters. Professors in every university have developed guilt feelings about the courses they have been giving harmlessly enough for years, and have added a great many facts and books from other fields, and seem bound to give the same courses next year under new and more complicated titles. Or, as an alternative, professors sometimes volunteer to give each other's courses, or to appear together in groups of three and four to conduct a single course. The whole operation is directed and inspired by curriculum committees chosen as representing each area in the curriculum, each group in the faculty, and every view point in the philosophy of education. In this way, it has been possible to do a great deal of shifting around without actually changing anything, except that, because of the voting power of various departments, an enormous number of courses previously without very large enrollment have suddenly become required. In the absence of a genuine unifying philosophy which could make dis-

criminating selections throughout the field of human knowledge, there is tacit agreement amongst the representatives of various subjects that, in all fairness to the interests of the faculty, something of everything should be required of the students.

As a result, most colleges in America now find themselves with a new curriculum. The new curriculum faces each student in his first two years with a survey of the things a young person should know, although opinion varies from college to college as to what these things are. The difficulties in performing all this rearranging are not to be under-rated, however, since the new curriculum must look sufficiently different from the old one to justify all the meetings held and the number of mimeographed statements issued, yet not be different enough from the old to lose the traditional values which faculty members associate with their own work in their own institution, and which they are quite likely to call the tradition of Western culture. The fact that this feat has been accomplished by the members of the colleges and universities all the way from Boston to Los Angeles is a tribute to the ingenuity of the American academic mind.

The origin of the current mode of thinking has two major parts—the failure of the elective system to educate in breadth and in depth, and the success of the departmental system in educating narrowly. The efforts of professional educators have been directed towards the correction of these twin evils. The effort has been diligent enough, and the elective system has been largely replaced, but in replacing it, most of the evils, of which the principle of election was only a part, have been preserved intact. That is to say, we have now a system of higher learning which continues to use most of the worn equipment of nineteenth century education—including the premise that the higher learning is a verbal process, that the mind is fully trained when it grasps generalizations, that knowledge is virtue, that lectures, notebooks, examinations, rote-learning, credits, grades are essentials of method, and that the whole apparatus is capable of giving correct aesthetic feelings about literature and art, and moral feelings about the good life to those who do not have them.

The root error of contemporary thought in education is that it is about abstractions and minds, and not about people. In order to learn to believe with reason the values which are central to a good society, it is necessary for individuals to become emotionally attached to those

values, and to make beliefs a source of action. In fact, beliefs, opinions, and attitudes are not united in a philosophy for personal and social use, they remain inert, they decay, they disappear from the consciousness. The way to develop meaningful beliefs leading to good action is to place each student in situations where he feels those beliefs to be true, and where there is an opportunity to explore their meanings in the practices of the college community and the society which surrounds it. This is true of aesthetic values, moral values, social values, psychological values. It is thus true of youth's experience with the arts, where the creation of feelings of aesthetic value in one's own life is the crucial point of education, rather than the reception of information about pictures, musical scores, or artists. It is equally true of youth's experience with moral values in personal and community relations. Unless the college community provides a place for living which extends beyond itself into the bigger society of contemporary life, and contains within itself the social atmosphere in which ideals can be tested and acted upon, it is bound to fail in its major task of developing in youth a loyalty to liberal principles.

It is wise to try as hard as we can to prevent our educational system from concerning itself with specialists, and to try to develop young men and women whose interests are broad and whose knowledge is wide. But it is unlikely that this will be achieved by producing standard programs of general ideas, and surveys of the materials of Western culture. What we get is a set of short reports about ideas, events, science, and people. Large areas of the new curriculum have lost any close relationship with the student, and educators have forgotten what we all thought had been learned, that our concern must be not so much with the formal order in which the curriculum is arranged and followed, but with the intimate relation of the student's life to the things he learns in college. The curriculum has become an end in itself. Rather than a means to the full growth of each person, it is likely to become a kind of ready-made coat which each person should wear if he wishes to be taken for a well-educated man. The student is formally prepared with general ideas. Yet that preparation is not a prelude to abundant living, but an introduction to further academic study. Only after such formal preparation is the student considered ready to be faced with the big and controversial questions of contemporary life. In the present curriculum, these questions are

often missed entirely, dealt with as phenomena in formal style, or included as a special course in the graduating year.

Such issues, in one form or another, should have been the beginning and the central concern of the student's whole education. For the primary intellectual necessity for modern living is an awareness of what are the biggest issues, and how we can go about settling them. Or, to put the matter differently, each must know his place in the world today, and each must know his responsibilities. Our youth in America lives in a situation in which responsibility is easily shelved, in which the individual is not faced with continual necessities for action in order to survive. Therefore we must teach and youth must learn to know what we can believe, and to have some clear indication of the ways in which it is necessary to act in order that some hope and some future be assured to ourselves and to others.

To meet this need, proposals have often been made by educators who advocate a return by our colleges to the classical curriculum, on the assumption that study of the history and content of Western culture through reading a number of prescribed texts will provide a sense of direction for contemporary living. This proposal is actually a narrower and more provincial form of the core curriculum movement—which it has undoubtedly influenced to some degree—and suffers from many of the same difficulties, while bringing one or two special ones of its own. Chief amongst the latter are the fact that the discoveries of contemporary science, philosophy, and art are shut away from the student, and that the distribution of practical knowledge of present international and national affairs is left to the auspices of the newspapers, radio, movies and local gossip. The accumulated wisdom of our past, and an understanding of the history of our civilization, are both matters of great importance to modern education. However, they provide a knowledge of only one aspect of contemporary reality, the aspect of its past, at a time when the full dimensions of the past, present, and future demand thorough exploration.

While the reforms of the core curriculum and the classical education movement have been gaining ground, those reforms associated with the progressive education movement have, on the whole, been neglected. In the present situation, even to use the term progressive to describe educational views is to invite the notion of laxity, bad spelling, impertinence,

laissez-faire, and the control of parents by their children. Yet where other theories fail to deal with contemporary reality, the progressive theory has no such lack of intention. It has most frequently been blamed, rightly or wrongly, for its total concern with immediacy in the present. It has been blamed for ignoring history, for neglecting cultural values, for encouraging the dilettante, for pampering the egocentric, for aiding the pacifist, for creating the radical, and, in general, for developing ignorant, difficult, amoral, and unpleasant youth. A correspondent recently attributed something loose and sinister to the fact that Sarah Lawrence students often sit on the floor. Others make cynical remarks about coaxing Bennington students into the study of physiology by first luring them into a performance of the modern dance. The extent to which the response of the ordinarily level-headed can be distorted by annoyance with progressivism is shown by Professor Brand Blanshard, who, in a singularly unhappy statement of the methods and aims of modern education claimed, "We do not need to take college students by their little hands and coax them into history or economics by showing them what fun it all is, or showing them what practical difference it will make."

Descent to this level of argument is usually found in those who become furious with modern painting, music, or sculpture. Seldom, in the past, has it shown itself in the field of education. Yet this way of misconstruing modern education is common in every part of current discussion in colleges, where the organic or contextualist theory of knowledge which lies at the base of modern educational thought is either misunderstood or rejected outright in favor of rationalistic philosophies. The criticism has grown in proportion to the misunderstanding, on the part of educators and the general parent public, as to the meaning of such tired pharases as child-centered school, self-discipline, interests, needs, and individual development.

The notion has been created that in thinking of the child, the adolescent, or the adult as the center of his own education, and in trying to bring to him the kind of knowledge and moral philosophy which meet his needs and will thus be useful to him in his life, we are developing a theory and practice of narcissism, egocentrism, and expediency. Actually, the distinctive contribution of the progressives in the past has been to demonstrate the ultimate importance of the individual student, and the ultimate union of psychological with moral factors. The aim of the pro-

gressive is to release energies, talents, and the intelligence of the child, without assuming that every impulse or talent of child or adult is of equal value. But in taking account of factors connected with motivation and with the psychology of learning, there is no less emphasis upon the moral structure which points the whole process to fruitful and desirable ends. It *is* to emphasize, however, the fact that the ends themselves are not fixed, and are an integral part of the process. This does not make them less morally valuable, but more so, since one must ask constantly, What kind of young people are we developing? What kind of social, intellectual, emotional, and moral behavior do we want? What kind of life do we want, for ourselves, and for our students, sons and daughters? These questions are raised not merely for the teacher, but for the student, who in this theory, is to be given responsibilities and disciplines as quickly as he seems able to cope with them. He thus becomes and remains the center of his own education, not in the sense that the world moves around him in a dance of approval, but in the sense that the individual learns only as much as he is willing and able to learn for himself. Among the things he learns is the basic fact that he is part of a context of individuals, with whose desires, experiences, and human rights he must concern himself.

There are, of course, educational risks in some of the forms of individualism with which progressive education has become involved. What begins as a true description of the way people learn—namely, that each person is unique, that each person does his own learning for himself, and that emotional aspects of his learning are of crucial importance—may end with some unwelcome consequences in the actual practice of education. If, in practice, the individual is considered as a kind of flower which will unfold if it receives the nourishment of a kindly and free environment, it is possible that no solid structure of social values will be built in the process. It is often considered that sheer uninhibited growth of the individual to that form which it is natural for him to assume, is the true aim of radical modern education. This reasoning has a streak of Aristotelianism in it which is badly suited to a philosophy which makes claims for contemporary relevance, and, as a kind of *laissez-faire* liberalism, is more appropriate to a stable world in which solid moral values of an enlightened and unselfish kind already exist in profusion, and have been absorbed by each child and adolescent. It is by reason of the previous

existence of these values in the personal life of the student that some of the most astounding successes which education has had in our experimental colleges have occurred with individuals who have come to college from conventionally rigid school situations from whose grip it has been possible to free the minds and attitudes of the student.

There is bound to be criticism of an educational philosophy which is intentionally vague about its ultimate value system. The chief criticism is that such a philosophy produces an infinite dispersion of aims, and fosters a calculated introversion, in which human conduct is explained in terms of the intricate play of unconscious forces over which one has no control and for whose social effects one cannot therefore be held responsible. In the context of the first half of this century, that philosophy represents in education part of the general revolt against absolutism. As a philosophy of education, it is the counterpart of a philosophy of literature which revolted against clarity, completeness, and form; of a philosophy of art marked by the disappearance of the object; of a philosophy of morality in which, as Camus says, "no one was ever wrong because everybody could be right"; of a philosophy of truth in which propositions either refer to immediate objects and are thus obvious, or refer to nonsensed objects and are thus meaningless. In such inversion or discursiveness of all values lies the possibility of dilettantism, personal enjoyment of confusion, social irresponsibility, and philosophical nihilism.

Auden's *The Labyrinth* states the matter briefly, in conducting contemporary man through theology, metaphysics, sense experience, mathematics, history, and art, in search of firm values as guides in modern experience. Auden ends with the introvert, about whom he has this to say:

> His absolute presupposition
> Is—Man creates his own condition.
> This maze was not divinely built,
> But is secreted by my guilt.
>
> The centre that I cannot find
> Is known to my Unconscious Mind
> I have no reason to despair
> Because I am already there.

My problem is how *Not* to will
They move most quickly who stand still
I'm only lost until I see
I'm lost because I want to be.

If this should fail, perhaps I should
As certain educators would,
Content myself with the conclusion,
In theory there is no solution.

As Auden suggests, there is probably no theory ultimately satisfactory. Whether there is or not, is, in my view, not an ultimately significant question, since life is much too rich in differences and new possibilities to be confined to a single theory of how growth may best occur. The fact is that the individual actually has a structure of values and a theory of truth, whether or not he is articulate or rational about them. These values make up a pattern of personality, of thought and of action. They are realized by the individual, in thought and in action, but seldom form a coherent pattern which can be identified as a logic, or as an ethic or aesthetic. The values themselves are in process, and fortunately, change in their emphasis from year to year, usually by the influence of material necessities or personal experiences—more rarely by the presentation of concepts from books or teachers. Values themselves have to be learned. But in order for values to be meaningful, and so absorbed into one's life as to have a continuing part in thought and in action, they must be learned as meaningful experience. The College community must therefore be organized so that each student is immersed in the stream of intellectual, social, and moral values which it is our intention to teach our youth. This means that we must have less of the competitive fraternity-sorority emphasis, with its cluster of snobbish and materialistic values, and more conscious effort to design a community in which each student and faculty member feels himself to be part of a total enterprise in which he has a share and an important contribution to make. It is possible to create the same loyalty and enthusiasm for liberal values as the enthusiasm now reserved for football teams and fraternities.

Accordingly, one can say that the whole matter of learning is much more complicated than is assumed by those who adopt traditional modes of thinking about education. New ways of educating students have relied

upon psychological research into human development and the learning process. The direction of this research has been, in the past, towards individual psychology, with additional work of a horizontal kind in the development of a mass testing program for general intelligence, and in information-testing performed by tests of general education. The latter research has now been frozen into the structure of secondary school education and colleges by the standard entrance examinations now administered, and by the credit-grade-objective examination system now in standard use in the colleges and universities. The more significant recent research in the psychology of learning has moved toward the study of the development of value structures, toward the relation of the individual to group attitudes and toward the relation of personality to intelligence. Yet little attention has been paid by educators to the material available from these sources, nor has contemporary thinking in higher education been modified or enriched by reference to contemporary research in the whole field of the social sciences. The demonstrations of the Dartmouth Eye Institute about the nature of perception, for example, would alter radically any traditional approach to questions of teaching and learning, even if there were not already available a large body of research giving similar conclusions. Yet no reference to these data and their conclusions appears in the curricular reports which represent the outcome of current thinking about educational reform in colleges and universities.

If modern theory of education is to advance from its present position, it must continue its earlier efforts to move behind verbal symbols and the imitation of reality to the direct knowledge of experience. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Bergson, Dewey, James and others rebelled against the notion that reality was logical, rational, and intellectual, and that the part played by us when we perceive was minor, and at best automatic. What William James did was to make us see that a great system of philosophy could be built by trusting individual immediate experience as a legitimate and respectable way of knowing, and that ultimately we knew things to be true and real because we felt they were. What Dewey did was to make us see that knowledge was not real for its possessor until it was used in personal and social life, and that individual experience was socially derived and depended upon a complex of social and intellectual sanctions for its ultimate verification as truth.

Modern philosophy, psychology, and social science, as it developed in different ways and by different influences, through Whitehead, Freud, Bergson, Frazer, and the cultural pluralists, has given contemporary thinking a philosophy of process, and of organism. That philosophy has influenced very deeply our contemporary art forms, in music, sculpture, architecture, painting, poetry, the dance. In education it has influenced the nursery school, the elementary school, and, to a more limited degree, secondary and higher education. The higher in conventional education rank we go, the less modern does our thinking become.

What all this means in the practice of education is that progressive theory, at the beginning of this century, and particularly in the 1920's, turned organic philosophy into new educational forms, and accepted as true the proposition that immediate experience is the prime learning factor. Thus we had the use of the arts for learning; field work and projects in social research; creative work in music, literature, sculpture, and in other arts; discussions in place of lectures; original sources in place of commentaries; freedom and responsibility for students—all designed to return the growing person to the center of life and knowledge in his own experience of the realities. The science and art of education grew, and new methods of teaching were developed through experiment. The mood in those thirty years was one of rebellion, of liberation from inhibiting theories, of joy in new discoveries, and hope for a new generation of free and happy children.

Now we have stopped rebelling, partly because we have won victories, but perhaps more because the original impetus to liberation is gone. The rebellion gave a unifying purpose to teachers everywhere who were concerned not simply with teaching subjects, but with teaching students.

We now know a good deal about liberating student minds and talents. The philosophy of individual growth has been proven to be sound, our students do develop in desirable ways according to principles derived from 20 years of experiment, and many of these educational ideas have been absorbed into our present system.

But in the meantime, the social climate in which those first experiments were made has changed. In that earlier time, we assumed that the successful first world war had brought us security and freedom for world democracy, and that if only each of us minded his own business and did

not behave too badly, society would continue to develop with a kind of unavoidable progress. Even the word "progressive" contains the hidden assumption that we are all moving ahead, that our education in freedom will take us to new and better forms of human life. This happy philosophy has been refuted by events. As Stephen Spender says, "What [the Germans] destroyed, once and for all, is the modern middle-class idea that man, as a social being, does not have to choose between good and evil. . . . The world is now aghast with the realization that society has got to choose not just to be free but to be good." Education must decide not only to make free people, but must teach them the means of keeping their freedom. On this point current American education has had nothing to say. It has done one of two things. It has made discreet remarks about the impossibility of accepting or teaching a modern philosophy, since to do so would be illiberal and a form of indoctrination, or it has recommended traditional values and conventional authors on the basis of their respectability and classical origins.

If we are to teach people to be free, they must first be aware of the forces at work in the society in which they live. The theory of progressive education has stated emphatically the need for creating a significant knowledge in the individual. Its next task is to show how knowledge for the individual can relate itself constantly to knowledge of the context in which each of us lives. The philosophy by which this task can be carried out is one which is, in its turn, emphatic in its statement that knowledge for the contemporary student must be related to the present. In Europe, young people are more conscious, without formal instruction in college, of contemporary social and political history, than are American students. A great deal of knowledge which the young European normally has, simply from living in Europe, is not available to Americans and must be provided in another form through college learning. Similarly, the European youth feel more deeply their cultural heritage, from the habits of thinking and acting which they have gained in childhood and adolescence. The high value placed upon the new, the fresh, the young, and the big, by Americans, and the general over-simplification of the traditional, means that American young people on the whole regard history as something which happened to people with whom we need no longer be concerned. Here again, our need is to create in each a sense of history, a feeling for the past, which can be at the same time, a clue to under-

standing the present, and an aesthetic satisfaction in the order and age of human processes.

If knowledge for contemporary youth must concern itself with the secrets of the present, the ideals of young people turn unavoidably into relative values. The goals of human life can be seen, in actual fact, to be relative to the time and place in which they are conceived, and it becomes actually impossible for educators to set down a complete value system, and then to present it forcefully as a series of basic truths. The students simply would not believe it, although they could make interesting variations of assent for examination purposes. The whole moral climate of America is unfavorable to absolutism. The tradition of dissent, of rejection of authority, of individual truth-making is too much a part of our culture pattern to sustain a single value system. The question of what is ultimately desirable as the ideal of human life is continuously under discussion. Ideals are asserted by journalists, politicians, clergymen, business leaders, labor leaders, educators, and, very occasionally, by philosophers. The extent to which they command agreement depends upon the social context and the cultural pattern of the society in which people exist. It depends also upon such factors as the prestige of the corporation executive, whose opinions are quoted, the status of the famous generals, the number of books sold by a novelist, and the number of readers or listeners connected with a journalist-commentator. At the moment, in American life, the ideals are being established principally by members of the non-intellectual groups, with the intellectual in the role of one who observes and comments to himself.

However, no final authority, either of the state or of the academy is recognized as a practical or philosophical ultimate. If there is an ultimate, it is that of the free individual. Within this concept, there is such wide variation in meaning that the term can cover the economic doctrine of free enterprise *laissez-faire* and government control at the same time, or can include the personalism of William James with the dogmatism of neo-thomism. This diversity of freedom according to individual conceptions, accounts, at one level, for the apparent confusion, profusion, and contradictions of American life. We experiment with our lives, adjusting the larger unities to individual unities, and forming a cohesive society by the tacit agreement that many things can exist together without too great danger to the whole. The existence of that agreement about philosophical

ulimates is illustrated by the actual diversity among the 1700 colleges and universities of the country.

A new college curriculum, reconstructed with these things in mind, will therefore form itself around the controversies, conflicts, and issues of contemporary life, and will try to teach a way by which they can be put into a coherent pattern. This is not to say that all issues are social, or that each must deal with social questions. The issues are aesthetic, personal, spiritual, psychological, and intellectual. Each student can best deal at first with the issues whose relevance to his own place in society he most readily comprehends. But he must be led from that beginning into the meaning of his knowledge for modern life, and each subject must lead beyond itself into the others, until he achieves some pattern of relation to the central matters of human destiny. In Whitehead's language, "What education has to impart is an intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a particular body of knowledge which has peculiar reference to the life of the being possessing it."

If this is true, then the intellectual life of the student must not be buttoned up in a tight curriculum. It is simply false to assume that each student is identical with every other student, that there is a standard set of facts, books, and ideas which will be appropriate for everyone, or that a standard body of knowledge for everyone will have anything fully significant for anyone. The task for teachers is that of imparting values, and sharing knowledge, by finding ways to help students to learn. If this is to be done with success, each student must actively draw that knowledge and those values into his own life. From the point of view of the person learning, there is no objectively valid system of knowledge by means of which he can equip himself for the company of the educated and the civilized, and for the accomplishment of the diversity of actions which the future may demand of him. Therefore, the choice among courses of study must be directly related to the ability, interests, and purposes of the individual, with the aid of teachers who can provide guidance in the making of choices. Those choices should not be made for everyone in *a priori* fashion by those who make academic curricula. The curricular judgments must be empirical, and must come as the result of careful attention by students and teachers to the kind of studies and

projects which are most meaningful to the individual in the light of his purposes and talents.

This is to say flatly that life is open-ended, and that to educate is to experiment with means and ends in the satisfaction of human wants. A philosophy which is adequate, for education as for life, will take account of these needs and locate them in their setting in contemporary reality. It will assert the belief that human nature is not static, and that human life is what we make it. It will deny the superstition that man is sinful, and affirm the fact that the causes of his fall from grace are in some sense discoverable and to some degree correctible. It will accept as valid the facts which social science gives us, and use those facts to reveal the path which we can take to make a good society. It will be a philosophy which accepts and welcomes change, and sets to us the task of participating in the changes. It will recognize our situation in a world of collective industrial societies, and will recognize the intimate connection between individual modern man and the social groups which give him his relation to the modern world. It will recognize the value of each person, each culture, each race, each nation, and will call for protection and support of those who have not the power to protect and support themselves. It will accept as true the fact that education is an instrument of social transition. It will thus be a liberal philosophy, taking as its goal the development of free men in a changing social order.

The teaching of this philosophy will mean certain immediate obligations and practical effects throughout large areas of higher education. Changes would occur in the curriculum. Studies would be organized to immerse each student in the adult world of contemporary ideas and events. The history and origin of such ideas will be discovered by moving outward and beyond our present concerns to the documents of the past. The test of whether a subject of knowledge is an essential part of liberal education will not be the weight of its place in the curricula of the past, but whether or not it yields an understanding of the most crucial questions in contemporary life.

The curriculum, however, will have to be conceived as a name for the total active life of each person in college. The college will therefore have to take account, as it never has before, of the kind of community life its students lead, and, in order to attain a democratic community, will have to take account in serious terms of the quality of its admission pro-

gram. Education in cultural pluralism comes best by cultural diversity in the population of the community. Each college must therefore take active leadership in breaking down barriers to Negro, Jewish, foreign, and underprivileged students.

The ideal towards which we work will be a student body whose members form a community of diverse talents and personal qualities, with wide distribution of cultural and economic groups. We will bring students and faculty members from other countries, and will seek funds from every source to make our colleges into community centers for international living. This will also mean that the notion of field work will have to be expanded radically to include the first-hand study of other countries by American students. The steps already taken by the federal government to use American funds to bring foreign students here should be followed by further steps to send at least twenty thousand American students abroad each year, to study the art, science, and life of other countries. A series of projects in student research could be established, and independent study and work in rehabilitation, not necessarily connected with universities, could be undertaken under the supervision of faculty members in this country. The year abroad in such a project would be an integral part of the college program of the selected student. It could be financed for approximately the same number of American dollars now used for a year in an American college.

There is room for expansion in many of the responsibilities we now give to students, particularly in the area of teaching. The methods of teaching used in experimental colleges are often criticized because they are expensive, in terms of teachers, time, and money. If those methods are to be extended to other institutions, we must invent and demonstrate ways in which they are adaptable to larger numbers of students, with fewer teachers and scanty facilities. One way would be to develop within each class a number of discussion leaders who could be given the responsibility of preparing themselves to lead smaller groups within the class, and other groups within the college. This kind of experiment might serve as a source for the new teachers our entire education system needs so badly. Each college must think of itself as a center of learning from which teachers will go. Any fully educated man is a teacher, whether or not he adopts it as his profession. The important fact for him is that

he believes so deeply in the things he has learned, that he wants to share them with others.

In the matter of educational research, all colleges have duties and opportunities. Only the surface of the modern problem has been scratched by what has been done in the past in the experimental colleges. We are still learning how to evaluate student ability, whether in order to select a student body or to decide when it should graduate. We are still vague about the relation of personality to intelligence. We still have rather simple notions about how to develop self-discipline, how to control aggression, discourage frustration, and encourage the deepest kind of learning. We have no certainty that our system of teaching is the one we should retain, or whether our present examination system has very much value as a way of designating the best students.

But these are practical matters which can be worked out in future planning, and by each college.

The distinctive aim of experimental education is to develop ways of creating in youth such a deep attachment to humane moral values that the life of each becomes intuitively liberal and the action of each constantly helpful to the total community of human interests. Our unique responsibility as philosophers of education or as teachers is to be educational pioneers, working steadily at the outer edge of intellectual and social advance. Our particular hope is to make in each of our college communities a model of what life can be in a happy, free, and useful human society.

"Goyim"

By J. L. TELLER

MY FIRST APPREHENSION of "goyim" probably dates back beyond the range of retrievable memory, to a time when an infant's ears absorb sounds in the same fashion as his lips absorb lactation—greedily, lustily, without comprehension. It may have first come to me at an ominous twilight hour in my parents' rambling, single-story house in Tarnopol, situated at the intersection of two streets, one terminating in the railroad yards, and the other leading down a precipitous slope to the fashionable mansions, set in large private parks behind iron picket fences, and to the suburbs and villages that were the city's granaries.

When first touched by memory, I found myself already in the midst of these ominous twilights which came intermittently, in series, and have stayed with me as the keenest memory of childhood.

Our house with its grocery store was usually as open as a circus tent, as if its doors were mere flaps. Customers used to come in by the front door at all hours, from dawn till late in the evening. Neighbors used the rear door, through the kitchen, pounding on it past midnight to purchase mustard for an aching back, rock candy for whooping cough, and in cases of sudden seizures enlist my grandmother's "concentrations" to stave off the evil spirits. My grandmother undoubtedly possessed telepathic powers and even when not in the same room with the ailing person, could relieve, by sheer concentration, some of his physical discomfort.

These awesome twilights however would find our house, its doors and shutters bolted, sealed like a clam shell. Inside the shell our family —grandmother, mother (father was in America), my brother and I— huddled around the kitchen stove, backs arched catlike in agonizing anticipation. The kerosene lamp was doused because its reflection might seep into the street. The women moved about in the scant eerie illumination which came from the stove whose door was deliberately kept ajar for that purpose. There was about it all the quality of living on the floor

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J. L. TELLER has published articles in *The New Republic, The Nation, Commentary, The Christian Science Monitor,* and others. This narrative is autobiographical.

of the seas. Sleep was made fitful by a gnawing semi-conscious trepidation, with morbid dream elements trailing, like saliva, into the state of wakefulness. Tossing in semi-wakefulness I would occasionally whimper and grope for either female. But no sooner did I stir, than I would feel a martinet pressure of fingers on my lips and be hissed into silence: " 'Schweig,' or you'll bring on the goyim and they'll slaughter us all, 'chas ve-sho-lem.' "

It was fear of the goyim prowling the streets that kept grandmother and mother from shedding their clothes during these periods of seclusion which dragged on for days, and in consequence the air in our kitchen was close with the stale odor of uncleansed females.

The goyim were on the prowl whenever Tarnopol changed hands in the war waged for its possession. Each time an army retreated, it vented its resentment on the civilian population, particularly the Jews, by plundering, butchering and raping. The incoming army would celebrate its victory in similar fashion. And to fill the vacuum between retreat and entry, the peasants would swirl in from the suburbs. Armed with hatchets and knives, and stimulated by their own hot whiskey breath and collective clamor, they would cause greater damage and more casualties among the Jews than the many months of incessant bombardment that preceded each retreat.

On entering and retreating, the armies always poured past our rambling, bolted house along the precipitous slope. On the mornings of such days one could sense a foreboding restiveness in the air. Panicky rumors would start among the Jewish stores and stalls in the marketplace and be quickly carried forward, like "shalach monot" or the communal "lulav," to all Jewish homes in Tarnopol. On hearing the news, women wrung their hands in anguish, young girls assiduously rubbed chimney soot into their faces, and Jewish males went determinedly about the job of slamming down the shutters.

News from the marketplace always reached us last because we lived up the hill, outside the Jewish quarter. But we were always kept apprised of the imminence of danger by the strange, almost ritualistic behavior of our Christian neighbors. On such days they would appear at dawn in front of their houses, with pails and big brushes and begin painting white crosses on their doors for identification. The hunchback shoemaker would stand on the pavement across the street, grinning and rub-

bing his hands, and shout to mother the news that "it won't be long now and they'll start killing the Jews." The postmaster's wife, a tall, buxom childless woman would lift me up and press me to her bosom, sobbing with hysterical abandon as if she had just snatched me out of one of the white infant coffins in which Tarnopol gentiles interred their youngest dead. "Flee, darlings, flee, or put an ikon in your windows," she would cry. Grandmother and mother did neither, and went about grimly bolting the doors.

By midmorning an awesome twilight had descended on our house, as frightful to a child as Yom Kippur eve in synagogue when the adult males assembled in their shrouds. In our Noah's Ark of a kitchen, the horrible vigil had already begun.

We could hear our Christian neighbors talking in the yard, a dog barking and the dull thump of a hatchet biting into a stump. From the distance would come the blast of a military band, rising in crescendo as it approached, climaxing in thunder as it passed our house, and trailing out in the suburbs. Then came the whining sirens of speed-crazed motorcycles, the restive thud and neighing of the cavalry's horses, the relentless surf of hundreds of boots marching in formation, and the slow, painful creaking of overladen wagons, harnessed to oxen straining down the slope. Then, as another battalion passed, the brassband again and a confirmation of all the earlier sounds in approximately the same chronology. This generally lasted for many hours, followed by an interminable chrysalis; as the last sentries withdrew, we could hear desultory shooting from the direction of the railroad yards, an occasional excoriating outcry from midtown where the Jews lived, and sometimes a light quick chase just outside our windows, a voice shouting "halt," an instance more of light, quick footfalls, a single shot, an outcry and silence. This was the period of greatest danger, when the local "goyim" moved in to fill the vacuum just before the new army took possession.

There would be loud pounding on our door with fists or iron bars. "Hey, open up or we'll tear the shutters down. Just give up the Jewesses you're hiding. Just the Jewesses." This was sometimes followed by an unintelligible querulous exchange in several voices, culminating in a final, disgusted kick at the door. Our backs arched more rigidly, a challenge to the spine's resilience, and fingers would press on my lips in anticipation of a whimper, as the steps receded from our front door, came

loudly past our windows and trailed out somewhere along the slope. Sometimes the retreating steps could be heard approaching again along the gravel path. There would then be even more obstinate pounding on our rear door, accompanied by obscenities in mock Yiddish. This pounding on the doors, and probing of knobs and bolts and the gush of obscenities would last sometimes for a half hour or more, the air inside close with sibilant breathing and uncleansed female flesh, but there was always some miraculous intervention, sometimes in the person of the postmaster's wife, ("Stop your pounding," she would shout, "they're Christians and have probably gone to bed."), and sometimes in the form of breathless rioters who would run past yelling: "Eh, peasants, on to the marketplace! The Jewish stores are on fire!"

Then there would be the brassbands again, whining motorcycles, the surf-beat of hundreds of boots, and the snap of whips on the backs of oxen straining uphill. Again there would be pounding on the doors, by soldiers who had broken out of line. "Hey, open up, we want women!" But as the brass bands struck up again, they would disappear in the tide of long-coated ranks. Many more hours would pass, and then the postmaster's wife could be heard tapping on the shutters: "Come out my darlings, it's safe now." Slowly, the heavy bolts would be removed. When the door finally creaked open, there was always the hunchback shoemaker on the pavement across the street, grinning and rubbing his hands as he shouted the information that "plenty of Jews have had their throats cut in the past few days, they went after you too, but I told them you were Christians."

Tall, clean-shaven, immaculate in his vestments, the parish priest would appear in our door, like a visitation, in a cloud of barking, baying and yelping dogs. With a snap of his fingers he would call them off, as frightened I would back into the floursack corner. He looked bemused, standing there, like a disdainful prophet, among his dogs and the Jews; his features small and delicate, and his complexion as white as writing paper which was scarce and expensive in wartime Tarnopol. During the siege, he complained, he had run out of the bread which my mother baked specially for him. He had sent his servant to order more loaves, but when she knocked at the door, there was no answer. So he had to try just any bread. Oh, Jesus-Maria, what a horrible mixture! This was two days ago and he has been sick since. "What would I have done, poor

me, if they had killed you along with the other Jews?" He moved towards me, with appraising mockery in his eyes, and felt my cheeks in the same connoisseur manner in which he felt the loaves before putting them in the basket hanging on his arm. He moved out again in a cloud of yelping dogs, and turned back at the door for a final mocking query. "You will give him to me someday, won't you, before he grows up just another Jew, fattened for the peasants' knives? I could use him, you know, as an incense boy," he would say to my mother. In consequence I would sometimes have dreams in which I sat at his table, wedged in by my foster brothers, the baying dogs, and suffocating on the "tarfuth" odors from the steaming bowls before him.

One morning we woke up to a topsy-turvy world. Soldiers ran around slapping their officers, instead of saluting. Youngsters in mufti scurried about with rifles dropped by fleeing soldiers. Mother had begun bolting the shutters, when the priest came by. "Stay open," he advised in his habitual mocking tone. "This is the beginning of Polish independence. They'll suspect you're in mourning for the alien ruler, if you shut down now." So we stayed open, but out of sight in the kitchen. A little later, the Christian population appeared in its Sunday's best and a procession with crosses, ikons and flags wound its way down the slope, past our house. The priest was at the head of it, followed by the gentry, their mustaches waxed to a fine point, and by their women wearing long, laced gloves and carrying dainty parasols. Then came the students, rifles dangling from their shoulders, and then the mob roaring the national anthem. All wore red and white little bows in their lapels, the Polish national colors.

That afternoon, when the procession disbanded, the mob fanned out across the city. A Polish student with a pistol in his hand ran into our store at the head of a half score panting, perspiring men and women shouting excitedly. Grandmother dropped at his feet, grabbed his hands and pleaded: "Remember when I fondled you in my lap when you were *that* small, and have you come now to kill us?" He flung her aside, and as she scrambled to her feet grandmother waved us all back into the kitchen. The student, his cheeks aglow, his hair disheveled, ordered the mobsters surging behind him: "Take all you want, but don't molest these Jews, so that they won't have cause to say that we Poles are savages." We looked on in fright, as they cleared the shelves, lugged out the sacks

of flour, beans and peas, ripping open and trampling whatever they could not carry away. Occasionally a ruffian would rest from his work of devastation and cast a glance in mother's direction, but this did not escape the student who, standing amidst the mob, acted as supervisor of the destruction. "Don't bother them, they're friends of the priest."

This was the beginning of a new relationship with goyim and of new fears. The ominous twilight sieges had ended but were replaced with something worse. Mother sighed almost with longing for the old days. "So you would stay locked in for several days, then a new army took possession of the city, and you could file complaints with the commandant. But now the danger is everywhere, and at all times, without respite," she would say.

The danger of the twilight sieges was anonymous and shapeless, a mass of noises pouring like a deluge past our bolted doors and windows. But the new danger was identifiable and bore the faces of many of our neighbors. Mother made her purchases at dawn or during the several hours of daylight when the students were at school; Jews kept off the streets in the evening for fear of the prowling students; synagogues were empty for "mincha-maariv" and private "minyanim" of frightened men mushroomed all over the city. The student across the street, who led the pillagers into our store on that first day, chose me as his special target. I tried hard to elude him.

One day as I came face to face with him, and before I could run off, he grabbed me by the lapels, shook me hard, and commanded: "Jew, lace my shoes!" He slapped me twice across the face as I hesitated, an undersized kid of six looking up at an oversized "sheigetz" of eighteen. Just as I was about to kneel down, his face went pale, his hands and feet twitched as if caught in a trap, his head bobbed like cork on a tide. He seemed to be working hard to amuse me in some frightful manner, and I stood there paralyzed with fright. His body shook suddenly with a violent explosion, and he dropped to the pavement, foam curling at the corners of his lips like smoke at the mouth of a gun. He had no peace even there, his limbs convulsing and twitching like the priest's hounds before they would subside at the snap of his fingers. He was like Korach about to be devoured by the earth. I yelled with fright and began to back out into a corner; there were no flour sacks in the street among which to hide, but I dropped into the arms of the postmaster's childless

wife. Tenderly she bent my head down as I began to retch. There were many women pothering around me, all of them "goyim," but to this day the word "goyim"—not Christians, nor gentiles, but "goyim"—brings up in my memory none of them, but only the vivid image of the twitching form on the pavement and the sudden tightness in my throat, and there is a bond between us as eternal as that between the Almighty and His People.

Books - - - -

"NEVERTHELESS, IT MOVES"

Soviet Views on the Post-War World Economy, an official critique of Eugene Varga's "Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting from the Second World War," translated by Leo Gruliow. Issued in co-operation with the Russian Translation Program of the American Council of Learned Societies. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1948.

The conflict of the democratic powers with Soviet Russia and her satellites is a many-sided one. In the long run, however, the decisive conflict is the control over men's minds which the ideologies of the contending systems are seeking to exercise. Hence, what the Russian intellectuals think about the operation of the economies of western Europe and America is important in our assessment of the success of Russian propaganda.

The book is a translation of the stenographic transcript of a conference held in Moscow on May 7, 14, and 21, 1947. It presents the reaction of a considerable number of Russian economists to Eugene Varga's book, *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting from the Second World War.* The translator, Leo Gruliow, is a former long-time resident of the Soviet Union and his balanced judgment and essential fairness were clearly demonstrated in an article on Russia he published in the *Antioch Review* two years ago.[1]

The impact of Varga's book on Russian economists, if not intellectuals in general, can appropriately be compared to the impact which Kinsey's *Sexual Behavior of the Human Male* made on American intellectuals. The analogy is not strained and far-fetched. Kinsey's report raised the question of whether the traditional mores of the American culture were actually undermined in practice. Varga's book posed the question: can Marxist ideology adequately furnish the theoretical structure within which the events of the war and post-war years can appropriately be assessed? Making socialism successful in a single country may be a tactic which a Russian Marxist will accept as a temporary expedient; in the long run he must view capitalism, including the "bourgeois reformism" of England, as doomed to break down, and salvation as something which can only be achieved through violence and the immediate socialization of the means of production.

The remarkable thing about this Russian conference is that it was held at all. Its conduct seems to have been on a pretty high level of intellectual give-and-take. The author was permitted to make remarks both before

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[1]Leo Gruliow, "It's Strange to be Home," *The Antioch Review,* Summer 1947.

and after his book had been criticized by his fellow economists. Particularly striking is the amount of information about current economic conditions and the writings of American economists with which the Soviet economists indicated familiarity. Where inaccuracies or distortions were evident they seemed to be due to the fact that data were interpreted in the context of Marxist ideology. Clearly, the Russians are reading American books on economics and examining current statistics on the operation of the "bourgeois" economy. A knowledge of English would appear to be part of the equipment of every doctor of economic science in the Soviet Union.

Varga's book was criticized and attacked on a number of points, but there were three issues which seemed to predominate:

1. The failure of the book to indicate the imminence of the breakdown of capitalism.
2. The author's assertion that non-communist countries actually had been engaging in planning.
3. The change in the nature of imperialism.

If Varga had not exactly claimed that the non-communist countries could stabilize themselves through reformist measures, he had not to the satisfaction of his fellow economists given a clear picture of the hoped-for breakdown of the enemy of communism. Economist Arzhanov gave this judgment:

> We are interested in the degree to which the foundations of capitalism have been shaken, what cracks have formed in its economic foundation, how near is the hour, the longed-for hour of its crash, its downfall, etc. We want to receive from the book a sharper, clearer and for us more optimistic answer to these questions.

One of the most strongly entrenched dogmas of the Russian Marxist is that non-communist countries are unable to plan. Thus, in suggesting that capitalistic countries had engaged in planning during the war, Varga had committed the unspeakable sin. V. V. Reikhardt probably expressed the consensus of his fellow economists when, in criticising Varga's treatment of non-communist planning, he maintained:

> It seems to me that planning is possible only where substantial changes have taken place in the foundations of the social structure, in the foundations of the economy. We can speak and we do speak of certain elements of planning, of the transition to planning, or of the first steps in planning, only for those conditions where the leadership of the national economy has been transferred to the people in one degree or another.

This Russian economist was unwilling to admit that such a transfer had taken place in Britain. ". . . doubts and idle talk begin when the subject of contemporary Great Britain is introduced. Whatever names the 'honorable' Laborites may have given to their organization, these organs of 'planning' do not at all represent organs of real planning of the national economy."

Varga claimed that the nature of imperialism had been changed as a result of the war. India now had an ambassador in Moscow, and because of heavy war purchases, England

found herself indebted to India. These two facts were presented by Varga as evidence that imperialism had changed. His comrades, however, would not grant any change in the basic pattern of imperialism. The example of the alleged new relationship between England and India was dismissed with the observation that "during the war the forms of exploitation of the colonies changed somewhat . . . nevertheless they do not change the general situation."

This colloquy took place over two years ago. According to news dispatches, in spite of demotions and disgrace for a period of almost two years, economist Varga stuck by his belief in the validity of stubborn facts. But finally on April 27, 1949, the break came. In a United Press dispatch to the *New York Times* for April 28, 1949, Varga was reported as having recanted. He admitted that he had not "acted cleverly" in failing to see the correctness of the party's criticism of his work. He admitted the sin of preaching "bourgeois ideology" and was particularly apologetic in being so slow in seeing and admitting his errors. He excused himself by saying, "But better late than never."

This recantation of Varga is reminiscent of Galileo's tragic abjuration over three hundred years ago. Galileo's recantation indicated that the church was powerful enough to force a man to renounce truth and espouse what he knew to be error. But the Catholic Church could not make the earth the center of the universe and astronomy probably took a leap forward because of the stir created by this assertion of ecclesiastical authority. While Galileo's case was a nominal victory for the church, it really signalled the breakup of the union of science and theology.

Given the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy that capitalism is doomed to extinction, including the socialist venture of England which is only "bourgeois reformism," the Russian intellectual would be completely out of character if he advocated any long-run agreement with non-communist countries. For, from the standpoint of his faith, such agreements can be no more dependable than the Soviet-Nazi Pact of 1939. However much we condemn the Soviet intellectual for his unswerving adherence to the Marxist line, we must admit that for the past several decades there has been considerable evidence to justify his belief in the instability of capitalism. The recent history of Japan and Germany can be pointed to as prime examples.

Only time will disclose whether or not the "bourgeois reformism" of the "imperialist" powers has promoted a social organization which will make invalid the prediction of the Marxist that only a revolutionary overturn can resolve the social conflict begun when the forces of machine production were released on the world. Will the socialism of Britain, the middle way of Sweden, the application of Keynesian economics in the Employment Act of 1946 in the United States, and similar measures in other countries, make possible the full utilization of our social means of production? Evidence now available will sustain both a negative and a positive answer to this ques-

tion. Extreme conservatives in the United States talk and would like to act according to the manner in which the Soviets claim the whole ruling class believes. But the extreme conservatives who, in their respect for an outmoded "relations of production" could most appropriately fit into the Marxist's classification of a ruling class, themselves feel encircled by communism, socialism, reformism, new dealism, and fair dealism. Paradoxically, there is an ideological bond between the "encircled capitalists" with their nostalgia for a 1949 version of *laissez faire* in "One Easy Lesson" and the "communists of encircled Russia" who choose to believe that the economy actually behaves as the reactionaries of the non-communist countries wish to have it operate.

How long can the world hold together in the unstable equilibrium of present day power conflicts and ideological differences? How long will it take the Russian intellectual to see that violent revolution is not the only way in which the contradictions in our social system can be resolved? The answer to the latter question is essentially a matter of faith in the ability of men to have their ideas changed by facts. In any case the duty of the non-Marxist liberal is clear enough. He must do his part to make sure that the facts of the future will prove to be a solution of political, economic, and social tensions without the resort to class conflict and violence.

VALDEMAR CARLSON

THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT

Humanism as a Philosophy. By Corliss Lamont. Philosophical Library, 1949. $3.75.

From the beginning, this magazine has devoted an appreciable share of its space to humanistic philosophy and humanistic tradition. Of course, it has been recognized that "humanism" has meant, and still means, many different things. A bare catalogue and description of ideas now or at one time called humanistic would fill a good-sized book, and one bulging with contradictions. The editors of the *Review* have apparently meant by humanism a complex of attitudes and tendencies describable in some such terms as these: In trying to solve his problems, man must rely on himself and not on magic or the supernatural. Relying on himself signifies relying on the general techniques of scientific method. It also signifies reliance on the social potentialities in man and on a democratic ethic. And there would be other more philosophical implications of humanism, to be found chiefly in the secular movements of naturalism, realism, and so on.

The present book by Corliss Lamont is allegedly dedicated to developing and justifying the above complex of ideas. And were about ten or a dozen pages of the book omitted, there could be no question but that it would have to be regarded as a significant

essay in the humanistic spirit. Before turning to those interesting ten or a dozen pages, the general plan of the work can be noted.

It is clearly of the class "textbook." (This is not meant to be an invidious classification.) A beginning course in philosophy, seen in humanistic perspectives, could easily be developed around the book. There are chapters —although not so named—on definition, history of philosophy, logic and metaphysics, ethics and esthetics, social problems, all of which are held together by the underlying theme of humanism. As is the case with so many textbooks, some sacrifices have to be made. For instance, the style is occasionally elementary to the point of being banal, and there is possibly a record number of philosophic clichés and "familiar quotations" sprinkled through the pages. Yet it must also be observed that there are a number of moving and eloquent passages, poetic in flavor and inspiring in effect.

Humanism as a Philosophy is avowedly a *mélange*. "Today all philosophy of the first rank must to some extent be eclectic and acknowledge its heavy debt to thinkers who have come before. To maintain otherwise is to strike an intellectual pose. Humanism is not interested in novelty as such." (p. 61.) In his chapter on "The Humanist Tradition," the author claims for his own practically every figure in the history of ideas. The traditional and familiar materialists, naturalists, positivists, atheists, and free-thinkers are all here and quoted, but even dualists, idealists, not to mention Christians and other supernaturalists are also shown to be contributory to humanism. The result of this kind of triumphant eclecticism is necessarily to thin out the philosophy of humanism to the point where in certain places it seems almost to disappear.

Perhaps it is because of his concern to dub as humanists even the most improbable figures that Dr. Lamont goes out of his way to include as humanists—or at least as humanistic fellow-travelers—the philosophers of the Soviet Union. Although here it seems as if he is acting in another capacity beside that of the objective philosopher, in his capacity, namely, of being one of America's leading apologists for the USSR. The aberrant dozen pages in the book appear to be almost a dutiful testimony to that other Corliss Lamont.

Now, that Karl Marx was himself a philosopher in the general spirit of humanism can be denied by no one unprejudiced. But what of the assertion that Leninism-Stalinism and the ideological pronouncements of a Politburo are "scientific," "democratic," and conceived in the interests of "the sacredness and dignity of the human individual"? Dr. Lamont appears to reject basic features of Marxism, such as determinism and the dialectic. (See pp. 209-210.) And he even admits that "the Marxists do not seem able to understand Deweyan theory."(p. 270.) So, his book can hardly be approved by *The Daily Worker*. Further, he dimly implies that there may be a number of things wrong with Russia —although he is coy and teases us to discover them for ourselves. He also teases his old teacher, Dewey, when

he says that "the pragmatic view of truth as developed in American philosophy and especially by John Dewey comes close to authoritative Marxist thought, though the Marxists hotly deny this. On the other hand, Dewey's own misconceptions are not to be overlooked. There is no doubt in my mind that he seriously misunderstands the practice of Marxism, particularly as evidenced in the Soviet Union." (p. 270.) Finally, in his concluding chapter, Dr. Lamont is constrained to come right out and welcome the Communist Party: "I believe that the Marxists, whether inside or outside of the Communist Party, are sincere in their intention of ultimately bringing about an enduring democracy embodying the principle of 'all for each and each for all.'. . . Their allegiance to this ultimate end properly places them within the ranks of democratic Humanists." (pp. 331-332.)

Perhaps we should end there, although that would hardly be fair to the book. There is much more to it than bald apology. But there is also this strange and bizarre note, almost as in a Truman Capote story—a kind of weirdness, almost calculated to repel the very people who should respond to the more general argument. Certainly Corliss Lamont would not accept what he must regard as a patronizing suggestion of a second edition without his "official-capacity-passages." Yet without them, the book is a welcome contribution to philosophic humanism: with them, it cannot help but make enemies and not influence people. G.R.G.

SUCCESS STORY — TODAY'S VERSION

Union Guy. By Clayton W. Fountain. Viking. $2.75.

It is a pleasure to note that this book recently received very favorable notices in the popular reviewing journals. No doubt to people in the labor movement those notices were a little astonishing as well as gratifying. One can imagine the kind of reception which would have greeted such a book five or six years ago, if indeed it could have found a well-established publisher at that time. Thus does the world move.

Mr. Fountain's story, told in autobiographical form, carries him from the shores of the upper Michigan peninsula where he grew up, to the auto shops and the union halls of Detroit where he matured. The greater part of the book is given over to the best account yet available of the goings-on in the world's largest, most turbulent (or if you will, most democratic) union, the UAW—CIO. It is this account, incomplete as it is and sometimes partisan, which will presumably render the author his just fame.

The autobiographical aspect, however, is worth its own special attention. The fact is that this is a modern version of an old American tale, the success story. Fifty years ago Horatio Alger told it on another level and he

told it over and over again in accents so crude and simple-minded that it has become a half-forgotten joke. Clayton Fountain is a worker who eventually becomes a union "pork chopper." But it is clear that his moderate climb up the success ladder was an exciting adventure and the apotheosis of economic opportunity. As author he is so genuine, so lacking in flamboyance and exaggeration that not many will recognize how ironically he has brought Alger down to date.

It is a pity that the fact will not be more celebrated. For as many of us believe there has been altogether too much prating about free enterprise. Here is the real thing in modern terms. I suggest the book as required reading for the gentlemen of the N.A.M. without any real hope that they will understand it. P.B.

I ACCUSE

The Whole of Their Lives. By Benjamin Gitlow. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. $3.50.

Gitlow v. People of New York (1925) is, no doubt, a case which gets itself reviewed in Government courses from time to time. It gave Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes a chance to express a notable dissent which stated, in effect, that the defendant ought to have the right to say anything he pleased so long as he did not immediately threaten the public peace. Some of Holmes's phrases may have present pertinency:

"It is said that this Manifesto [for which Gitlow shared responsibility] was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and, if believed, it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it, or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. . . . Eloquence may set fire to reason. . . . If, in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."

Holmes's was an Olympian wisdom which would seem to place him miles above the grim revolutionist upon whose case he acted. It would, however, be unwise to underrate Gitlow or the forces about which he writes. If Holmes had his roots deep in Anglo-Saxon law and American history, Gitlow had roots which pierced deep into American unrest. One of the founders of the Communist party, U.S.A., a popular rank-and-file leader and, by grace of the Palmer Raids, a martyr, he became one of the leaders of his party who, in 1929, was abruptly shorn of his power, over the heads of his party followers, by decision of the Communist International. As one of the heads of the expelled group of "Lovestoneites," he persisted in trying to "reform" the International from the "right" until he made his personal decision to repudiate communism. This was years before his group convened to make its astonishing decision

to dissolve itself on the grounds of intellectual bankruptcy.

One remembers a public meeting which the cold-eyed, magnetic Gitlow held breathless with his vibrant account of disillusionment with communism. It appears to have been the fall of Germany before Hitler, and the destruction of the Austrian Socialists by the Dollfuss Government which finished Gitlow. The German Communists, with their elaborate apparatus and inexhaustible treasury, with their five million members, had gone down "without firing a shot." Yet the Austrian Socialists, "the so-called yellows," in Gitlow's bitter and scornful phrase, had died in the Karl Marx Hof and the Vienna underground fighting "with guns in their hands."

In his earlier volume, *I Confess* (1940), Gitlow drew up one of the now numerous documents which the student of communist affairs must cope with. His present volume joins him to what might be called an anti-communist center, which now takes in a considerable number of well-known persons and talents: Max Eastman, Eugene Lyons, Isaac Don Levine, and John Dos Passos, among many others. Their great weakness is that their program highlights anti-communism, rather than pro-democracy. Or, to put it another way, though they are rich in details respecting the horrors of communism in practice—its murky underground, its conspiratorial dangers—they are less rich in viewing it from a democratic perspective, and are as like as not to accept democratic platitudes with the helpless amenability of amateurs. They can't seem to understand that democracy is also complex, that common ground, "the ground we stand on," is not easily determined.

This does not dispose of their charges against the communists, and Gitlow's are calculated to raise the uninitiated reader's hair. To appreciate their possible significance one must fully grasp his major contentions: that communism represents a world-wide conspiracy to carry out the aims of its Soviet masters; that the original American communists who (despite party politics and personality weaknesses) were basically sincere, have been superseded by ruthless and unprincipled puppets; and that, most important, their strength cannot be measured by their insignificant membership figures, but must be realized in terms of the unions they control and the middle-class circles they influence.

Some of Gitlow's charges are rather well-known, though how widely is another question, and he adds details in almost every case: that "Big Bill" Haywood and John Reed, whose bodies lie in the shadow of the Kremlin, were disillusioned and broken men; that the infamous Trade Union Unity League was a labor-splitting agency; that the "united front" tactic was cynically misused; and that communist foreign policy slavishly followed Soviet policy. Sometimes there is more ground for controversy than Gitlow would have us think. For example, he presents the Hunger March of 1930, the Bonus March of 1932, and the organization of the Unemployed Councils as dark communist con-

spiracies against democracy. But obviously others besides communists were interested in such affairs. As a matter of fact, the communists often boasted, sometimes without justification, of their part in such work, claiming to be "the foremost and bravest fighters in the mighty vanguard of the victorious proletariat," and so forth. It is not only the communists who preached violence and conspiracy. Anyone whose memory goes back to the 1930's will remember every variety of parlor pink, fellow-traveler, sympathizer, and communist, affiliated and unaffiliated, who argued "tactics and strategy" without honor and without humor, and who openly advocated violence in such terms as: "All right, and so what? You're not afraid of a little blood, are you?" (Other people's blood.) They, and also certain species of anti-communist, needed no prompting from Moscow to come to such conclusions.

Still, one is likely to be chilled by accounts of the extremes into which inner circle party politics could draw some people. Take the disappearance of Juliet Stuart Poyntz in 1937. According to Gitlow, this seasoned ex-communist was condemned by the Party because she had left the OGPU and was suspected of getting ready to reveal secrets about communist operations in America. Gitlow asserts that she was driven to Dutchess County, murdered, and buried in a deep gully near the Roosevelt estate. Are we to assume that dead or alive she is none of our business, and treat the entire matter as one might a gang war?

The difference is that gangsters are assumed to be outside the law, whereas the communists bid for our suffrage. How much can Gitlow help us to understand their role? The situation has changed since he was jailed merely for talking too much. Gitlow is weak on *evidence,* and, to some extent, perhaps unnecessarily so. He retails long passages of conversation, when it would have been better to cite documents or explain why he doesn't. Documents are drier reading than narrative, and Gitlow has no doubt been eager to reach a wide public. But this public is likely to wonder how much of what he says is fact, and how much rumor. It will credit his personal reminiscences more than it will his unsubstantial tales of treachery, chicanery, robbery, bribery, and murder from Moscow to Mexico City —not because it desires to defend communists, but because it is determined to defend the Bill of Rights. Conspirators will doubtless continue to try to take advantage of us and of it. It must be hoped that we can learn ways and means of making our homes and institutions uncomfortable for them. The merely anti-communists must study the ways of democracy, if they wish to help further it.

L.F.

BOOK NOTES

Passionate Journey. By Frans Masereel. Lear, 1948. $3.00.

Nausea. By Jean-Paul Sartre. New Directions, 1949. $2.50.

What Is Literature? By Jean-Paul Sartre. Philosophical Library. $4.75.

The Diaries of Franz Kafka. Edited by Max Brod. Vol. 1, 1910-1913; Vol. II, 1914-1923. Schocken Books, 1948, 1949. $3.75 each.

There are a number of authors—I distinguish them from personalities—whom one must know to be in the literary swim. Modern poetry is very high, at the moment, and no modern poet rates higher than T. E. Eliot. The fiction of Henry James continues to be issued in every shape and size. James Joyce, W. H. Auden, William Faulkner, William Carlos Williams, Jean-Paul Sartre, and a further variety of domestic and foreign authors appeal, in one or another degree, to segments of the literary-minded. Behind them all grow hills of comment and criticism—it almost seems, at times, as though the purpose of the fiction and verse is to furnish an occasion for criticism, rather than the other way around.

To avoid any more misunderstanding than is inevitable, it should be said that the above-mentioned authors warrant attention, and this Section intends to give them the relative consideration due them—relative, that is, to other problems and personalities vital to the whole man as person and as citizen. What seems to unite such figures as Eliot and James Joyce and the apostles of the New Criticism, and constitute a claim on our attention, is their concern for the individual. It therefore becomes fair to ask how adequately they come to grips with their problem, and what they have to tell us about it.

The "crisis of the individual" is a real crisis, but it is not really a new one. There needs to be some clarification about what the individual is, and what his rights are, or can be, under complex social conditions. I confess to a bias toward democratic symposia on the subject, democratically conceived. Donald Stauffer, in an essay, "Modern Myth of the Modern Myth," delivered before the English Institute at Columbia University in 1947, complained that the newspapers accorded the Institute too little attention. One doesn't suppose he seriously expected that such typical Institute essays as "The First Quarto of *Titus Andronicus*" or "Attitudes to Fiction in the Eighteenth Century" were calculated to stir popular interest and controversy. The question is whether his own essay, or William Carlos Williams's "An Approach to the Poem" were any more so.

* *

Must the artist be a person apart? I suggest that this question can be profitably considered in connection with Frans Masereel's *Passionate Journey,* a "novel in 165 woodcuts." It is an odyssey of the 1920's, but so rich in human values as to be even more evocative today, perhaps, than

it was when first issued by the Flemish master.

Properly to appreciate this "story," one ought to compare it with other works of a similar character. Lynd Ward, for example, published two "novels in woodcuts": *God's Man* (1929), and *Madman's Drum* (1930) which consisted of incredibly fine and intricate woodcut panels. But his symbols were fairly obvious, his stories thin. What first strikes one in Masereel is the feeling of life and vigor in his designs. His streets are vibrant with people, his factories, woods, seascapes, night-scenes what one has himself significantly experienced. His hatless Ulysses who loves, works, and travels in search of reality is anybody who is determined to live before he dies, and is therefore bound to suffer as well as exult. Masereel's scenes of "social significance" derive from and flow back into his personal experiences. His people are symbols of what the world offers, who have everything to contribute from malice to affection, yet they are also people whom one has known or is likely to know. Masereel, in short, fronts life as an artist and as a human being, and does it without the sentimentality which always threatens such efforts. One can turn back to these woodcuts and find that they do not cloy and do not fade.

* * *

Sartre's not-so invitingly titled novel, *Nausea,* is something else again. In what was his first novel, as always, he tells a story well. Its obvious use is that it offers an easy approach to the Existentialist philosophy with which his name is associated. His hero Roquentin, quite evidently himself, awakes to the realization that existence is intolerable. He must devise a point of view which will permit him to go on in the face of this conclusion. He sees himself a man alone, surrounded by dullness and futility. There are sharp satirical portraits of French Babbitts and humanists, as well as persons caught in common, unthinking moments; and a number of pathetic pages about a self-educated library habitué who loves mankind and, for his pains, is grossly accused of being a homosexual. The novel is lively, inconclusive, and less helpful in throwing light upon the problem of the individual than upon the tone of French thought in 1938, when *Nausea* was first published. It might have been more helpful if Sartre had included among his characters more formidable characters representing, to the extent that they must "represent" anything, the possibilities imbedded in (if you will forgive me) faith, hope, and charity.

The first thing to be said about Sartre's *What Is Literature?* is that it does not very well answer the question. To be sure, Sartre tells us that "the essence of the literary work is freedom of other men," but that "the different forms of oppression, by hiding from men the fact that they are free [this is an Existentialist idea], have screened all or part of this essence from authors." If you understood him, splendid: you have a feast before you.

It should be noted that the above is not necessarily profound: it is literary jargon that Sartre is batting about such as we are not over-accustomed

to in this country except in our most esoteric or merely academic native publications. It can be read by the yard in Europe, and in elements of the general press there. For Europe has a cultural tradition which attracts intellectuals not only in the specialized publications, but even in the newspapers. France in particular has had an intellectual "class," and Sartre's long chapter on "The Situation of the Writer in 1947" would indicate that the tradition is still alive. The present reviewer, for one, is not too sorry that the United States lacks such a tradition and such a class. Our general cultural organs are eagerly shallow with respect to literature, and our book reviewers live frankly from hand to mouth. However, their impressions and opinions, such as they are, go in one eye and out the other; and our intellectuals are so far removed from the general public as to leave no real mark upon it for better or worse. The field is clear, therefore, and one can continue to hope for a democratic criticism and understanding.

Sartre is allusive and gossipy. One catches echoes of a score of Parisian literary quarrels and picks up odd bits of information on the way. Sartre's more "philosophic" sections are a mixture of idealism and shrewd awareness of trends. For instance, he informs us that "one does not write for slaves," but then goes on to record the forces which channelled French literary talents into such currents as surrealism and communism. Sartre himself seems to have had more than one finger in Marxism, and he writes glibly about the working class. But it is more likely a college class in philosophy which could follow his equally glib Hegelian intellectual gambits. It is good to report that Sartre is a free man. It would have been pleasant to report the absence of metaphysical verbiage, the presence of more discussion of people, specific people.

* * *

Finally, Kafka, who is even more of a favorite among those in America interested in modern literature, and whose life was an endless effort to understand the meaning of man and his relations to men. There is no need to review his work here: from the numerous comments and reviews, one has either acquired an inkling of its content, or one hasn't. Charles Neider's *The Frozen Sea* (Oxford, 1948) contains a concise summary of the esoteric attitudes through which Kafka has been read, and, I am afraid, goes on to contribute an esoteric interpretation of its own. These need not concern us. We can, however, be a little concerned over unspoiled readers who find Kafka odd and irrelevant. How do those who claim that they can't "understand" him, or "can't read him," handle their own imponderables? Have they never dreamed that they ran down endless corridors pursued by a nameless fear, perhaps with dragging feet? That they have been falsely accused of a crime they could not deny, endured what the Constitution calls "unusual punishments," or otherwise been deprived of human and legal justice? In Kafka, such situations become not the unusual, but the normal. But to look down one's nose at them, thanking God that one is an

American, is, to say the least, smug. Who made *The Lost Week End* a best-seller and a movie triumph? Why is psychoanalysis so promising a profession?

Kafka's diaries are worth notice here if only because we lack native records of a similar kind from which we could more intimately benefit. This has not always been the case. A hundred years ago, without the aid of Marx or Freud, our intellectuals never tired of trying to understand themselves and develop integrated personalities; and we have, for study, shelves and archives of journals by Emerson, Thoreau, Bronson, Alcott, Melville, and many others. In fact, there was no clear dividing line between the personal documents and "artistic works" of these artists. Thoreau, for instance, never wrote a book as such: his books were composed of excerpts from his journals. Today? There are imitations of Thoreau, which, however, never drive to the bottom of meaning and intention. Instead, they merely tell us how delightful the seasons are, when the first crocuses appeared, and the like.

Kafka is closer to Thoreau. If he does not get as close to nature, he comes closer to his own human nature. Like Thoreau, he includes everything he can: in his own case, drafts of letters, observations, scraps of tentative prose—above all, facets of his point of view. Being a modern and a European, he cannot as legitimately as Thoreau "transcend" sex. Nature is less promising than it seemed in Thoreau's time, and Kafka cannot find himself in it. He can transcend politics, for the most part, but not environment, and this is not only alien, but aggressive. He can lose himself in dreams, but, unfortunately, they are bad dreams. What he has to say, despite flashes of wit and exaggeration, and the sense of proportion which is the essence of true humor, is tortured, unhappy, and neurotic. And if his work seems inadequate for that reason, one must ask what was more adequate during his life-span, including as it did World War I as a climax and incubus.

One would like to cite something from his comments, readings, and reports which might even partially illustrate his faithful talent. It is a token of its substance that Kafka cannot be casually read. "The horror in the merely schematic," he notes—a phrase that deserves re-reading. Or take his sensitive reports on people, books, and his own complex behavior and states of mind: sometimes shocking, sometimes unfamiliar, and always requiring mental activity of one kind or another on the part of the reader, challenging, as it were, his own individuality. For example:

> The fear of folly. To see folly in every emotion that strives straight ahead and makes one forget everything else. What, then, is non-folly? Non-folly is to stand like a beggar before the threshold, to one side of the entrance, to rot and collapse. . . . There must be follies greater than those who perpetrate them.

Or a fragment of his war-time observations:

> Red Cross nurse. Very certain and determined. Traveled as if she were a whole family sufficient to itself. She

> smoked cigarettes and walked up and down the corridor [of the train] like a father; like a boy she jumped up on a seat to get something out of her knapsack; like a mother she carefully sliced the meat, the bread, the orange; like a flirtatious girl—what she really was—she showed off her pretty little feet. . . .

I see no reason for making more of Kafka than there is. One can draw just so much nourishment from frustration and maladjustment. It is not enough to describe the difficulties of modern life; the artist, like anyone else, can, if he will, try to master life on satisfactory terms, recreate artistically conditions which offer authentic peace and balance to the individual. Kafka exposed areas of feeling and experience which are worth facing, but not, it would seem, worth losing oneself to. The cultists will make what they can of him. Others may prefer to appreciate his artistry, his fine dedication to the truth as he saw it—and leave room for other truth, equally valid and more promising.

L.F.